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Abstract 
The importance of better understanding error and safety in the community setting is 
widely accepted, with recent calls to promote efforts and improve resources in this 
area of research (Jacobson, Elwyn et al. 2003).  The measurement of patient safety 
events in primary care is a relatively under-researched area and it is well recognized 
that there are large gaps in the research describing patient safety in ambulatory 
settings (Hammons, Piland et al. 2003).  Attitudes towards embracing safety event 
measurement have improved in recent years, however there remains a substantial 
amount of work to be done before common standards can be recommended, despite 
recent calls in the scientific literature for national and international systems 
(Runciman, Williamson et al. 2006).   
  
This thesis describes the Threats to Australian Patient Safety (TAPS) study, which 
aimed to create a secure anonymous web-based error reporting system suited to the 
Australian general practice setting, and then describe and quantify the errors reported 
by a representative random sample of Australian general practitioners.  
 
The study was made possible with the support of funding from a National Health and 
Medical Research Council project grant, and also gained support from NSW Health 
and the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aging in the form of granting 
qualified privilege and providing essential Medicare data under legal instrument.   
 
The study methodology involved the development of a database management system 
which created an electronic method for managing and analysing a wide variety of 
   
 
vii
features related to large numbers of anonymously reported errors from Australian 
general practice.  A representative random sample of 84 general practitioners (GPs) 
from New South Wales (NSW) participated in the study, with over 400 errors 
reported in a 12 month period.   
 
The key messages arising from the TAPS study were: 
• GPs embraced anonymous patient safety event reporting using a secure 
website, with the majority of study participants making reports 
• New findings from this study on the incidence of reported error in general 
practice were published in the scientific literature, which will help guide the 
design of future error reporting systems 
• A new taxonomy to describe reported error from GPs was developed as part of 
this study and published in the scientific literature, with the view of allowing 
future self-coding of reported patient safety events by GPs 
 
The TAPS study presented the first calculations known worldwide of the incidence of 
reported error in a general practice setting using a representative random sample of 
general practitioners.  It was found that if an anonymous, secure, web-based reporting 
system was provided, approximately 2 errors were reported by general practitioners 
per 1000 patients seen per year (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).   
 
In addition, the study created a simple descriptive general practice based error 
taxonomy, entitled the TAPS taxonomy (see Appendix 10) (Makeham, Stromer et al. 
2007), and was the first study to test the reproducibility of the application of such a 
   
 
viii
tool using a group of general practitioners.  The TAPS taxonomy developed as part of 
this study was found to have a good level of inter-coder agreement. 
 
With respect to the underlying causes of errors, the TAPS study found that the 
majority of reported patient safety events were errors related to the processes of health 
care (70%), rather than errors related to the knowledge and skills of health 
professionals (30%). 
 
Most errors reported in the TAPS study had the direct involvement of a patient (93% 
of error reports).  Overall the reporting general practitioners were very familiar with 
these patients, who were on average 52 years old, and more often female (56%). 
Around one quarter of the errors reported was associated with patients being harmed.  
Reports containing events related to processes of health care were associated less with 
harm than those containing events related to the knowledge and skills of health 
professionals.   
 
The patients in errors associated with patient harm reported in the TAPS study were 
on average older than patients in reports where no harm was known to have occurred 
(58 years versus 50 years respectively).  There was no statistically significant 
difference found between these groups with respect to gender or ethnicity, including 
people from Non-English speaking backgrounds or Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander (ATSI) peoples, although the association with the latter group approached 
statistical significance. 
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Cases of patient death were reported in 8 of 415 errors reported in the TAPS study 
(2%), and more often involved events relating to the knowledge and skills of health 
professionals than events relating to the processes of health care compared to reports 
not involving a known patient death. 
 
In support of suggestions in the scientific literature about the importance of 
anonymity as a feature of an error reporting system, a feedback interview found that 
an anonymous reporting system was a factor which made participants more likely to 
report error events, with two thirds of participants agreeing that anonymity made them 
more likely to participate in reporting.   The majority of participants found the 
reporting process easy to undertake, and took approximately 6 minutes to send a 
report.   
 
The study provided a self directed learning educational activity for participating 
general practitioners that was approved for 30 group 1 Quality Assurance and 
Continuing Education points by the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners 
(RACGP). 
 
An important practical outcome of the TAPS study was that it highlighted a 
systematic error relating to immunisation failures with meningococcal vaccines which 
was reported to relevant organisations including NSW Health, the RACGP and the 
manufacturer involved, which was addressed with educational materials for GPs being 
distributed and communication in Australian Family Physician. 
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There are further analyses that could be undertaken using the TAPS data to improve 
our understanding of the errors reported, such as further statistical analyses using 
techniques such as building a model with multiple regression to determine significant 
factors that contribute to different error types.  This work was beyond the scope of the 
TAPS study aims, but is part of further research recommendations. 
 
In addition, future studies should address aspects of patient safety and reported error 
that it would not be possible to capture from the perspective of the reporting GP.  
Rather than one taxonomy which describes the reported errors from the GP’s 
perspective in the way that the TAPS taxonomy does, it may be useful to develop a 
series of interlinked taxonomies that are directed to the needs of differing 
constituencies, such as the organisation providing health funds or the health insurer, 
the health regulators and legislators, and the patients or their significant others.   
 
The assessment of potential and actual harms sustained by patients involved in 
reported errors is a further area of patient safety research that is difficult to 
comprehensively assess, and existing reporting systems in the literature, whilst 
addressing this from the reporter’s perspective, require further work to improve the 
accuracy by which harm is measured and correlated with other data sets such as those 
managed by health insurers, and the experiences of people who are the subject of the 
reports. 
 
The TAPS study presents a number of new findings about the nature of error and 
threats to patient safety that arise in the Australian health care environment, reported 
by a representative sample of general practitioners, and it is hoped that these will be 
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useful to all stakeholders in the health care setting, from clinicians, through to policy 
makers, and most importantly the patients who are the subject of the potentially 
preventable harms and near misses that are highlighted in this thesis.    
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the Threats to Australian Patient Safety 
(TAPS) study - Why study patient safety events in the 
community setting? 
The study of patient safety in community settings is recognized as a relatively under-
researched area (Hammons, Piland et al. 2003).  A stronger emphasis on community 
based patient safety research is important because the overwhelming majority of 
healthcare is delivered outside hospitals, in community settings (Green, Fryer et al. 
2001). 
 
Community based settings may hold distinctly different threats to patient safety from 
hospital settings due to the nature of the environment in which health care is 
delivered. Health professionals may have less continuity over patient care in some 
community based settings than in a hospital admission in which the patient is 
constantly under supervision, and more than one site is often required for an episode 
of care (having implications for patient and information transfer).  Sites are not 
necessarily designed for providing healthcare (for example: patients’ homes, 
providers’ cars, on roads, or anywhere else, in fact).  
 
Additionally, it may not be the rare mistakes with the drastic consequences that place 
the most burden on health systems, but possibly the more mundane threats to patient 
safety that may be less disabling when they cause harm, but have effects that are 
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magnified in community settings by frequent repetitions and exposure of a large 
number of people (Runciman, Edmonds et al. 2002). 
 
1.2 Knowledge gaps in patient safety event research in 
community settings at the commencement of the TAPS 
study 
The TAPS study protocol was written and funding applied for in early 2002, with 
NHMRC project grant funding for a three year period commencing in February 2003.  
At this time, a number of key patient safety organisations had not yet been 
established, such as the WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety (commencing in 
October 2004), and the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care 
(commencing in January 2006).  There was little activity worldwide on monitoring 
threats to patient safety in the community, as demonstrated later in the literature 
review of this thesis.  There had been no studies in the community setting using the 
incident monitoring technique to obtain error or safety information from a randomly 
selected and representative group of primary care clinicians.  The estimation of 
reported error rates in the community setting had not been attempted with any rigour.  
There had been no taxonomy established in primary care either in Australia or 
internationally as a preferred method of classifying reported errors. 
 
The TAPS study remains as the only collection of data of reported errors in a 
community setting that has been based upon a randomly sampled representative 
cohort of general practitioners, submitting reports over a twelve month period with an 
anonymous secure online reporting system and allowing the collection of all patient 
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attendance data held by the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aging over the 
same time period.  This allows a number of questions relating to the nature of threats 
to patient safety in the community setting to be addressed. 
 
1.3 Major aims of the TAPS study 
The TAPS study had the following major aims at its onset: 
1. To design a web-based, secure and anonymous error reporting system that was 
suitable (in terms of access and ease of use) for Australian general 
practitioners. 
2. To determine the incidence of reported error amongst general practitioners if a 
secure anonymous electronic reporting system is provided. 
3. To quantify the types of errors reported by general practitioners if a secure 
anonymous electronic reporting system is provided. 
 
As work towards the third aim progressed, it became clear that existing taxonomies 
did not meet the needs of clearly classifying the group of error reports, and so a 
subsequent aim of the project developed as follows: 
4. To design a taxonomy for describing reported errors from general 
practitioners in the community setting that was comprehensive and 
reproducible amongst a group of clinicians, and that would be possible to 
adapt as a tool for clinicians to self-code reported errors. 
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1.4 Potential application of TAPS study findings 
It was envisaged that the findings of the TAPS study would be of benefit to a number 
of groups, including: 
• General practitioner participants who were embarking upon a process of 
professional development through reflection and self-directed learning. 
• Health policy makers who would become better informed about the nature 
and extent of different types of reported threats to patient safety, and how best 
to direct resources to combat such threats. 
• Patients, who it is hoped could benefit from practice changes made by their 
clinicians who participated in the TAPS study process and may have 
addressed particular errors in their practices after reflection and self-analysis, 
and any future resulting changes in policy or the health system. 
 
There are several areas that could be explored in the Australian health policy context 
to support an error reporting system accessible to primary care clinicians modelled on 
the TAPS system.  In addition to the points below, this is further discussed in this 
thesis in section 5.8 ‘Future directions – error analysis and feedback as learning tools 
for GPs and the primary care sector’. 
1.4.1 Legislative changes 
Protections for reporters could be considered in the form of legislative changes at state 
and federal levels that exempt the reports made to safety reporting systems from 
subpoena in an Australian state or federal courts.  At a state level the application of 
qualified privilege legislation could also be explored to support the reporting process.  
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These protections could be introduced without impacting on other systems by which 
medical practice is regulated.  
1.4.2 Incentives to encourage reporting 
Incentives to encourage reporting could be considered in various ways.  These could 
include funding accredited general practices which engage in error reporting and an 
associated reflection and learning cycle with some form of practice incentive 
payments.  Other cost-offsets could be offered in the way TAPS participants were 
supported with small annual payments to cover internet or computing costs.   
1.4.3 Error reporting as a continuing education activity 
Positioning error reporting activities within a form of continuing education for general 
practitioners would also encourage reporting, and participation in reporting and 
learning audit activities could be rewarded with Quality Assurance and Continuing 
Education points towards the compulsory requirements for vocational registration in 
the way that the TAPS program was accredited by the Royal Australian College of 
General Practitioners as an audit activity. 
1.4.4 Positioning an error reporting system in the practice 
An error reporting system could be more accessible and quickly used if the system 
was built into existing medical records packages which could then send online reports.  
However it would be important to consider ways in which the data could be sent in 
either an anonymous fashion or with legal protections for reporters.  There are issues 
of medicolegal risk for the reporting GP at present if there is a record kept in a patient 
file or a link between a report and a patient, and these would need to be overcome 
before such a package was acceptable. 
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1.4.5 Linking error warnings to general practitioner activity in real 
time 
Medical software packages used for prescribing and recording other treatments could 
contain links to error warnings, generated from regionally or nationally reported data.  
For example, as a general practitioner selects a particular medication or treatment 
option, a pop-up link or brief information box could inform them if particular error 
types had been reported in association with this therapy, to highlight that risk as they 
were proceeding with the prescription or treatment. 
1.4.6 Introducing error reporting guidelines in association with 
new practice accreditation standards 
Australian general practice accreditation standards have been very recently changed 
by the RACGP to include that a practice has a system for monitoring and addressing 
events that could affect patient care, and so GPs would be receptive to being able to 
access a standardised system such as a national error reporting site to help address this 
new need.  At present the standard has been introduced to the accreditation regime for 
practices with very little support or information on how a practice should best conduct 
this activity.  At this point in time, we may therefore be at the beginning of a major 
rise in general practices acknowledging and addressing the fact that errors are part of 
patient care, and combining the knowledge and lessons learnt from individual GPs or 
small groups could provide major advances in patient safety in the community setting.  
An immense simplification of the process of analysing errors in general practices on 
regional, state and national scales would result if all practices were at least given 
guidance on what sort of system to use, even in advance of a centralised reporting 
system being available.  
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1.4.7 Modelling the safety culture and error reporting 
Cultural improvements in clinician’s attitudes towards patient safety will happen more 
readily if senior role models display the desired behaviours and the methods of 
monitoring and learning from patient safety events are begun in the early stages of a 
clinician’s career.  Medical curricula at undergraduate and postgraduate training levels 
could be enhanced and standardised in this area, to highlight the concepts of patient 
safety and reinforce the importance of learning form error.  For example, a national 
reporting and learning site modelled on TAPS could provide audit style research 
activities for GP registrars and a focus for selecting topics for self-directed learning 
and study. 
1.4.8 Providing positive feedback to users 
General practitioners will value systems that improve their ability to provide good 
patient care, and this means that the focus of the introduction of any major error 
reporting system should be firstly on the benefits to the patient, rather than knowledge 
or financial incentives of any kind.  The system should have a form of positive 
feedback to the user to remind and encourage them, noting that whilst they are always 
entering reports of possible poor outcomes or patient harms, their contributions are 
adding to essential knowledge that will hopefully contribute to system wide 
improvements and lead to tangible benefits for the community.  A positive feedback 
newsletter or electronic transmission with recent findings and practice tips should be 
built in to the system.  
1.4.9 Universally accessible website  
Knowledge about errors occurring in health care settings could benefit patients as well 
as clinicians, who may be able to become better informed about the system in which 
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primary care is provided, its strengths and weaknesses.  Access to a public area of a 
national safety reporting site where de-identified data and error stories are able to be 
presented and explained to the community could help with both raising the public 
awareness of areas of care that are perhaps higher risk, or even by simply improving 
public awareness that system and human errors are part of health care, and patients, 
clinicians and organisations need to acknowledge their existence in a collaborative 
way to foster improvements and changes.  
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2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Overview of the literature review 
2.1.1 Literature review objectives and structure 
The purpose of this section of the thesis is to review current understanding of 
reporting error and its measurement in the general practice and broader community 
setting, particularly considering the methods and measures that have been used in 
researching patient safety in community based care settings.   
 
The structure of the review first addresses the methods applied to examine the 
literature, and then considers the findings in terms of the main themes that emerged, 
as detailed in section 2.1.4.  These themes are expanded upon in sections 2.2 to 2.6.  
Section 2.2 discusses the context of error reporting in community settings, 2.3 
discusses definitions and common understandings of concepts in error reporting, 
section 2.4 describes methods used to collect information on error, 2.5 discusses the 
types of errors reported in community settings and taxonomies of error, and  2.6 
discusses aspects of the quantification of error in community settings.  
 
Following this section 2.7 presents the main groups of studies contained in the review 
in table form describing their major features, section 2.8 expands upon the Australian 
literature, and the limitations of the review are discussed in section 2.9.  Section 2.10 
concludes with a summary of the main findings of the literature review. 
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2.1.2 A note on terminology used in the literature review 
Throughout the literature review, there are many references to error reporting in the 
‘community setting’.  This term is used to be inclusive of the general practice setting 
which was the focus of the TAPS study.  The international scientific literature uses a 
variety of terms that may encompass a ‘general practice’ setting as understood in 
Australia and the United Kingdom, or for a medically trained health professional who 
would be identified as a ‘general practitioner’ in Australia.  These include ‘family 
practice’ and ‘family physician’, and in some cases the ‘primary care’ setting, and a 
‘primary care clinician’, although the latter would have a different implication in 
Australia where general practice is a subset of primary care.   
 
All of these terms may appear in the review, as an attempt has been made to reflect 
the origins of the works described, however the wording of ‘community setting’ 
should be understood as being inclusive of all of these terms, as all of these findings 
may be relevant to the Australian general practice setting. 
 
Further, the terms ‘classification’ and ‘taxonomy’ are often used interchangeably in 
the scientific literature.  ‘Taxonomy’ is the accepted term for a system to define, 
harmonize and group patient safety concepts, as used by the majority of publications 
that describe the classification of errors in community settings, in addition to the 
WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety on their website at 
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/taxonomy/en/ (accessed 12th June 2007), who are 
currently leading a project to develop an internationally accepted taxonomy of patient 
safety.   ‘Taxonomy’ is therefore used throughout the review to describe a system of 
classifying errors in the community setting. 
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2.1.3 Literature review methods 
A comprehensive review of the published scientific literature was undertaken, using 
OVID Medline.  Commencing in 1966, this collection includes In-Process & Other 
Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid's collection of non-indexed NLM records, both the in-
process and PubMed-not-MEDLINE records, and OLDMEDLINE  (the National 
Library of Medicine's online database of approximately 1,700,000 citations to articles 
from international biomedical journals covering the fields of medicine, preclinical 
sciences and allied health sciences).  Details of the search strategy and results are 
shown below in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Search strategy used for OVID Medline 
# Search History Results
1 exp Family Practice/ 48951  
2 primary care.mp. or exp Primary Health Care/ 66109  
3 General Practice.mp. or exp Family Practice/ 59255  
4 1 or 2 or 3 116178 
5 
exp Medical errors/ or error.mp. or exp Diagnostic Errors/ or exp Medication 
Errors/ 
130279 
6 exp Risk Management/ or exp Medical Errors/ or incident.mp. 156757 
7 
exp Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems/ or exp Medical Errors/ or 
adverse event.mp. 
60157  
8 
exp Safety Management/ or exp Quality Assurance, Health Care/ or exp Medical 
Errors/ or exp Risk Management/ or patient safety event.mp. or exp Safety/ 
311300 
9 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 408046 
10 
exp Insurance Claim Reporting/ or reporting.mp. or exp Adverse Drug Reaction 
Reporting Systems/ or exp Mandatory Reporting/ 
46498  
11 4 and 9 and 10 346  
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A variety of Medical Subject Headings (MeSH terms) relating to patient safety, 
primary care and incident reporting were used to search Web of Science (general and 
related references), and Excerpta Medica (EMBASE), and the reference lists of 
selected articles were scanned for any additional relevant publications.  
 
In addition to database searches, the internet sites of national patient safety 
organizations in Australia, Europe and North America and the English-language 
websites of 92 international, national or provincial general practice/family medicine 
organizations, one international and one national physician insurance agency have 
also been reviewed.    
 
A complete set of articles identified in the search described above that related to 
patient safety in community settings and classified by topic, plus university 
departments, national and international organisations working in patient safety in 
community settings, is provided as Appendix 1.  
 
2.1.4 Thematic structure of the content of the review 
The findings of this literature review are presented within several major theme 
groupings, each of which is part of the overall picture of a current understanding of 
the elements that are known about the reporting of error and its measurement in the 
general practice and broader community setting.  The themes may be grouped into 
two overarching areas, being the context in which error reporting occurs, and the 
nature of reported errors.   
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Figure 2.1 gives a pictorial representation of the context in which error reporting 
occurs, showing three major themes.  Community expectations around error reporting, 
as set by legal boundaries in state and federal laws, provide the general background 
upon which error reporting occurs.  Within this, the regulations and structures 
provided by professional bodies and health insurers further define the activities 
involved in reporting error.  Third, central to the activity itself, are the attitudes and 
opinions of health professionals that engage in error reporting in the community 
setting.   
 
Superimposed on this interpretation of the context in which error reporting occurs is a 
triangular pyramid which represents the nature of the activity of error reporting itself, 
and this is expanded in figure 2.2.  This is designed to illustrate the major themes 
described in the literature on the nature of reported errors, and their dependence upon 
one another with the broadest concepts required to understand the nature of error at 
the bottom of the pyramid, and further themes building upon these.   
 
The basis of the structure is the definitions and common understandings around error.  
Built upon this are the methods employed to gather information on patient safety 
events, followed by the types or taxonomic classifications of errors described by these 
methods, and the quantification of these error types reported in the community setting. 
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Figure 2.1 The context within which error reporting in the community occurs, 
represented by the elements of community expectations, professional 
organisations and attitudes and opinions of health professionals. 
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Figure 2.2 The major themes described in the scientific literature on the nature 
of reported error in community settings, including definitions, monitoring 
methods, types of errors reported, and their quantification. 
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2.2 The context of error reporting in community settings 
The context or environment in which error reporting is occurring in the community 
has been measured in some studies found in the scientific literature, and these studies 
generally relate to the central concept in figure 2.1, being the theme described as 
attitudes and opinions of health professionals reporting error.  Comment on the ‘safety 
culture’ in primary care reflects these attitudes.  
 
No papers were found that specifically studied aspects of the next level of the 
reporting environment in figure 2.1, being systems provided to report or monitor error 
by professional organisations or health insurers.  Appendix 1 however provides a list 
of professional bodies found to be engaged in this type of work, and some studies 
have looked at desired locations of error reporting systems, which provide some 
further comment on this theme and are discussed in more detail in this section of the 
review .   
 
The third theme in this area is that of the general community expectations and this 
includes the varying legal protections that different countries afford health 
professionals reporting error.  Some comment is made on the legal protections offered 
to reporters in a small group of papers, which are discussed in more detail below.  
Also discussed in relation to the broader community context is the balance between 
the interests of the individual clinician and the patient who may have suffered from 
being exposed to an error.  
 
   
 
17
2.2.1 Attitudes of individual health professionals to reporting 
error:  The ‘safety culture’ and barriers to enhancing safety 
in community settings 
The safety culture in primary care has been recognized by many researchers as a key 
factor in improving the acceptance and development of enhancing patient safety in 
primary care.  Patient safety may be improved through the cultural change associated 
with an increased awareness of the subject when systems are put in place (Dambro 
and Weiss 1988) (Coyle, Mercer et al. 2005).   
 
It has also been shown that primary care clinicians suffer an emotional impact when 
mistakes are made, and there is a need to share experiences that diminish an ambient 
culture of perfectionism and recognize errors as a natural part of the health system 
(Newman 1996).  The view is being actively promoted that human fallibility can be 
moderated, but it cannot be eliminated (Reason 1995). 
 
There is a need for leaders in the system to encourage patient safety and in many 
countries an important way to do this is through event reporting. For this method to be 
successful, the system needs to be able to take action to prevent such problems from 
recurring (Wilson and Sheikh 2002; Wood and Nash 2005).   
 
A recent qualitative focus group study of Family Practices conducted in the US 
examined barriers and motivators for making error reports, and concluded that 
successful error reporting systems for Family Physicians’ offices need to have a low 
burden of effort to report, have great clarity regarding the information requested, 
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provide direct benefit through feedback useful to reporters, and take into account error 
severity and responsibility (Elder, Graham et al. 2007).    
 
Numerous impediments to reducing threats to safety in community settings have been 
identified in the literature.  These include a widespread misunderstanding about the 
nature of threats to patients in community settings, why they occur, the prevailing 
culture of "name and blame" surrounding these events, and fear of litigation if errors 
are acknowledged and reported (Kizer 2001).  Other difficulties that need to be 
addressed to consistently measure patient safety in the community include the major 
variations that have been used to date in definitions, methodologies and the levels of 
legal protection offered in different settings (Jacobson, Elwyn et al. 2003; Sandars and 
Esmail 2003; Wood and Nash 2005). 
 
Evidence from a recent survey of GPs' attitudes towards reporting and learning from 
adverse events supports the notion that primary care may be ready to overcome the 
above barriers.  Conducted in Denmark with around 1200 participants, it concluded 
that GPs had a positive attitude towards discussing adverse events with peer groups as 
learning exercises, and towards reporting adverse events to a database if the system 
granted legal and administrative immunity to reporters (Mikkelsen, Sokolowski et al. 
2006).   
 
2.2.2 Professional organisations and providers of medicolegal 
insurance 
The next level of the environment in which errors are reported is the professional 
organisations to which a potential reporter belongs and the providers of medical 
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indemnity insurance who request comment from their customers on events that could 
result in medicolegal risk.  The latter also keep databases of claims which have 
occasionally been used to study patient safety events in community settings (Fischer, 
Fetters et al. 1997; Phillips, Bartholomew et al. 2004).   
 
It is likely that a system located in a national organization focused on safety would be 
more readily accepted by potential users than one within a medical board or insurance 
organization (Beasley, Escoto et al. 2004).  GPs in the Danish survey described earlier 
displayed a significant preference in reporting to a research institution over the latter 
options (Mikkelsen, Sokolowski et al. 2006). 
 
There are a number of national and international professional organisations that 
engage in error reporting activities in the community setting, and these are listed in 
Appendix 1.   
 
2.2.3 Broader community context in which error reporting occurs 
The community in which individual health professionals and their professional 
organisations operate is ultimately responsible for monitoring and creating the legal 
boundaries that relate to reporting threats to patient safety.  Apart from one paper 
which asked a very small non-representative community group for their view on 
errors that they had experienced (Kuzel, Woolf et al. 2004),  there were no studies that 
examined this aspect of error reporting. 
 
Some discussion was found in the literature of the legal context in which error 
reporting occurs.  Many researchers have advocated a non-punitive approach to safety 
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event reporting (Wilson and Sheikh 2002; Beasley, Escoto et al. 2004; Wood and 
Nash 2005; Mikkelsen, Sokolowski et al. 2006).  The recent Danish survey described 
earlier found 80% support for a model of confidential reporting where the recipient 
knows but conceals the identity of the reporter, versus only 35% supporting a 
‘conditionally confidential’ model, whereby the names of reporters would be passed 
on in a case where the reporter may have breached a relevant law (Mikkelsen, 
Sokolowski et al. 2006).   
 
There is also some debate in the literature over the benefit of a legally protected  and 
confidential method versus an anonymous approach to reporting, with some 
advocating confidential reporting provides more detailed data and opportunities to 
further explore safety events (Pace, Staton et al. 2003).  However the anonymous 
approach has been used in several studies and is more likely to prevent unwanted 
discovery of reporter details. To date, no reports of a legal challenge associated with a 
patient safety event reporting system in primary care have been found, so confidential 
systems are untested with respect to protecting reporters from legal action. 
 
The WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety has produced draft guidelines for 
adverse event reporting and learning systems(Leape and Abookire 2005).  This guide 
comments that reporting to most of these systems is voluntary, which invites a 
professional ethic of participation in continuous learning and prevention, encouraged 
by acknowledgement and the reward of visible change.  It also notes that experience 
from outside of health care, particularly aviation, shows that reporting systems are 
more likely to be successful if those reporting do not need to worry about adverse 
consequences to themselves or others. 
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This attitude of health professionals to how the community should regulate their error 
reporting activities needs to be balanced with the interests of the individual patients 
who may have been injured as a result of an error.  In Australian settings on balance, 
governments have supported the concept that error reporting should be non-punitive, 
with the earliest work on incident monitoring in general practice actually creating an 
Act of the NSW parliament to protect its participants from legal action as a result of 
participating in the study (Britt, Miller et al. 1997).  Further, both the Commonwealth 
of Australia and the individual states of Australia provide a system of ‘Qualified 
Privilege’, which allows the records of specific activities which benefit the 
community but may pose a risk to participating health professionals to be protected 
from subpoena by decree from the relevant Minister.  This is discussed further in the 
methods of this thesis, and was granted by the NSW Minister for Health in the TAPS 
study.  
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2.3 Definitions and common understandings of concepts in 
error monitoring  
As shown as the broadest base for understanding the nature of reported error in figure 
2.2, the definitions of error, harm and safety in the scientific literature are an 
important starting point when considering aspects of monitoring and measuring 
threats to patient safety in community settings. 
 
There is no single definition that stands out as the accepted meaning of what should 
define a patient safety event in a community setting.  The literature on patient safety 
in community settings has used a range of definitions of error, usually focused around 
the notion of whether or not the reporter of an event should base their inclusion of the 
incident on whether or not a patient may have been harmed, or potentially harmed.  In 
some cases, no clear definition is reported.  In most studies reviewed, the concepts of 
‘harm’ and ‘safety’ were not clearly defined, despite their inclusion in the definition 
of ‘error’.  Various leading researchers and organizations in the field have produced 
documents suggesting preferred definitions (Runciman 2006; WHO World Alliance 
for Patient Safety 2006), and shared concepts and standard definitions are a necessary 
concept for the field of patient safety to progress (2003).  The definitions adopted in 
each group of studies are detailed in the descriptions of their methodology (in section 
2.7, part A).   
 
Further discussion of the rationale for the definition of error adopted for the TAPS 
study is discussed in Methods, Section 3.5 of this thesis. 
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2.3.1 Current definitions in the Australian context 
The Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care was established in 
2006, and in terms of defining error has followed the lead of a recognised expert in 
the field, James Reason.  Although no Australian studies in community settings have 
applied these, it has recently published the definitions (shown in figure 2.2) on its 
website (WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety 2006), which appear quite broad and 
not restricting the interpretation of whether an error has occurred to the presence of 
patient harm: 
 
Figure 2.3  Definitions of error, harm and safety described by the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, accessed Jan 7th 2007 at 
http://www.safetyandquality.org/internet/safety/publishing.nsf/Content/former-pubs-archive-
definitions# . 
Error Error will be taken as a generic term to encompass all those occasions in 
which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve 
its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the 
intervention of some chance agency (Reason,1990). 
Error 
(active) 
An error in which the effects are felt almost immediately (Reason, 1990). 
Error 
(latent) 
An error whose adverse consequences may lie dormant within the system 
for a long time, only becoming evident when they combine with other 
factors to breach the system’s defences (Rasmussen, Petersen and 
Goldstein, 1994) 
Harm Death, disease, injury, suffering, and/or disability experienced by a 
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person.(ACSQHC)  
Safety The degree to which the potential risk and unintended results are avoided 
or minimised. (ACSQHC). 
 
2.3.2 Definitions used in the broader scientific literature in studies 
of error in community settings 
Although one of the difficulties in comparing works published on this subject is the 
differences of definitions used, there are some common elements of the definitions of 
error to be found in many of them.   
 
The most commonly shared concept is that events being measured could have resulted 
in a patient harm, and several studies mention the word ‘harm’ in their definition of 
error (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998; Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; 
Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Beyer, Dovey et al. 2003; Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003a; 
Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003b; Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003c; Pace, Staton et al. 2003; 
Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et al. 2004; Woolf, Kuzel et al. 2004; 
Rosser, Dovey et al. 2005; Shaw, Drever et al. 2005; Tilyard, Dovey et al. 2005; 
Kostopoulou 2006; Williams and Osborn 2006).  
 
In other studies where the definition didn’t actually use the term ‘harm’, a common 
practice was to include very similar phrases that could be interpreted as such.  For 
example, a US study of patient reported errors (Kuzel, Woolf et al. 2004) defined 
error for the participating patients as all forms of improper, delayed or omitted care 
that unnecessarily injures patients by either worsening health outcomes or causing 
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physical or emotional distress.  An Israeli work from 2003 (Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et 
al. 2003) defined an adverse event as being “an unexpected occurrence during medical 
care, involving physical or emotional injury, or the risk thereof”: the latter was termed 
a ‘near miss’.    
 
There was also an approach adopted to defining error in some works that described a 
process disruption, but did not have any relationship to or mention of harm, such as 
two UK studies which used a definition of error as being an event that was not 
completed as intended and/or meant that work was disrupted in some way (Rubin, 
George et al. 2003; Steele, Rubin et al. 2006). 
 
Another angle taken on the definition of an error was concentrating on the way an 
event made the reporter feel, rather than the process or potential or actual 
consequences of events for patients.  An early US work (Ely, Levinson et al. 1995) 
used the definition for ‘error’ as an act or omission for which the physician felt 
responsible and that had serious consequences for the patient.  It does not define 
‘serious consequences’ however, which allows a large degree of personal 
interpretation for the reporting physician. Australian studies of general practice  
trainees (Diamond, Kamien et al. 1995; Sim, Kamien et al. 1996) defined ‘positive 
incidents’ as events that had made trainees feel good or competent; and ‘negative 
incidents’ as events that had made them feel incompetent or unhappy with their 
performance.   
 
In studies which looked at medicolegal data, interestingly there was no use of the term 
‘error in their definitions of what was being measured.  Definitions reflected the 
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setting, containing words like ‘liability’, as in Adverse Events in Primary Care 
Identified from a Risk-Management Database (1997) (Fischer, Fetters et al. 1997), 
which measured ‘adverse events’ and defined them as incidents resulting in, or having 
the potential for, physical, emotional or financial liability to the patient.  Another later 
US work of this type (Phillips, Bartholomew et al. 2004) measured ‘claims’, and 
defined them as both cases where demands were made for compensation but no legal 
papers were filed in court, as well as formal litigation events.  ‘Negligent claims’ were 
deemed by peer reviewers as legally indefensible, ‘non-negligent claims’ were 
defensible, and the defensibility of ‘other claims’ was undetermined.   
 
Finally, some papers were very poor in their definitions of exactly what was being 
measured, with no definition really provided.  A 1998 UK study examining deaths in 
a group of general practices (Holden, O'Donnell et al. 1998) stated that the 
classification of a death as a preventable event was agreed upon by the participating 
GPs, although no definition or criteria are described in the paper. Another paper that 
describes a model for using a computer system to visualize patient safety in primary 
care does not present any definitions of error or harm (Singh, Singh et al. 2005). 
 
2.3.3 Definitions used in studies examining patient safety events 
in hospital settings 
An important distinction to be made between patient safety studies in community 
versus hospital settings was the unit of ‘event’ being measured.  Generally it is not 
possible to make comparisons between major works in the literature that have 
examined events in hospital settings such as the Harvard Medical Practice Study of 
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the mid 1980s (Brennan and Leape 1991; Brennan, Leape et al. 1991; Leape, Brennan 
et al. 1991), or the Quality in Australian Healthcare study of the early 1990s (Wilson, 
Runciman et al. 1995), as their basic definition of what was being measured was an 
‘adverse events’, which was something which resulted in actual patient harm, but did 
not necessarily involve a system or human error.  This varies significantly from 
studies conducted on patient safety in community settings, which have almost all 
adopted an incident monitoring approach and an accompanying definition of error 
which considers disrupted processes rather than outcomes. 
 
2.3.4 Definition of error used in the TAPS study 
The TAPS study was commenced in 2003, prior to the Australian definitions being 
proposed by the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care 
(ACSQHC) presented in section 2.3.1.  The definition of error was taken from the 
pilot study, the Primary Care International Study of Medical Errors, (further discussed 
in section 2.8.4), where it was found to be very well understood by participants with 
almost no error reports received by the research team that did not comply with the 
definition (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).     
 
The definition asked for participants to report any event that made them conclude 
‘That was a threat to patient well-being and should not happen.  I don’t want it to 
happen again’.   It differs mainly from the ACSQHC definition in that it does not 
matter what outcome resulted, rather it is concerned with anything that participants 
identified as something wrong, to be avoided in the future.  The full definition and 
further discussion of its use are presented in the Methods section 3.5 of this thesis. 
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2.4 Methods used to collect information on error in the 
community setting 
The next theme discussed here as an element of the nature of error reporting is an 
appraisal of the methods developed to collect error information in various studies.  
 
2.4.1 Overview of error reporting methods  
Methods used in studies in community settings that monitor patient safety events have  
predominantly used prospective event reporting, with survey designs (‘incident 
reporting systems’) (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 1998; Dovey, Meyers et al. 
2002; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Pace, Staton et al. 2003; Rubin, George et al. 
2003; Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 2003; Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 2004; Fernald, 
Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et al. 2004; Shaw, Drever et al. 2005; Makeham, 
Kidd et al. 2006; Williams and Osborn 2006).  A small number of studies have used 
other methods including interviews with health care providers (Diamond, Kamien et 
al. 1995; Ely, Levinson et al. 1995), reviews of incident reports or malpractice claims 
data (Fischer, Fetters et al. 1997; Phillips, Bartholomew et al. 2004), and one study 
interviewing primary care patients (Kuzel, Woolf et al. 2004).   
 
Although almost all of the methods employed in hospital-based research have also 
been used in research in community settings, there are some methodologies missing 
from the literature.  No studies using direct observation of incidents or autopsy reports 
were found in the literature as have been described in hospital based studies, no long-
term systematic initiatives to use mortality data in quality and safety improvement in 
general practice (Baker, Sullivan et al. 2007).  Of particular note, no methods were 
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found that were directly comparable to the retrospective records reviews used in 
hospital-based patient safety studies and the measures that might arise from such 
reviews (with the exception of records review to investigate defined activities, such as 
prescribing). 
 
National consistency in patient safety event reporting systems has been called for in 
several countries (Sheikh and Hurwitz 1999; Sheikh and Hurwitz 2000; Sheikh and 
Hurwitz 2001; Runciman 2002; Wood and Nash 2005; Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006), 
and the NHS in England and Wales established the first national on-line system 
(Shaw, Drever et al. 2005), and this is the only one known that is accessible to 
community based clinicians.  
 
Much evidence of the design success of a system should be considered in terms of  its 
ability to answer the research questions that it set out to answer, or provide the service 
or education to clinicians for which it was established.  To date there is little critical 
appraisal of existing reporting systems along these lines, and further evidence is 
needed before one particular style of reporting model should clearly be supported over 
another. 
 
A variety of models have been trialled using methods described previously, and in 
addition there are proposals for theoretical models of community based safety event 
reporting.  An example is a ‘systems engineering’ approach created by a 
multidisciplinary team of a visual computer based systems, where the reporter would 
‘point and click’ on a diagram to show where an error occurred in the system, and be 
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presented with further systems to enter more error information (Singh, Singh et al. 
2005).   
 
The WHO world Alliance for Patient Safety commissioned a report which defined the 
characteristics of a successful reporting and learning system, and these features are 
presented in figure 2.4 below, which provide a starting point for organisations wishing 
to establish such a system. 
 
Figure 2.4 The characteristics of successful reporting and learning systems to 
enhance patient safety as defined by WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety. 
 
 
2.4.2 Incident reporting systems in community settings 
Incident reporting systems were the most commonly used method to answer questions 
relating to types of safety events in community settings.  There were variations in the 
style by which reports were collected, including completing a paper based pro-forma 
or questionnaire (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 1998; Rubin, George et al. 2003; 
Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 2004), telephone reporting (Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 
• Reporting is safe for the individuals who report 
• Reporting leads to a constructive response 
• Expertise and adequate financial resources are available to allow for 
meaningful analysis of reports 
• The reporting system must be capable of disseminating information on 
hazards and recommendations for changes 
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2003), electronic transmission of reports (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002), secure web-
based reports (Shaw, Drever et al. 2005; Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006; Williams and 
Osborn 2006), or a combination of these (Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; Pace, Staton et 
al. 2003; Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et al. 2004).   
 
Reporter protections varied, with clinicians being anonymous (Makeham, Dovey et al. 
2002; Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006), reporting confidentially (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; 
Bhasale 1998; Kostopoulou 2006), being identified (Rubin, George et al. 2003; Elder, 
Vonder Meulen et al. 2004), or a combination or option of these (Pace, Staton et al. 
2003; Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et al. 2004).  Some settings had 
varying legal protections in place to prevent litigation (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; 
Bhasale 1998; Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 2003).   
 
The profession of reporters also varied, so that some collections of data were general 
practitioners or family physicians only (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 1998; 
Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 
2004; Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006), while other studies used a variety of other 
community based medical, allied health, nursing, administrative and reception staff 
(Pace, Staton et al. 2003; Rubin, George et al. 2003; Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 
2003; Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et al. 2004).   
 
In addition to varying types of participants in these studies and their reporting options 
and protections, a variety of definitions of what constituted a reportable event and 
classification systems used to describe events make the results of these studies 
difficult to combine or compare. 
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2.4.3 The individual dialogue approach to error reporting 
There were two studies found in the literature that employed an entirely verbal 
communication approach to reporting error by clinicians in the community setting 
(Ely, Levinson et al. 1995; Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 2003).   
 
Firstly Ely’s study used an in-depth interview design with qualitative analysis to 
determine the perceived causes of self-admitted errors from family physicians (Ely, 
Levinson et al. 1995).  ‘Error’ was defined as an act or omission for which the 
physician felt responsible and that had serious consequences for the patient.  53 
Family Physicians participated, including osteopathic and allopathic family 
physicians, in Iowa City, USA. 
 
In in-depth 30 minute interviews, participants were asked to describe their most 
memorable errors and the perceived causes.  Transcripts were audio taped and 
analysed to determine frequencies of different causes.  Participants were also asked to 
rate 20 possible causes of error as contributors.  
 
The findings describe 34 causes of error, fitting into four main categories:  physician 
stressors, process of care factors, patient related factors, and physician characteristics.  
Patient adverse outcomes and malpractice claims were also recorded.  A mean of 8 
causes per error was reported, and 47% of reported cases resulted in patient death.  In 
26% of cases there was no adverse outcome.  Malpractice suits arose from 4 of 53 
errors.  Of 70 physicians invited to participate, 10% could not recall any error.  The 
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most common causes of error identified were hurry, distraction, lack of knowledge, 
premature closure of diagnostic process, and inadequately aggressive patient 
management. 
 
The main problem with this method was that reporting was dependent upon events 
being ‘memorable’, and recalled details of events could have differed after varying 
time lapses.  Also to note is that analysis was conducted on only one case of error per 
participant.   
 
A more recent study by Wilf-Mirron undertaken in Israel used a risk-management 
process to apply aviation safety principles to incident reporting in a large ambulatory 
healthcare setting, and describe its implementation (Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 
2003). An adverse event was defined as “an unexpected occurrence during medical 
care, involving physical or emotional injury, or the risk thereof”: the latter was termed 
a ‘near miss’.   
 
Maccabi Healthcare Services is an impressively large non-profit HMO in Israel, 
providing primary and secondary ambulatory services for 1.6 million members.  
Community based services were provided by 3000 physicians, GPs and specialists, 
and 2000 auxiliary medical staff.  All administrative data and a portion of the medical 
data (diagnoses, prescriptions, laboratory tests and referrals) were linked online to a 
central system.  Each site, including doctors’ offices, served as a computerized work 
station. 
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A central risk management (RM) unit for the area was established in 1996.  Strategies 
in risk management involved a multidisciplinary team and aviation personnel and 
psychologists from the Israeli Air Force.  Adverse events were reported by medical 
staff via a telephone hotline to a member of the RM unit, who used a computerized 
system that structured event debriefing.  This addressed what happened, how it 
happened and why it happened.  The key principle was that events should serve for 
learning, not blaming, and official immunity from disciplinary acts was granted to 
voluntary reporters.  The RM staff provided emotional support and medical guidance 
to the reporters, and the developed risk reduction strategies were distributed to all 
staff.  
 
To analyse the results the aviation safety approach to data collection and analysis 
known as ‘5M’ was adopted:  Man (human factors); Machine (technological aspects); 
Medium (environmental factors); Mission (care-specific activities containing potential 
risks and hazards); and Management (managerial regulations and staff aspects).  A 
root cause analysis of over 2000 encounters in a 5 year period was presented.  Errors 
were related to:  processes of care, such as failure to order a test or make a referral 
(33%); treatment, such as medication errors (21%); judgment, such as under 
estimation of symptom severity (18%); auxiliary tests, such as imaging (15%); and 
poor physician-patient communication (13%).   
 
The system was highly supportive of medical staff, and provided medico-legal 
protection, support and guidance when they were faced with an error.  These factors 
are likely to be of great importance to primary care medical staff, who often work in a 
more isolated environment than hospital based doctors. Based on aviation industry 
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experience, the authors suggest that direct reporting captures better detail through in-
depth dialogue than written reports. 
 
Although the method described in this Israeli study has many impressive features, the 
individual dialogue approach to reporting has cost, medico-legal and practicality 
issues that make it difficult to replicate in many other community settings.  This quite 
impressive system would likely come at a significant financial cost to establish and 
maintain.   
2.4.4 An example of a national error reporting system available in 
the community setting 
Two papers were found in the scientific literature that describe a national system for 
adverse event and near miss reporting in England and Wales (Shaw, Drever et al. 
2005; Williams and Osborn 2006).  To date, this system established by the National 
Patient Safety Agency of the NHS in England and Wales represents the only known 
adverse event reporting system that has been provided at a national level using a 
secure anonymous online method, which is accessible to clinicians in a community 
setting as well as a hospital setting.  
 
In this system, an incident was defined as any event causing harm to a patient 
(adverse event) or an event that might have resulted in harm (“near miss”).  The 
publications available to date describe its establishment, initially in 18 NHS trusts in 
England and Wales, including one that was a Primary Care Trust (most were acute 
care).  
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In the paper by Shaw, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) received data from 
participant trusts electronically.  Patient and institution names were removed prior to 
data transfer to the NPSA.  Due to major inconsistencies in the systems each used, 
analysis was undertaken manually by the NPSA determining:  time, date, patient age, 
sex, clinical specialty, location, risk rating, outcome for patient, type of incident and 
description of incident.  
 
The other publication by Williams and Osborn describes developments in reporting 
techniques, and in September 2004 the NPSA opened an anonymous on-line web-
based reporting route for staff who did not want to report via their host organizations. 
This system can be viewed at:  
http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/health/reporting/reportanincident (accessed 3rd Nov 2006). 
 
Some results were presented in the publications.  Outcome gradings of incidents were 
recorded using 5 descriptors:  catastrophic, major, moderate, minor and none.  Type of 
incident was described by a two level categorization with 12 main categories:  Slips, 
trips and falls; Medication management; Resources; Treatment; Medical records; 
Violence, harassment and aggression; Medical devices; Abscondment; Patient 
management and progress monitoring; Self-harm and suicide; No classification 
available.  There were 33 end classifications within these 12 groups.   
 
Shaw describes 28 998 incidents collected in a nine month period (95% were from 
acute care trusts).  Over 20% of the incidents described as having catastrophic or 
major outcomes occurred in the patient’s home or a residential care unit.  ‘Slips, trips 
and falls’ was the most commonly reported incident type.  Only 32 reports came from 
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the participating primary care trust.  Williams and Osborn go on to state that a further 
303447 reports were received between 2003 and 2005, and provides a series of 
‘lessons’ for other countries to use when embarking on setting up a system such as 
this.     
 
The system described is an attempt to integrate data on patient safety from many 
different health care settings with a large variation in the services delivered.  The 
difficulties described in the papers demonstrate well the importance of planning a 
unified reporting and analysis system if different health settings are to attempt to 
combine their activities. 
 
The findings presented to date on event type and outcome presented by Shaw et al are 
not able to be generalised because only 18 of the 700 trusts in the region were 
included in the study. Although these were all selected because they were thought to 
have adequate managerial support to engage in risk management activities and an IT 
based reporting system, there were many difficulties with integrating their data.  
There is no information on the size of the participating primary care trust or its 
reporting profile.  The very low number of reports from that trust may indicate that 
the system was not feasible in a primary care setting.   
 
Little more is gained in terms of information for the community setting in the second 
publication from Williams and Osborn, as there is very little quantitative analysis of 
the 303 447 reports collected between 2003 and 2005, and no descriptions relating to 
data received from primary care trusts.  However, the website referenced in this paper 
provides an excellent patient safety resource for health workers in the NHS, and the 
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web based anonymous reporting tool provides a model for other countries wishing to 
take this approach.      
2.5 Types of errors reported in the community setting  
The next theme in this review related to the overall types of errors that are described 
in community settings in the scientific literature.  Some studies have developed 
taxonomies of error, while others have not attempted to do this but still provide some 
rich information on the types of errors that occur.  Overall there is relatively little 
information available on the proportions of types of patient safety events that are 
reported in general practice and other community settings, and no taxonomy that is 
widely used by general practitioners (GPs) to describe these events.   
 
Previous studies in primary care have provided descriptions of the relative proportions 
of different types of patient safety events that they have collected, (Ely, Levinson et 
al. 1995; Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Fischer, Fetters et al. 1997; Bhasale, Miller et al. 
1998; Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003c; Rubin, George et al. 2003; Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff 
et al. 2003; Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 2004; Phillips, Bartholomew et al. 2004; 
Rosser, Dovey et al. 2005) but none have been based upon a representative sample of 
primary care clinicians contributing data, and all have used different classification 
methods.   
 
Only seven groups of studies that propose a taxonomy for describing safety events in 
the community setting were identified in the literature (Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; 
Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Rubin, George et al. 2003; Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 
2004; Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Kuzel, Woolf et al. 2004; Kostopoulou 2006; 
Kostopoulou and Delaney 2007).  These classifications fell into two main categories: 
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(1) ‘multiaxial’ taxonomies and (2) ‘domain specific’ taxonomies, or more simple 
classifications describing a single element of the safety event.  The former incorporate 
a number of different aspects about a safety event into its coding, such as the nature of 
the event, associated harm, patient and reporter factors, or cognitive factors in its 
causation.   
 
There have also been some recent calls for classifications that address cognitive 
psychological processes (Zhang, Patel et al. 2004), and one has been developed for 
general practice (Kostopoulou 2006), also yet to be tested.  Finally, one taxonomy has 
been described that is based upon patient’s perceptions of harms in primary care, 
although it has a limited application in terms of categorizing causes of events (Kuzel, 
Woolf et al. 2004). 
 
The domain specific taxonomies identified focus mainly on the nature of the event in 
categories with a mixture of clinical and administrative titles.  The various domains 
that have been measured in community based patient safety event taxonomies are 
detailed below in figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5 Features of a patient safety event described by taxonomies developed 
in community settings. 
 
 
 
 
• Nature or descriptive type of event 
• Location of event 
• Mitigating factors associated with an event 
• Outcomes of event, including patient harm 
• Patient factors, such as age, gender and ethnicity 
• Reporter factors, such as profession  
• Preventative factors relating to an event 
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At present, the WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety is in the process of drawing 
together existing theories on this subject in both community and hospital settings, and 
has a Drafting Group who are presently undertaking a project to develop a proposed 
“International Patient Safety Event Classification”.  Their second report was 
published on the WHO website in 2006 (WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety 
2006), and describes their progress towards establishing guidelines and a consultative 
process for completing this task.   
 
Not all of the taxonomies in the literature proposed for community settings have been 
tested, and in those that have, there are major limitations to consider with respect to 
their validity and comprehensibility.  None of the studies attempted to test the 
reproducibility of their proposed taxonomies across different analysts or primary care 
clinicians. Of all the studies identified discussing safety events in community settings, 
only the TAPS study used a representative sample (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).  
Although a taxonomy developed to cross disciplines has been proposed (Chang, 
Schyve et al. 2005), it also remains untested with clinicians in the community setting.   
 
2.5.1 Multi-axial taxonomies  
‘Multiaxial taxonomies’ have been suggested as better tools to capture different 
elements of an event in addition to its description and causation, such as harm levels, 
location, participants or preventability.  Examples include the taxonomy used by the 
Applied Strategies for Improving Patient Safety (ASIPS) collaborative in the United 
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States (USA) (Fernald, Pace et al. 2004), and the cognitive psychology based 
taxonomy developed recently by a group in the UK (Kostopoulou 2006).   
 
These taxonomies are appropriate tools if the research question requires a detailed 
measure of a safety event at multiple levels, as when the research attempts to address 
the complexity of the underlying causation and associated features of specific event 
types.  This process is carried out by specifically trained coders and analysts, 
following notification of a patient safety event by a healthcare provider or patient.  
Other multi-axial taxonomies that have may also be appropriate for community based 
settings but have not yet been field tested there.  An example here is the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) Patient Safety 
Event Taxonomy (Chang, Schyve et al. 2005). 
 
2.5.1.1 Applied Strategies for Improving Patient Safety (ASIPS) 
The best example of a large multiaxial taxonomy in use in the community setting is 
that developed by the ASIPS collaborative based in Colorado, USA (Pace, Staton et 
al. 2003; Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et al. 2004).  This work  
was a multi-institutional, practice based project designed to collect and analyse data 
on medical errors occurring in primary care offices, and to develop interventions to 
reduce those errors.  ASIPS included a voluntary Patient Safety Reporting System 
(PSRS) that captured anonymous and confidential reports of medical errors.  The 
study aimed to develop the PSRS database (designed to capture error detail while 
protecting the identity of reporters and the details of the events themselves from 
discovery and thus potential use in medico-legal action against reporters), to develop a 
reporting system that physicians and staff would use, to describe the types of errors 
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reported by confidential and anonymous reports and highlight differences between 
them, and to develop interventions to decrease errors and improve quality of care. 
 
Participants were asked to report “any event you don’t wish to have happen again that 
might represent a threat to patient safety”, including events associated with clinical 
judgment and knowledge, administrative procedures, and “near misses”, which were 
defined as events where threats to patient safety happened but no harm occurred. Over 
475 physicians, nurses and other clinical and administrative staff from two practice 
based primary care research networks (urban and rural) in Colorado, USA. 
   
The reporting method described was that a primary care provider who was aware of a 
patient safety event reported it using an automated telephone hotline, a website, or in 
paper form.  Reports were either confidential (reporters provided their identity, 
answered one free-text question and were followed up by ASIPS staff on phone, 
following which reports were de-identified) or anonymous (reporters identified their 
role and practice type but not their identity, then answered a series of free text and 
multiple choice questions about the event and patients involved).   
Errors were analysed by the research team using a measure adapted from an insurance 
company taxonomy, with the three members of the research team consensus coding 
the reported errors.  The final measure contained 10 axes with 5 domains: patient 
characteristics; participants; course of events; outcome; and event discovery.  There 
was hierarchical sub-categorisation within each section.  Several codes could be 
chosen within a number of the domains for each report.  Harm was assigned one of 
five categories for each report.     
 
   
 
43
The results published to date concluded that over 800 reports had been received by 
February 2004.  Anonymous reports provided less detail than confidential reports, 
with root causes less frequently identifiable.  Database design features and 
administrative system features to overcome medico-legal detection threats were 
presented.  An analysis of 608 reports was described, with two thirds of reporters 
using the confidential rather than anonymous system, and physicians chose the 
anonymous method more often than office staff.  Common error types related to 
diagnostic tests (47%), medication (35.4%) and communication (70.8%).  A clinical 
steering committee developed interventions to reduce error in commonly occurring 
areas, and alerts were issued to practices.  
 
The ASIPS study has a number of strengths.  Having alternative reporting options 
available may improve capture of events over methods concentrating on a single 
reporting tool.  Demonstrable patient safety improvements in the form of alerts to 
practices resulted from this project.  The full taxonomy is available online at 
www.cudfm.org/carenet/asips/taxonomy.  It has links to the International 
Classification of Primary Care (ICPC) (Lamberts, Meads et al. 1985), which could be 
useful in considering error types associated with types of episodes of care.  It contains 
detailed descriptions of some sub-levels, with up to 7 layers within several of the 
hierarchical categories.   
 
The methods have a number of weaknesses however , and although this study 
addresses the medicolegal needs of one US state, it may not be so applicable in 
different legal environments.  Stringent data security processes were followed but 
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even so, ASIPS had no control over the legal discovery of report data by subpoena, 
for their own or any linked organizations.   
 
In terms of the taxonomy itself, there is no information presented on the reliability of 
the full ASIPS taxonomy and only the main axes and domains have been published in 
peer-reviewed literature.  It is difficult to determine the link made by the authors 
between the descriptions of the nature of errors reported and the application of the 
taxonomy’s ‘10 axes with 5 domains’.  Looking at the link provided to the taxonomy 
website, the tool itself is enormous with literally hundreds of lines of code, which 
would be very difficult for a national system where GPs might be asked to self-
classify the errors reported.  There may be some overlap within these detailed 
descriptions and further work on the reproducibility and ease of classification using 
this tool would be helpful. 
 
2.5.1.2 A multiaxial taxonomy of cognitive and system factors 
Another example of a multiaxial taxonomy developed in the general practice setting 
in the UK is that described by Kostopoulou (Kostopoulou 2006).  This study aimed to 
develop a taxonomy of patient safety in general practice based on a theoretical model 
of human cognition.  Further analysis and results of the study were published earlier 
this year (Kostopoulou and Delaney 2007).  It differs dramatically from other 
taxonomies in use in patient safety, in that it is based on concepts from cognitive 
psychology.  It is multiaxial as there are three separate ‘domains’ that are classified 
for each event. 
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A patient safety ‘event’ included in this study had to fulfil three criteria:  be harmful 
or potentially harmful to patients; result directly from the process of care (rather than 
patient’s condition); and be unintended.  The underlying theory and definitions of 
some terms based in cognitive psychology used in this paper are based on the JCAHO 
theoretical taxonomy (Chang, Schyve et al. 2005).   
 
Participants were from five general practices in the West Midlands, UK, all suburban 
or inner city (Kostopoulou and Delaney 2007), and errors were reported for varying 
lengths of time from these locations, between 6 and 16 months.  Reporting was open 
to clinicians, administrative staff, and others attached to practices such as community 
nurses, health-care assistants and physiotherapists.  This study used a survey design to 
solicit reports that were then further investigated by interview and qualitative analysis.  
A confidential reporting method was used, and reporters were followed up with 
interview from the investigators.  Taxonomy development was a continuous process 
that occurred as events were analysed.   
 
The resulting taxonomy uses a theoretical model entitled the “information processing 
model” of human cognition.  Events were classified at three levels.  At level one, the 
‘cognition’ level, the error is classified according to (a) the cognitive domain involved 
(perception, memory, situation assessment, response execution) and (b) the error 
mechanism, which is the ‘psychological’ mechanism through which the error 
occurred.  At level two, immediate causes are identified, internal (affective, 
motivational, psychological or cognitive states) and external to the individual.  At 
level three, the likely contributions to the event (‘performance shaping factors’), 
which are more remote causal factors are identified as either ‘work organization’ or 
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‘technical’, each with subcategories.  The full taxonomy can be viewed at 
http://qshc.bmj.com/supplemental in association with the 2007 publication 
(Kostopoulou and Delaney 2007). 
 
Data collection in this study resulted in a relatively small collection of 94 reports, and 
only 78 of these were related to patient safety and analysable.  Further, only 47 of this 
group contained the ‘cognitive information’ required in taxonomic levels 1 and 2 to 
actually use the taxonomy that was developed.  Therefore in order to describe the 
events and attempt to make a comparison to other work, the authors actually also 
present the findings in terms of a ‘clinical categorisation’, which is a basic list of 11 
descriptive terms, and there is no explanation of the meaning of these categories, 
some of which seem to overlap.  Using this clinical categorisation, the largest group 
of errors of the 78 classified were ‘administrative – mainly booking appointments and 
filing’ (25%).  Using the cognitive taxonomy where possible, the level 1 classification 
found ‘situation assessment and response selection’ as the most often involved (45%).  
It was found at level 2 that ‘immediate internal causes’ proved difficult to identify in 
most cases because of insufficient information in the reports or subsequent recall 
when participants were further questioned by the investigators.  More than one level 3 
‘performance shaping factor’ was found for each error reported in many cases, and 
they are described as ‘technical factors’ (contributing to 30 events) and ‘work 
organisation factors’ (contributing to 71 events), the latter being further categorised as 
‘excessive task demands’, ‘fragmentation’ and ‘communication’. 
 
The terminology in this cognitive multiaxial taxonomy is challenging, and not clearly 
explained, and although the concept underlying this taxonomy has some merit, in that 
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it should capture elements starting from an individual’s cognition and move out to the 
environment that predisposes to error, the main difficulty with the taxonomy is that 
the language may be too complex for practical use, and probably requires a 
background in cognitive psychology to apply.  It has moved well away from a 
descriptive approach of event type, and although it is based on a body of theory, the 
results of classification using the proposed tool may have limited use for policy 
makers who require a grouping of like events in terms of clinical categories. The data 
used to create the taxonomy came from only 47 events.  
 
There is no information on the confidential method of collecting reports, proportions 
of different types of contributing participants, their reporting frequencies, who 
contributed to taxonomy development, or any description of the event types that were 
included using the proposed taxonomy.  The patient safety measure requires more 
extensive testing of its validity, reliability and comprehensiveness. 
 
2.5.2 Domain specific taxonomies 
These most commonly describe ‘event type’ without necessarily incorporating a 
measurement of other aspects of the event such as location, provider, and associated 
harm.  Due to their simplicity, they may be more practicable for broad application in 
community settings.  They could appropriately address research questions about the 
types of patient safety risks occurring in community based settings, and their 
quantification.   
 
There are several examples of domain specific taxonomies in the literature.  These 
less complex taxonomies, such as that described in the literature relating to the 
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Preliminary Taxonomy of Medical Errors in Family Practice (Dovey, Meyers et al. 
2002), the simplified three level taxonomy from the International Study of Medical 
Errors (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002), or the taxonomy developed in a United 
Kingdom (UK) general practice study (Rubin, George et al. 2003), could be applied as 
tools that providers of community based care access in order to code event types 
themselves.  An electronic event reporting system may also capture patient safety 
domains other than the causal and descriptive factors (such as a severity score, 
location, patient demographic factors, or reporter factors), which could be combined 
with a descriptive taxonomy to answer other questions about factors associated with 
specific event types. 
 
2.5.2.1 A preliminary taxonomy of medical errors in family practice  
Published in 2002 and 2003, this domain specific taxonomy is the earliest example of 
such a classification developed in the community setting (Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; 
Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003a; Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003b; Dovey, Phillips et al. 
2003c). 
 
The study was initially commenced as a randomized controlled trial that aimed to 
compare paper and computer reporting of medical errors observed by family 
physicians.  The rationale for this aim was that family physicians might feel better 
able to report more sensitive events using computer reporting, where stricter 
confidentiality protections are possible, although this primary objective was not met 
and the RCT results have never been published. A secondary goal of the study was to 
develop a preliminary taxonomy of primary care medical errors observed by family 
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physicians in their daily practice and this has been published (Dovey, Meyers et al. 
2002). 
 
Participants were told to “report anything that happened in your own practice that 
should not have happened, that was not anticipated and that makes you say ‘that 
should not happen in my practice, and I don’t want it to happen again’.  It can be 
small or large, administrative or clinical – anything that you identify as something to 
be avoided in the future.”  Reported events did not require the physician to identify an 
adverse outcome, or an actual or potential harm to a patient.      
A group of 42 Family Physicians from different parts of the USA who belonged to the 
American Academy of Family Physician’s (AAFP) National Network volunteered to 
participate.  Participants submitted 10 anonymous error reports using a questionnaire 
about the event over a four month period, five on paper and five via a purpose 
designed computer reporting form that was sent electronically to a central database.   
 
A qualitative method was applied to review free text responses to the questionnaires 
and develop a draft taxonomy by one investigator. Following this two other 
investigators independently reviewed reports and assigned them a classification from 
this draft.  The three investigators then revised the measure through consensus 
discussion.      
 
There were 330 errors reported and a multi-level taxonomy was developed.  The 
highest level divided events into ‘process’ or ‘knowledge and skills’ errors.  Second 
level ‘process’ categories were: office administration, investigations, treatments, 
communication, and payment.  Second level ‘knowledge and skills’ categories were: 
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execution of a clinical task, misdiagnosis, and wrong treatment decision.  Some 
second level categories were further sub-classified (up to a total of four levels), and 
others had no further sub-classifications.  Altogether there were 32 end-
classifications.  At level one, 86% of errors were ‘process’ and 14% were ‘knowledge 
and skills’.   It was found that family physicians reported a spectrum of error different 
from those identified in studies from hospital settings. 
 
The study was deliberately developed to study ‘mistakes’ in medical care and it 
therefore did not focus on associated harm, which may have allowed a broader 
capture of safety events. The definition was developed by clinicians providing care in 
community settings and was accepted by them as comprehensible.  The reported 
taxonomy was regarded by the investigators as a work in progress.  It was developed 
from the data without direct reference to any pre-existing classification, and the 
investigators expected that the measure would become more sensitive with further 
use.   
 
With respect to potential weaknesses in design, this study has been criticized for 
lacking a theoretical framework (Kostopoulou 2006)  After level one, there was no 
guide or definition used when determining the type of category that constituted 
another tier within the hierarchical structure presented.  Quantitative results could not 
be generalized due to the participant sampling being non-representative, and the error 
reporting method with a set number of errors being asked to be reported in the study 
period, rather than all errors noted.  The taxonomy’s absence of a ‘not otherwise 
specified’ group at the base of each branch of the structure could also pose difficulties 
in its application.        
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2.5.2.2 Error classification and method of detecting errors from a UK 
general practice setting  
Developed in a UK general practice setting, another example of a domain specific 
taxonomy has been published.  The paper describes this classification of errors and 
aims to assess the feasibility and acceptability of a method for GPs and administrative 
staff to report error (Rubin, George et al. 2003; Steele, Rubin et al. 2006).  This 
taxonomy is quite simplistic in its design, and a subsequent pilot study adapted the 
method and used the error classification in optometric practices (Steele, Rubin et al. 
2006). 
  
An error was defined as an event that was not completed as intended and/or meant 
that work was disrupted in some way.  Ten general practices in the North-East of 
England – 163 participants including 39 GPs, 20 nurses, 81 reception staff, 10 
managers and 13 other staff (health visitors, midwives, community psychiatric nurses, 
and pharmacists) were involved in the initial study (Rubin, George et al. 2003).  The 
subsequent study used ten community optometric practices in the UK (Steele, Rubin 
et al. 2006).    
 
A pilot general practice reported errors in notebooks over a two week period.  Based 
on this, two investigators developed an error classification and incorporated it into a 
reporting form.  Participants in 10 practices recorded errors on these forms over a 2 
week period, and reported on the number of available appointments in the period.  
Reports were anonymous.  A questionnaire on acceptability was also completed.         
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A six category classification of errors resulted, with each category having between 0 
and 6 sub-categories, resulting in 18 end classifications.  The same six categories were 
used in the optometric practice study.  940 errors were reported in general practices, 
and the proportion of errors in the 6 categories were:   42% prescriptions 
(administrative, clerical, medication, inaccurate computer records); 30% 
communication (case notes missing, delivery of post, information missing, wrong case 
notes, message failure, referral errors); 16% equipment (computer, other); 7% 
appointments; 3% clinical (notes, diagnostic, therapeutic, omission); 2% others.  The 
error rate was 75.6 per 1000 appointments.  Participants found the method generally 
acceptable (<10% feeling threatened or finding the process disruptive). 
 
The attractive thing about this taxonomy for broader application in the general 
practice setting was that the patient safety measure was derived directly from clinical 
practice and reporters themselves coded events. This may make it more practicable 
than a system requiring expert coders or risk managers to determine types of errors 
reported. Reporting was anonymous, which may also encourage reporting.  However 
the classification and reporting method does not address underlying causation, harm 
levels, patient attributes and settings of events, and there may be problems with 
reproducibility. A high proportion of detected problems were administrative, possibly 
because most reporters were administrative staff.  The paper-based reporting method 
raises issues of medico-legal risk as reports were hand-written. There was no 
discussion of linking reports to reporters or removing sensitive information on time, 
setting and location of events.  The error rate and other findings cannot be generalized 
as the study sample was not representative of UK general practices or patients.   
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2.5.2.3 Patient reports of preventable problems and harms in 
primary care 
Patient reports of preventable problems and harms in primary care was a study that 
provides a different type of domain specific taxonomy from any others presented in 
the literature, in that it is based on patients’ perceptions of error and harm for general 
patient safety events (Kuzel, Woolf et al. 2004). 
 
The study design used in-depth interviews of a random selection of patients to 
develop patient-focused measures of medical errors and harms in primary care and 
determine the most important to patients.  Error was defined as all forms of improper, 
delayed or omitted care that unnecessarily injures patients by either worsening health 
outcomes or causing physical or emotional distress.    
 
38 volunteers from Virginia and Ohio were recruited by random telephone calls from 
the local phonebooks.  Participants were one-third male and two-thirds female.  They 
were interviewed by trained investigators, using a standard guide.  Interviews were 
taped and transcribed with personally identifiable information removed. Participants 
ranked their reported errors from least to most disturbing.  A qualitative method of 
analysis was used to define event types.  
 
A taxonomy of patient reported errors was organized around 5 domains:  access 
breakdown, communication breakdown, relationship breakdown, technical error and 
inefficiency. Each domain was further categorised with up to 4 levels, and there were 
70 end categories in total.  Harm was assigned into 40 separate non-hierarchical 
categories.  
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Two hundred and twenty one ‘problematic incidents’ were described in 38 interviews.  
Breakdown in the clinician-patient relationship comprised 37% of these, and were 
dominated by stories of disrespect or insensitivity.  One hundred and seventy reported 
accounts of harm were described and 70% of these were psychological harm.   
 
This paper represents one of only two published studies in a community setting found 
relating to patients’ perceptions of error and harm for general patient safety events as 
opposed to specific topics such as medication events (Kuzel, Woolf et al. 2004; 
Phillips, Dovey et al. 2006).  The paper reported on ‘problematic incidents’ but this 
term was not clearly defined.  Cues to prompt interviewees were used - these may 
have influenced the results.  Although a range of patient types were included amongst 
participants, the study involved a small non-representative sample of patients, and so 
there may be many error types that remain undetected. The study’s results 
demonstrated little association between patients’ impression of events and their 
treating physicians’: for example, that a misdiagnosis had occurred.  The 
classifications of event types and harms would be difficult to apply to a clinician-
reporting system.  However the study highlights the importance of communication 
issues and the patient-doctor relationship in primary care as a source of harm to 
patients. 
 
2.5.3 Evidence on types of patient safety events from studies 
examining medicolegal data in a community setting 
There has been a small amount of work published that relates to types of errors found 
in the community setting based on analysing medicolegal claims databases.  Two 
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studies that specifically undertook this task were found based in the US (Fischer, 
Fetters et al. 1997; Phillips, Bartholomew et al. 2004).   
 
The first study in a community setting to use systematic risk-management record 
review methodology to measure the prevalence of adverse events in community care 
was published by Fischer in 1997 (Fischer, Fetters et al. 1997).  This work analysed 
data reported in a risk-management database of an academic health centre to describe 
the prevalence of adverse events in the out-patient primary care setting.  ‘Adverse 
events’ were incidents resulting in, or having the potential for, physical, emotional or 
financial liability to the patient. Incident reports from the database of an academic 
centre were collected over a 5 and a half year period (1991-96) from eight primary 
care clinics. 
 
Two family physicians reviewed all reports to determine whether an incident was 
associated with medical management or due to some other cause, such as 
environmental. 
   
If due to a medical error, one of four classes of causes was applied:  diagnostic, 
treatment, preventive and ‘other’. Adverse events were also classified as preventable 
or unpreventable. 
 
The prevalence of incidents that resulted in an injury, potential injury, or financial 
liability was 5.4 per 100,000 clinic visits (51 cases), with 3.7 per 100,000 (35 cases) 
assessed as adverse events associated with medical management:  83% of the latter 
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were due to preventable error. The adverse events were due to treatment (31%), 
diagnostic mishaps (26%), ‘other’ errors (26%) or no error (17%), such as known 
complications.  No adverse events due to preventive care were found.    
 
The findings of this study may not be able to be generalised to other community 
settings as a single academic centre contributed study data.  The method probably 
under-estimated the occurrence of adverse events and in more than half of the 
incidents, the reviewers could not agree on classification or preventability.   
 
The second US study found in the literature of this nature was by Phillips (Phillips, 
Bartholomew et al. 2004), and used a large US malpractice database to describe the 
epidemiology of negligent adverse events from primary care (location, conditions, and 
attributable root causes of the claims).  ‘Claims’ were defined as both cases where 
demands were made for compensation but no legal papers were filed in court, as well 
as formal litigation events.  ‘Negligent claims’ were deemed by peer reviewers as 
legally indefensible, ‘non-negligent claims’ were defensible, and the defensibility of 
‘other claims’ was undetermined.  ‘Underlying cause’ was taken as the most 
significant medical misadventure identified by the insurer. 
 
The study involved 49,345 primary care claims made between 1985 and 2000 to the 
Physician Insurers Association of America.  Between 14 and 23 companies 
contributed to the database each year.  Study data represented 361 member years (one 
company insured for one year) and over 1.8 million exposure years (one physician 
insured for one year).  The analysis included claims made against family physicians 
and GPs, internal medicine physicians, and paediatricians. 
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Claims were analysed by study investigators to detect negligent adverse events.  
These were then analysed to determine the types of physicians involved, the severity 
of the outcome, the 10 most common associated medical conditions, the underlying 
cause, contributing factors and relative risk of negligent claims for specific medical 
conditions.  
 
Severity of outcome was measured with 4 levels of harm (including death), 
underlying cause was described by 18 types of medical misadventure, contributing 
factors by 7 types presented from standardized insurance data, and background rates 
of medical conditions were determined from all 14 National Ambulatory Medical 
Care Surveys (NAMCS) conducted since 1980.   Only five underlying causes 
appeared in 77% of claims:  diagnostic error (34%), failure to supervise or monitor 
case (16%), improper performance (15%), medication errors (8%), failure/delay in 
referral (4%).   Within contributing factors, problems with records were evenly 
distributed with respect to outcome severity, whereas high severity outcomes and 
death more often involved claims with communication between providers and early 
hospital discharge as contributing factors. 
 
This data in this study was derived from a large number of physician exposure years, 
and rigorous measures were taken to compare the data on negligent claims per 
medical condition with background rates of medical conditions from a national US 
database spanning a similar time frame.  For policy makers, this study is an excellent 
source of information to use in considering significant sources of morbidity and 
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mortality in primary care, and in determining medical conditions associated with a 
disproportionate number of negligent claims.   
 
It is important to consider however, as the authors point out, that malpractice data 
represent a limited view of patients’ experiences with patient safety events, missing 
many episodes that have no association with an insurance company.  The underlying 
cause classification may have too few categories to use in patient safety research, and 
incidents may have been ‘fitted in’ to categories by reviewers regardless of their 
complexity.  In addition, these categories may not reflect the range of event causes 
described other research on patient safety in this setting.   
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2.6 Quantification of errors in the community setting 
The final theme to address with respect to the nature of reported errors in the 
community setting is the issue of their quantification.  Although there are a number of 
studies which have described the types of errors we see in the community using the 
incident monitoring technique (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 1998; Bhasale, Miller 
et al. 1998; Steven, Malpass et al. 1999; Elder and Dovey 2002; Makeham, Dovey et 
al. 2002; Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003c; Rubin, George et al. 2003; Elder, Vonder 
Meulen et al. 2004), it is very difficult to quantify the number of errors occurring in 
the community setting in a given period of time.  This estimation is important as it has 
major implications when directing resources that aim to combat such threats to patient 
safety.   
 
Attempts have been made to estimate the incidence of errors in hospital settings, 
ranging from an adverse event rate of 3.7% of hospitalizations in the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study (Brennan, Leape et al. 1991), to 16.6% in the Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study (Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995).   
 
In the community setting however, there is little, if any, data available concerning the 
incidence of error.  A recent study of 15 Family Medicine Physicians in Cincinatti, 
USA, showed that the doctors identified errors in almost one quarter of their clinical 
encounters, although this was not able to be generalized (Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 
2004).  An error rate of 75.6 per 1000 appointments over a two week period in 10 
general practices in the North-East of England was based on reports from both clinical 
and administrative staff (Rubin, George et al. 2003).  A review of a large US 
malpractice database over a five year period found that problems with records were 
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evenly distributed with respect to outcome severity, whereas high severity outcomes 
and death more often involved claims with communication between providers and 
early hospital discharge as contributing factors (Phillips, Bartholomew et al. 2004).  
However malpractice data represent a limited view of patient safety events, missing 
many episodes that have no association with an insurance company, and it has been 
suggested that there is no case for claims reviews which rely on data which have been 
assembled for legal purposes only (Vincent, Davy et al. 2006). 
 
As there are so few studies that attempt to quantify reported error in the community, 
there was no specific discussion found in the literature regarding the barriers to 
undertaking such quantification.  A likely reason could be that in order to answer 
research questions of this nature, careful attention to study design, especially in 
relation to representative participant sampling and numbers of patient encounters by 
participants in a given time period, need to be undertaken so that numbers of errors 
reported can be measured in some logical context that can then be generalised.  Prior 
to the TAPS study, this was not done in studies of error in the community setting 
described in the literature. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the results of studies asking questions relating to 
the prevalence of safety events using incident reporting were likely to have been 
limited by the fact that reporters may not recognize safety events, or choose not to 
report for a variety of reasons.   
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2.7 Comparative tables of studies measuring patient safety 
events in community settings identified in the literature 
In this section of the literature review, summarized in the following tables are 16 
groups of studies identified within three main types relating to the measurement of 
patient safety events.  These summary tables are designed to assist in an overview of 
the literature to date that deals with taxonomy of error and the general description of 
patient safety events in the community setting.  They are presented in chronological 
order with aims, data collection and analysis methods, and major findings:   
Type 1:  Studies proposing a taxonomy of safety events in community settings (7) 
Type 2:  Studies describing types of safety events seen in community settings (6) 
Type 3:  Studies that measure other aspects of safety events in community settings (3) 
 
Table 2.2 Type 1 - Studies proposing a taxonomy of safety events in community 
settings. 
 
Study Aim of research Data collection 
method 
Measurement 
method  
Major findings 
1.  Dovey et al (2002-
03) (Dovey, Meyers 
et al. 2002; Dovey, 
Phillips et al. 2003a; 
Dovey, Phillips et al. 
2003b; Dovey, 
Phillips et al. 2003c) 
Describe the 
types of errors 
reported in daily 
practice by 
family 
physicians and 
develop a 
taxonomy of 
error 
Errors reported 
by 42 family 
physicians using 
both paper and  
computer based 
questionnaires 
Four level 
taxonomy with 32 
end codes, based 
on two main error 
types of ‘process’ 
or ‘knowledge and 
skills’ as 
underlying  cause 
at level 1 
A different spectrum of 
error types was reported 
by family physicians 
than has previously 
been described in 
hospital based studies 
2.  Makeham et al 
(Makeham, Dovey et 
al. 2002),  
Beyer et al (Beyer, 
Dovey et al. 2003) 
Woolf et al (Woolf, 
Kuzel et al. 2004) 
Rosser et al(Rosser, 
Dovey et al. 2005) 
Tilyard et al (Tilyard, 
Dovey et al. 2005) 
(2002-05) 
To describe the 
types of errors 
reported by GPs 
and family 
physicians in 7 
countries and 
develop an 
international 
taxonomy of 
error 
Paper and 
computer based 
questionnaires 
submitted by 100 
GPs and family 
physicians over a 
four month 
period 
Multiple level 
taxonomy with 
172 end codes, 
based on two main 
error types of 
‘process’ or 
‘knowledge and 
skills’ as 
underlying  cause 
at level 1 
Around 80% or reported 
errors were caused by 
‘process’ problems, and 
20% by deficiencies in 
‘knowledge and skills’.   
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Study Aim of research Data collection 
method 
Measurement 
method  
Major findings 
3.  Pace et al (Pace, 
Staton et al. 2003), 
Fernald et al 
(Fernald, Pace et al. 
2004), Westfall et al 
(Westfall, Fernald et 
al. 2004) Parnes et al 
(Parnes, Fernald et al. 
2007) (2003-07), 
Develop a 
system for 
confidential  
error reporting, 
describe types of 
error and 
differences 
between 
confidential and 
anonymous 
reports 
Confidential or 
anonymous 
reports submitted 
by phone, 
electronically, or 
on paper from 33 
practices with 
475 clinicians 
and staff  
ASIPS taxonomy 
is a multiaxial 
system having 5 
domains: patients, 
participants in 
event, outcome of 
event, course and 
cause of event, 
and event 
discovery.  Harm 
was assigned to 
one of 5 groups.  
Confidential reports 
afford greater analysis 
of cause than 
anonymous ones.  
Common errors types 
reported were 
diagnostic tests (47%), 
medication (35.4%) and 
communication 
(70.8%).   
4.  Elder et al (Elder, 
Dovey et al. 2002 and 
Elder, Vonder 
Meulen et al. 2004) 
(2002-04) 
Describe errors 
identified by 
family 
physicians and 
determine 
physician’s 
perception of 
resulting harm  
Errors noted by 
family 
physicians on a 
proforma during 
half day sessions 
followed by 
interview with 
researchers 
Classification by 
‘preventable 
adverse event 
type’ (diagnosis, 
treatment or 
preventive 
service) and 
‘process error’ 
(clinician, 
communication, 
administrative and 
‘blunt end’ 
factors) 
Errors reported in 24% 
of clinical encounters, 
and harm or potential 
harm reported in 24% 
and 70% of patients 
where error was noted 
respectively.  
Administrative errors 
were most common type 
reported. 
5.  Rubin et al 
(Rubin, George et al. 
2003), Steele et al 
(Steele, Rubin et al. 
2006) 
(2003-06) 
Classify general 
practice errors 
and assess a 
reporting method 
for 
administrative 
staff and GPs  
Events reported 
using an 
anonymous 
paper form, 
reporters coded 
events using a 
descriptive 
classification 
Classification had 
6 main categories:  
Prescriptions, 
Communication, 
Appointments, 
Equipment, 
Clinical Care and 
‘Other’ 
Practices found 
anonymously reporting 
errors using a simple 
paper form neither 
disruptive nor 
threatening.  Most 
reported errors were 
administrative.  
6.  Kuzel et al (Kuzel, 
Woolf et al. 2004) 
(2004) 
Develop patient-
focused 
typologies of 
medical errors 
and harms in 
primary care 
Structured 
interviews with 
38 people 
recruited from 
phonebook. 
5 domain 
taxonomy (4 
levels, 70 end 
classifications):  
access breakdown, 
communication 
and relationship  
breakdowns, 
technical errors 
and inefficiency  
Breakdowns in the 
clinician-patient 
relationship represented 
37% of incidents, 
dominated by disrespect 
or insensitivity.  70% of 
reported harms were 
psychological. 
7.Kostopoulou 
(Kostopoulou 2006), 
Kostopoulou and 
Delaney 
(Kostopoulou and 
Delaney 2007) (2006-
2007) 
Develop a 
taxonomy of 
patient safety in 
general practice 
based on 
cognitive 
psychological 
theory 
Confidential 
reports received 
from 5 general 
practices in UK 
with follow up 
interviews from 
investigators 
A three level 
taxonomy:  level 1 
‘cognitive 
domain’ that 
failed, level 2 are 
immediate internal 
and external 
causes, level three 
are ‘performance 
shaping’ factors  
77 events contributed to 
taxonomy development. 
“Situation assessment 
and response selection” 
is the most frequently 
involved domain.  
Further testing of the 
model is required for 
validity and 
comprehensiveness. 
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Table 2.3 Type 2 - Studies describing types of safety events seen in community 
settings. 
 
Study Aim of 
research 
Data collection 
method 
Measurement 
method  
Major findings 
1.  Diamond et 
al(Diamond, 
Kamien et al. 
1995) and Sim et 
al(Sim, Kamien et 
al. 1996) (1995-
96) 
Describe GP 
trainee 
experiences 
with positive 
and negative 
incidents 
Qualitative 
analysis of 
open-ended 
interviews with 
GP trainees   
The 15 most 
frequent of 36 
descriptive groups 
of critical incidents 
were reported  
Analysis of critical 
incidents can accelerate 
learning and help plan 
curricula 
2.  Ely et al (Ely, 
Levinson et al. 
1995) 
(1995) 
Determine 
perceived 
causes of family 
physician error 
Qualitative 
analysis of in-
depth 
interviews with 
53 Family 
Physicians 
34 causes identified 
falling into 4 main 
groupings 
Most common causes were 
hurry, distraction, lack of 
knowledge, premature 
closure of diagnostic 
process, and inadequately 
aggressive patient 
management 
3.  Fischer et 
al(Fischer, Fetters 
et al. 1997) (1997) 
Describe the 
prevalence of 
adverse events 
identified 
through a risk-
management 
database 
Review of all 
incident reports 
from the 
database of an 
academic center 
over a 5.5 year 
period 
Classification of  
causes into 4 types: 
diagnostic, 
treatment, 
preventive and 
‘other’  
Adverse events associated 
with medical management 
were detected in 3.7 per 
100,000 clinic visits.  83% 
were due to preventable 
error 
4.  Britt et al(Britt, 
Miller et al. 1997), 
Bhasale et 
al(Bhasale 1998; 
Bhasale, Miller et 
al. 1998) (1997-
98) 
Describe 
incidents 
occurring in 
general practice 
Modified 
critical incident 
technique, with 
participants 
anonymously  
submitting 
paper reports 
Participants 
selected from four 
incident categories, 
and four ‘problem 
areas’ identified by 
investigators 
The incident monitoring 
technique can be 
successfully applied to 
general practice.  76 % of 
incidents were preventable, 
major harm occurred in 
17%, and death in 4% 
5.  Wilf-Miron et 
al (Wilf-Miron, 
Lewenhoff et al. 
2003) (2003) 
Apply aviation 
safety principles 
to reporting 
errors in a large 
ambulatory 
healthcare 
setting  
Events reported 
by telephone 
hotline to a 
specialized risk 
management 
unit for debrief 
and analysis 
‘5M’ model from 
Aviation safety:  
Man (human 
factors), Machine 
(technology), 
Medium 
(environmental), 
Mission (care 
activities), 
Managerial aspects. 
Root cause analysis of 2000 
errors over 5 years: 33% 
processes of care; 21% 
treatment; 18% judgment; 
15% auxiliary tests; and 
13% poor physician-patient 
communication  
6.  Phillips et al 
(Phillips, 
Bartholomew et 
al. 2004) (2004) 
Describe the 
epidemiology of 
negligent 
adverse events 
from primary 
care within a 
large US 
malpractice 
database 
Claims analysed 
for negligent 
adverse events: 
their severity, 
causes, 
contributing 
factors, and 
medical 
conditions 
Classification by 
measurement 
systems used within 
insurance database:  
18 types of ‘cause’ 
and 7 types of 
‘contributing 
factors’ 
Causes:  diagnostic error 
(34%), failure to monitor 
case (16%), improper 
performance (15%), 
medication errors (8%), 
delay in referral (4%), 
others (23%).   Higher harm 
outcomes from provider 
communication error. 
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Table 2.4 Type 3 - Studies measuring other aspects of safety events in community 
settings. 
Study Aim of 
research 
Data collection 
method 
Measurement 
method  
Major findings 
1.  Holden et 
al(Holden, 
O'Donnell et 
al. 1998) 
(1998) 
Determine the 
pattern of 
deaths and 
potentially 
preventable 
factors in four 
practices 
Audit of all 
deaths over 40 
months using a 
standard data 
collection form  
A series of 
preventable factors 
were determined by 
GPs at quarterly 
clinical meetings 
An audit of deaths has 
educational value for 
GPs and is a source of 
ideas for service 
improvement and 
further study 
2.  Singh et al 
(Singh, Singh 
et al. 2005) 
(2005) 
Develop a 
visual model for 
of error in 
primary care, 
using a ‘systems 
engineering’ 
approach 
Computer based 
reporting 
system is 
suggested, 
using visual 
cues to indicate 
problem areas 
of system, and 
enter error data. 
No error 
measurement 
method or 
classification 
described  
No trials of method are 
described, theoretical 
findings are presented 
describing the 
components of the 
primary health care 
system. 
3.  Shaw et al 
(Shaw, Drever 
et al. 2005), 
Williams and 
Osborn 
(Williams and 
Osborn 2006) 
(2005-06) 
Describe the 
implementation 
of a national 
incident 
reporting 
system for 
England and 
Wales 
Reports from 
participating 
NHS Trusts 
sent 
electronically.  
System now 
capable of on-
line anonymous 
reporting. 
No error 
measurement 
method described, 
the reports were 
classified by 108 
different types, not 
defined.   
Majority of reported 
incidents from all 
sources were slips, trips 
and falls.  Only 32 of 
nearly 30 000 reports 
came from one primary 
care trust. 
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2.8   Patient Safety Research in the Australian Community 
Setting 
2.8.1 Cost of medical errors in Australia 
The financial burden of hospital based iatrogenic injuries have been analysed in 
Australia, and account for 2 to 3% of the annual budget of typical Australian 
community based hospital of 120 beds (Rigby and Litt 2000).  It is very likely that 
financial savings would also result from the prevention of errors in primary care, 
where the majority of health care encounters take place, however as no studies to date 
have described frequencies of primary care errors, it is not possible to calculate this 
cost.  However, Australia has been ahead of the rest of the world in research that has 
attempted to provide an overview of the type of errors encountered in general practice 
(Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 1998; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998).  
 
2.8.2 The Incident Monitoring Technique applied to general 
practice 
In 1993, the Commonwealth provided funding to test incident monitoring in six 
specialties, which included general practice.  The resulting study’s objectives were to 
apply the incident monitoring technique to the general practice environment, collect 
data on incidents and evaluate their possible causes, and examine potential harm 
relating to diagnostic processes.  Bhasale and Britt have published results of the first 
805 incidents reported between October 1993 and June 1995 (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; 
Bhasale 1998; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998), and their analysis found that incident 
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monitoring is a useful tool for identifying sources of misdiagnosis and for 
implementation and assessment of quality improvement strategies.   
 
‘Incidents’ were defined as an unintended event, no matter how trivial or 
commonplace, that could have harmed or did harm a patient.  Between October 1993 
and June 1995, 324 GPs participated at some time by invitation from membership lists 
of research and professional groups, and as volunteers.     
 
The method used in this study was an anonymous written reporting system, which 
because of the possibility of identifying general practitioner participants, required an 
application for protection from subpoena under a Commonwealth Act of Parliament, 
the Health Insurance Act 1973.  Participants were sent 10 copies of a four page 
incident report form, which included questions relating to patient and reporting GP 
demographics, and allowed free-text descriptions of incidents and structured 
responses for preventability, potential for harm, immediate consequences, predicted 
long-term outcomes, type of incident, contributing factors, mitigating factors and 
additional resource use(Britt, Miller et al. 1997).   
 
Incidents were categorized as one of four major types, based on fixed choice 
responses from participants, and each type had varying numbers of sub-categories (in 
brackets).  They were:   pharmacological (16), non-pharmacological (6), diagnostic 
(4) and equipment related (3).  Participants graded potential for harm using a five-
point scale.  Investigators used qualitative analysis to identify broad problem groups.       
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Altogether 805 incident reports were analysed, with 142 of the first 500 included in 
the exploration of harm relating to diagnostic processes.  Pharmacological errors were 
most often reported by GPs.  GPs reported that incidents were preventable 76% of the 
time, and that major harm occurred 17% of the time, with an additional 4% resulting 
in patient death.  Investigators identified four broad problem groups from qualitative 
analysis of free-text responses:  communication problems, procedural problems, 
clinical problems (due to human error) and external problems (outside the control of 
the GP).  
 
The collection of incident forms was continued by the Research and Health Promotion 
Unit of the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners until June 1998, and of 
the total of 2582 reports received, 50% involved medication problems (Steven, 
Malpass et al. 1999).   
 
The publications by Bhasale and Britt represent the first major study of a modified 
incident monitoring technique in a community setting, and provided the earliest 
evidence of the suitability of this method for subsequent similar studies on this 
subject. Anonymity and legal protections for reporting GPs provided a safe 
environment to encourage reporting.  The methodology is an appropriate option for 
continuous use and quality improvement purposes.  Although interview may elicit 
greater detail, completion of paper-based reports proved an effective and economical 
method to collect data.   
 
There are a number of weaknesses in the method, which did not allow quantification 
of error types, as GPs may have been selective in their reporting.  There was no way 
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of knowing how many reports were submitted per participant (not all forms were 
identified by a participant number), and participants did not complete the study in a 
defined time frame, sending in 10 reports from their point of enrolment. The findings 
are not able to be generalized as the sample was not randomly selected or 
representative.  The measurement methods for classifying incidents may not be 
reliable, as there may be major inconsistencies in the way different GP participants 
classified their incident reports into the four main categories.  In addition, the 
identification of problem groups by investigators appeared to have some degree of 
overlap (for example, ‘procedural’ problems included diagnostic incidents where “a 
correct diagnosis was rejected due to insufficient or incorrect examination”, and at the 
same time ‘clinical’ problems included diagnostic incidents “where symptoms and 
signs were not recognized”). 
 
2.8.3 The critical incident technique applied to GP Registrars 
Australian researchers also published some of the earliest work using the incident 
monitoring or critical incident technique with GP registrars.  Two studies, conducted 
in 1992 and published in 1995 and 1996 aimed to obtain information on the 
experiences of GP trainees during their early training, and follow up with the same 
group after their advanced training to gauge changes in performance (Diamond, 
Kamien et al. 1995); (Sim, Kamien et al. 1996) 
 
‘Positive incidents’ were events in their GP training that had made trainees feel good 
or competent; ‘negative incidents’ were events that had made them feel incompetent 
or unhappy with their performance.  39 GP trainees in Western Australia in their first 
term in 1992 were initially included, and follow-up was conducted with 18 of these 
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participants.  The study method was a qualitative analysis of open ended interviews 
about positive and negative incidents describing competent or poor professional 
practices.  In this respect it differed from other studies of ‘error’.  The study was not 
aimed at detecting harms to patients and so ‘incidents’ include non-patient safety 
related events such as poor relationships between GP and practice staff.   
 
Investigators grouped critical incidents into 36 types, with the seven most commonly 
reported being described as:  difficult patients, paediatrics, doctor-patient relationship, 
counselling skills, obstetrics and gynaecology, relationships with others involved in 
care, and cardiovascular disorders.  Major skills associated with critical incidents were 
reported in three major categories:  interpersonal skills, diagnostic skills, and 
management skills.   
 
The studies found that the initial training is a crucial transition period for GP trainees, 
and analysis of incidents can be used by training programs to accelerate the learning 
process of doctors, and for planning undergraduate curricula.  The trainees were found 
to have developed competence, confidence and reduced levels of anxiety with 
advancing experience.  However, the findings are not readily able to be generalised as 
the study used a small non-representative sample with a low follow-up rate in the 
second study.  The method did not allow anonymity of participants from investigators, 
and the 36 category classification has not been published. 
 
2.8.4 The Primary Care International Study of Medical Error  
This study (PCISME) provided a pilot for the TAPS study, and the Australian data 
and taxonomy published to its third level in the MJA in 2002 (Makeham, Dovey et al. 
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2002) provided the basic starting point for the development of the TAPS study and 
taxonomy.  The PCISME taxonomy is presented from this publication in Appendix 4 
of this thesis.  Both the Australian and international results are described in this 
section of the thesis. 
 
In 2000, the Robert Graham Centre of the American Academy of Family Physicians 
conducted a pilot study of medical mistakes reported by Family Physicians. This 
research informed the development of the 2001 pilot study, the Primary Care 
International Study of Medical Errors (PCISME).  This study was an international 
collaboration of six first world primarily English speaking countries comprising 
Australia, Canada, England, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the USA. There have 
been a number of publications describing different aspects of the study from a range 
of the participant countries (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Beyer, Dovey et al. 2003; 
Woolf, Kuzel et al. 2004; Rosser, Dovey et al. 2005; Tilyard, Dovey et al. 2005) 
 
Prof Michael Kidd and Dr Meredith Makeham coordinated the Australian arm of this 
pilot study in the Department of General Practice, University of Sydney.  The 
methodology developed an electronic method for the anonymous collection of self-
reported errors from general practitioners.   
 
PCISME differed from previous Australian work in its focus on unwanted events, 
rather than ‘incidents’, whether or not they resulted in harm.  The definition of an 
error used was: 
Errors are events in your practice that make you conclude: “that was a 
threat to patient well-being and should not happen. I don’t want it to 
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happen again”. Such an event affects or could affect the quality of the 
care you give your patients. Errors may be large or small, 
administrative or clinical, or actions taken or not taken. Errors may or 
may not have discernible effects. Errors in this study are anything that 
you identify as something wrong, to be avoided in the future. 
 
Accordingly, the data related to any occasion, regardless of actual or potential 
outcome, in which any of the health care procedures or delivery systems used by 
participants and their patients deviated from their course, or were not capable of 
achieving the intended outcome.  The data included the observations of general 
practitioners during their daily clinical practice of medicine, whether in practices, 
hospitals, patients’ homes, nursing homes, or other sites of care delivery. The 
reports were therefore not necessarily of actions or omissions made by the 
reporting doctors themselves or affecting their patients. Reports could include 
incidents participants observed but involved other providers or patients.  This 
definition attempts to incorporate as broad a range as possible of problems 
occurring in general practice.  It allows participants to report not only on events 
that they consider to have been attributable to their own actions, but also 
unwanted occurrences that they note concerning patient care.   
 
The methods used in PCISME also differed from previous primary care error research 
in that it allowed the development and testing of an on-line error reporting system, 
which comprised of an electronic form with free text and multiple choice fields, 
which was attached to a database for collection and analysis of results.  The 
questionnaire was a series of closed and open-ended questions about the reported 
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error and the patients involved, including harm rating and suggestions for 
preventability.  In order to use the electronic form, participants required a software 
package called Healix.  Error reports were transmitted to a secure Healix server in 
London under encryption, and access to the database was protected and limited to the 
chief investigators in each country.    
 
100 GPs and Family Physicians participated from all seven countries, with study 
group size varying between countries (8 to 23).  A non-random sample of 20 general 
practitioners from the Sydney metropolitan region was enrolled in PCISME, and over 
a four month period contributed 139 electronic error reports. 
 
A multilevel taxonomy based on previous work (Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002) was 
developed by the lead investigator based in Washington, USA (SD) working with the 
participant country investigators.  Additional categories and sub-categories were 
created and/or changed as necessary. The resulting taxonomy contained 172 
categories, with between 4 and 7 further levels in the measure’s hierarchy.          
 
There were similarities observed in the types of errors reported by all participants at 
the first and second levels of the measure (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).  
Approximately 80% were ‘process’ errors and 20% ‘knowledge and skills’ (Beyer, 
Dovey et al. 2003).  Physicians in most countries found the electronic method 
feasible.  Altogether 166 qualitatively different prevention strategies were identified 
(Tilyard, Dovey et al. 2005). 
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PCISME represented the first attempt to develop a standard measure of patient safety 
events across different countries, although all countries represented in the study had ‘a 
similar concept of health care’(Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).  The study showed that 
it was possible to form a measure of patient safety that was comprehensible across 
different countries, cultures, and language bases. Only the first three levels have been 
described in the peer-reviewed literature (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002) but the full 
measure is available on-line at www.errorsinmedicine.net/taxonomy/aafp.   
 
There were a number of weaknesses in the study design.  The number of participants 
in each country was small and they were not randomly selected or representative.  It is 
unlikely that all possible patient safety events are captured by the measure.  No 
statistical comparisons could be made of the different types of events reported in 
different countries.  There were differences in the roles of primary care doctors in 
these different countries, and in the levels of computer use in community settings.  
Some participants (notably in Canada) were unable to submit reports via computer 
and had to use paper reports. This may have systematically altered the quality and/or 
content of their reports. The size of the resulting taxonomy may make it difficult for 
use other than as a descriptive tool. 
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2.9   Limitations of this review 
Included in the literature review for this thesis were only research publications 
investigating the breadth of community based healthcare activity and its risks for 
patient safety.  Excluded were studies that focused on a single bounded activity or 
cluster of activities, such as medications use or diagnosis.  Only English-language 
papers were included.  
 
This review produced papers mainly from the US, the UK, and Australia.  The 
overwhelming body of published research about patient safety comes from this very 
limited set of countries, and so it is unlikely to address issues of importance to patient 
safety in many other countries – especially in the developing world.   
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2.10   Literature review conclusions 
The key findings of this review are presented below in figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6 Key findings in the literature review of patient safety methods and 
measures in community settings. 
 
 
As recently as five years ago, community based health care providers were more or 
less exempt from considerations about patient safety and they were explicitly 
excluded from the seminal patient safety reports from the US (Committee on Quality 
of Health Care in America 2000)and the UK (Chief Medical Officer, NHS 2000).  
Since that time there has been a growing recognition of the increasingly urgent need 
• Incident reporting systems are reported as the method most often applied to 
safety event data collection in the community setting 
• There is a large variation in definitions of ‘error’ and other related terms in 
patient safety research, and national or preferably international uniformity 
should be established to improve shared understanding of the subject 
• Taxonomies of patient safety events in community settings are of two main 
types:  ‘domain specific’ and ‘multiaxial’, and the appropriate classification 
will depend on the aims of the research, nature of the reporters and 
resources available to analyse data 
• Despite a recognized poor ‘safety culture’ in health care, clinician attitudes 
to safety event reporting are positive provided the systems in place are non-
punitive and educational, and support clinical care 
• The National Reporting and Learning System established by the National 
Patient Safety Agency of the NHS is the only national safety event 
reporting system reported in the literature as being an anonymous secure 
system accessible to health care workers in community settings 
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to reduce patient safety threats in community settings because most patients encounter 
formal health systems most often outside hospitals (Green, Fryer et al. 2001). 
 
It has become generally accepted that a prospective reporting system is more suitable 
than retrospective record review for identifying safety events in primary care with a 
view to developing preventive strategies (Malpass, Helps et al. 1999) although this 
view has received little critical appraisal.  The incident monitoring technique has been 
used in various forms in the majority of the studies identified, and was found to be an 
appropriate method for patient safety surveillance in community settings.  
 
Although limited by background levels of computerization in the primary care setting, 
electronic databases and secure web-based reporting systems may offer the greatest 
potential for information gathering, data analysis, ease of access and protection from 
punitive repercussions for the reporters.  Community based clinician attitudes to 
safety event reporting are generally positive, provided the systems in place are non-
punitive and educational, and their institution on large scales would likely provide a 
mechanism to assist in improving the safety culture in community settings. 
 
No literature was identified that used the technique of retrospective records review to 
discover threats to patient safety, apart from reviews of incident reports in one US 
study (Fischer, Fetters et al. 1997).  Numerous barriers to this method could apply in a 
community setting, where a record of the breakdown in care that leads to a safety 
event might be spread amongst several different health care providers in different 
locations, unlike a hospital record, where multiple providers can contribute to a single 
set of patient notes. However, a study of this type has the potential to draw some 
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comparisons with hospital-based studies using this method (Brennan, Leape et al. 
1991; Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995) and may warrant further exploration.  
 
There have been calls for large scale reporting systems that would capture incidents 
and adverse events (Runciman, Edmonds et al. 2002), however only the National 
Reporting and Learning System established by the NHS in England and Wales has 
been reported in the literature to have achieved this on a national scale for health care 
professionals in the community setting.  Overviews of its results have been published, 
but there have been no results of its findings regarding reports from the community 
setting, or aspects of its validity or acceptability in community settings published so 
far (Shaw, Drever et al. 2005; Williams and Osborn 2006).   
 
There is a gap in the evidence on the types of methods that may better engage patients 
in safety reporting in community settings, and the value of their input in addressing 
different aspects of patient safety.  Patients have been engaged successfully in 
qualitative research in community settings about perceived harm, but not in trials of 
safety event reporting systems, and this should be considered in future research 
planning.    
 
Only seven studies that propose a measure (or taxonomy) for describing safety events 
in the primary care setting were identified.  These classifications fell into two main 
categories: (1) ‘multiaxial’ taxonomies and (2) ‘domain specific’ or more simple 
classifications describing a single element of the safety event.  The former incorporate 
a number of different aspects about a safety event into its coding, such as the nature of 
the event, associated harm, patient and reporter factors, or cognitive factors in its 
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causation.  The domain specific taxonomies identified focus mainly on the nature of 
the event in categories with a mixture of clinical and administrative titles.  
 
Not all of the taxonomies in the literature proposed for community settings have been 
tested, and in those that have, there are major limitations to consider with respect to 
their validity and comprehensibility.  None of the studies attempted to test the 
reproducibility of their proposed taxonomies across different analysts or primary care 
clinicians. Of all the studies identified discussing safety events in primary care, only 
one used a representative sample (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).  Although a taxonomy 
developed to cross disciplines has been proposed (Chang, Schyve et al. 2005), it also 
remains untested with primary care clinicians.   
 
The research into patient safety in community settings generally spans little more than 
a decade, although there is an extensive literature easily interpretable as relevant to 
patient safety in more bounded areas such as medications use and diagnosis.  The 
scope of this review has not included a rigorous analysis of these specific safety 
topics, which may provide further insight into methods and measures of relevance to 
patient safety events in community settings.  
 
A limitation of attempting to combine the findings of various studies is that there is a 
large variation in definitions of ‘error’ and other related terms in patient safety 
research.  It would therefore be useful if national or preferably international 
uniformity was established amongst researchers and health policy makers.  
Taxonomies of patient safety events in community settings are mainly in 
developmental stages, and much further testing is required in the field.   
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There are relatively few countries engaged in patient safety research in community 
settings, and the review was limited by the predominantly ‘Western’ nature of the 
published scientific literature.  Attempts to increase the efforts at an international level 
should ideally consider ways to engage a broader range of communities and health 
care settings, including developing countries and different cultural groups.   
 
This review supports the conclusion that prospective reporting of threats to patient 
safety made by healthcare providers in community-based settings is readily 
achievable.  Local, institutional, national, and international reporting systems have all 
been successfully trialled.  Reports made this way will identify classes of risk to 
patient safety.  This reporting should probably be facilitated through electronic 
systems and analysed using multi-axial or domain-specific taxonomies of event type, 
combined with other information that a sophisticated reporting and learning system is 
able to collect about the safety event.   
 
There are challenges in many countries to instituting national reporting and learning 
systems, but developments on the international scene such as the creation of the WHO 
World Alliance of Patient Safety are improving the research effort in the subject of 
patient safety in community settings, and the benefits to health systems and patients 
should follow. 
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3 Methods 
3.1 Overview 
This section of the thesis addresses the methods by which the four major aims of the 
TAPS study outlined earlier were met.  A group of general practitioners (GPs) 
submitted anonymous online reports about any errors that they noted over a twelve 
month period commencing in October 2003, and the basic design and various ethics 
and other approvals are described in sections 3.2 to 3.6.  The design of the web-based 
reporting system had a number of technical requirements, which are addressed in 
sections 3.7 and 3.8.  The process of sampling the group of GPs and their consent and 
education on how to use the TAPS reporting system is described in section 3.9, and 
the method of collecting their patient visit data is described in section 3.10.  The 
methods used to determine the incidence of reported error are presented in section 
3.11, and finally the methods used to develop the TAPS taxonomy of safety events 
and determine their proportions are described in section 3.12 and 3.13.  Sections 3.14 
to 3.18 describe the methods applied to analyse other features of the reported errors, 
including patient related factors, event locations, associated harm, preventability, 
perceived frequency of reported error types, and the final section 3.19 discusses the 
participant feedback interview. 
 
The methods of the TAPS study have been previously published in the peer reviewed 
scientific literature, relating to general study design, incidence calculations, taxonomy 
development, proportions of error types and coder agreement (Makeham, Kidd et al. 
2006; Makeham, Stromer et al. 2007), and these papers are presented in Appendices 6 
and 7. 
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3.2 NHMRC Project Grant funding, Ethics approval and 
consent process 
The TAPS study won a National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) 
Primary Health Care Project Grant for the years 2003 to 2006, which funded direct 
research costs and research assistant staff salaries associated with the study.  In 
addition, the Chief Investigator (Meredith Makeham) was awarded an NHMRC 
research scholarship to undertake the study.    
 
The TAPS study ethics approval was obtained from the University of Sydney Human 
Research and Evaluation Ethics Committee.  The Information and Consent Form 
appears as Appendix 2 of this thesis.  Consent from all general practitioner 
participants was obtained in person at their practices in metropolitan and rural regions 
of NSW by a member of the study team.  Participants were given an electronic 
demonstration of the TAPS web-based error reporting system at this time. 
 
3.3 Qualified Privilege granted by NSW Health Minister 
The Chief Investigators of the TAPS study (Dr Meredith Makeham, Prof Michael 
Kidd, Clinical Professor Michael Mira and Dr Chris Cooper) applied for and were 
granted Qualified Privilege under Division 6B of the Health Administration Act 1982 
and the Health Administration Regulation 2000, which provided protection from 
subpoena of TAPS committee meeting minutes by the NSW State Minister of Health 
(at this time, The Hon. Mr Morris Iemma).   
   
 
82
The provision of qualified privilege for quality assurance committees is designed to 
encourage health care professionals to participate in quality assurance activities by 
providing for: 
• the confidentiality of documents and proceedings of the Committee 
• the protection of those documents and proceedings from being used in legal actions 
• the protection from liability and indemnity for present and former members, of the 
  Committee, who were acting in good faith in carrying out their responsibilities.   
 
There is clearly a strong public interest in ensuring that the health system provides 
high quality health care.  The rationale behind the provision of these privileges is that 
if reviews of health services are impeded by the lack of participation by health care 
professionals then there is a public interest need to remove the known barriers to their 
participation.  This is the basis for arguing that there is a public interest in maintaining 
the confidentiality of information generated by quality assurance committees, if 
that confidentiality is essential to the participation by health care professionals. 
This public interest should however, be balanced against the community’s interest in 
accessing information about health services (NSW Health 2007). 
 
The TAPS committee was required when seeking qualified privilege to show that: 
• the public interest in gaining health care professionals participation outweighed the 
community’s interest in accessing information, and  
• that there would be an improved standard of patient care arising from the 
Committee’s activities if it was able to operate under a guarantee of privilege. 
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3.4 RACGP Audit Activity Approval 
The acquisition of QACE points is mandatory for Australian general practitioners 
(GPs) who wish to remain on the vocational register, and GPs require 60 group 1 
points within a triennial cycle. Application to the Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners (RACGP) was made by the chief investigators of the study and the 
TAPS study was approved as an audit activity.  TAPS study participants who wished 
to participate were granted 30 Group 1 Quality Assurance and Continuing Education 
(QACE) points for their completion of a twelve month learning cycle that coincided 
with the twelve month reporting period.  The award of QACE points was optional for 
participants and had no bearing on their general involvement in the study.  
  
In order to be eligible for the 30 QACE point award, the TAPS participants who 
requested to be a part of the additional audit activity had to complete a baseline 
reflective questionnaire prior to the commencement of reporting.  They received a 
summary of the TAPS activity results at the end of the first and second six months 
and completed a questionnaire at each point detailing their learning as a result of the 
study.  A final questionnaire was completed in which participants reflected on what 
they had learnt as a result of their participation, completing a learning cycle. 
 
3.5 Definition of error in general practice used 
The definition of ‘error’ used was derived from previous work (including that 
undertaken by Meredith Makeham) (Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; Makeham, Dovey et 
al. 2002; Woolf, Kuzel et al. 2004a; Tilyard, Dovey et al. 2005) and attempts to 
incorporate the broadest possible range of problems that may be encountered.  The 
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error may be attributable not only to the reporter’s actions, but also other unwanted 
occurrences concerning patient care: 
“Errors are events in your practice that make you conclude: ‘That was a threat 
to patient well-being and should not happen.  I don’t want it to happen again’.  
Such an event affects or could affect the quality of care you give your patients.  
Errors may be large or small, administrative or clinical, or actions taken or not 
taken.  Errors may or may not have discernable effects.  Errors in this study 
are anything that you identify as something wrong, to be avoided in the 
future.” 
 
This definition was the most appropriate to use in the TAPS study as it had already 
been tested in association with a very similar questionnaire in the pilot study (Dovey, 
Meyers et al. 2002; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Woolf, Kuzel et al. 2004a; Tilyard, 
Dovey et al. 2005), and participants had displayed a good understanding of the term 
(Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002), although more recent suggestions of definitions of 
error, harm and safety have been discussed in the literature review (Runciman 2006; 
WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety 2006), with suggestions that common 
meanings are adopted by researchers. 
 
3.6 TAPS study error questionnaire 
The questions contained within the TAPS questionnaire were based upon those used 
in the pilot study, PCISME (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).  The difference from the 
pilot study was the addition of Question a) relating to the RRMA area of the practice, 
which allowed some sub-group analysis of error reporting rates based upon practice 
location further discussed in section 3.11. The questions are shown below in table 3.1: 
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Table 3.1 Error questionnaire used in the TAPS study. 
Question Answer format 
a)  What is the RRMA area of your practice? RRMA 1, 2-3 or 4-7 
b)  Is the problem related to a specific patient? YES/ NO 
c)  How well do you know the patient? 5 point Likert scale 
d)  What is the patient’s age? Free text 
e)  What is the patient’s sex? MALE/ FEMALE 
f)  Is the patient from a non-English speaking 
background? 
YES/ NO 
g)  Is the patient of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
descent?  
YES/ NO 
h)  What happened?  Please consider what, where and 
who was involved. 
Free text 
i)  What was the result?  Please think about actual and 
potential consequences. 
Free text 
j)  What may have contributed to this error? Please 
consider any special circumstances. 
Free text 
k)  Where did the error happen?  Choose all that apply 
from Office or surgery, Nursing home, Hospital, 
Patient’s home, Telephone contact, Emergency Room, 
Laboratory, Pharmacy, Radiology 
Check a box or boxes:  
9 choices 
l)  To your knowledge, was any patient harmed by this 
error? 
YES/ NO 
m)  If yes, how would you rate the seriousness of this 
harm? 
5 point Likert scale 
n)  How often does this error occur in your practice? 
First time, Seldom 1–2 per year, Sometimes 3–11 per 
year, Frequently >1/month 
Check a box: 4 choices 
o)  What could have prevented this error?  Please 
consider what could be done to prevent similar episodes 
from happening in the future. 
Free text 
p)  Other comments? Free text 
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3.7 The TAPS web-based error reporting system 
3.7.1 Major requirements of the TAPS reporting system 
In order to collect sensitive information on threats to the safety of their patients from a 
group of Australian general practitioners (GPs), the following requirements of the 
system were established: 
• Of the utmost importance was that participant GPs and any health workers or 
patients involved in reports should have their anonymity protected 
• The system should allow ease and flexibility for reporting GPs who wish to 
submit reports either at home or at work, check on numbers of reports submitted, 
contact the investigators and access useful links to other information sources 
 
A Sydney-based private internet service providing company (ISP) called L&P Net 
Solutions Pty Ltd was engaged to develop the website and reporting system based on 
the system and security requirements developed by the candidate that are outlined in 
this section.    
 
3.7.2 The TAPS website security measures 
There were a number of considerations taken into account when establishing that the 
TAPS reporting system would ensure privacy for participants.  Figure 3.1 displays the 
various website security measures described in this section.  A website security 
engineer was consulted in the early stages of planning, and the system was designed 
to follow internationally recognised information security standards for highly 
sensitive information.  In addition to other techniques outlined below, a service level 
agreement (SLA) was entered into with the web hosting company. This SLA enforced 
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a required level of vigilance on the part of the web host company regarding the 
security of the system. This ensured server patches were kept up to date, intrusion 
detection logs were checked, and physical security was maintained. 
   
In a system such as the one proposed there are three major risks to the security of 
participant data. The first is that the data may be intercepted while in transit between 
the GP and the system, the second is that there may be unauthorised access to the data 
stored on the system, and the third is that the anonymity of survey participants may be 
compromised. These concerns are addressed below. 
 
3.7.2.1 Data interception risk 
The data interception risk was mitigated by employing industry standard encryption 
between the survey participant's computer and the system. The encryption is built into 
the operating system on all standard computers and does not require any configuration 
on the part of the user. The encryption was enabled automatically when the participant 
began undertaking a report, and if for any reason the participant's computer was 
unable to provide this encryption the system would not then allow them to continue. 
3.7.2.2 Unauthorised access risk 
The unauthorised access risk was mitigated by splitting the system into two parts - a 
web server and a database server. The web server was accessible from the internet and 
did not store any participant data. The database server was accessible only from the 
internal network of the web hosting company, and this is where the participant data 
was stored. Access to the database server required a password. Both systems were 
protected by firewalls and both were supplied with intrusion detection capabilities.  
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3.7.2.3 Compromise of anonymity risk 
The compromise of anonymity risk was mitigated by participants being identified in 
the reporting process with a personal identification number (PIN) of their own 
choosing. This PIN was known only to the participant. Thus the identity of 
participants was protected even in the highly unlikely event that the system security 
was compromised. In addition, the web server logs were purged on a periodic basis to 
prevent reconstruction of session information. 
Figure 3.1 Illustration of the TAPS electronic system architecture displaying 
security measures. 
 
  
3.7.3 Contents of the TAPS website  
The TAPS website structure consists of two main areas, being the online area 
accessible to participants granted password access, and the database management 
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system, accessible only to Dr Meredith Makeham and members of the research team.  
This section of the thesis describes the online area. 
 
3.7.3.1 TAPS Website access and security pages 
The first step was for participants to go to www.tapsproject.com.au and once at this 
location, a user name and password was required to proceed to the homepage, which 
was given to all participants with a demonstration of the site after they had consented 
to participate in the study.  There was also a button on this page entitled ‘Forgotten 
your password?’ which if activated allowed the participant to send a query directly to 
the investigators who could discuss the access process by telephone after verifying the 
authenticity of the sender.  These queries were followed up within 24 hours of receipt 
by the Chief Investigator (Meredith Makeham) or Project Manager (Geraldine Card). 
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Once successfully through the access page, the participant was required to read and 
acknowledge their understanding of a security and privacy statement: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.3.2 TAPS Website home page 
The home page of the website had five different sections available to the user, being 
more information about the study, the TAPS questionnaire and report submission 
area, an area to contact the investigators, an area to check on the number of reports 
that had been submitted, and an area with useful links to online education resources.   
 
‘Tell me more about the project’ was a page with the general aims and an outline of 
the study methods.  The page entitled ‘summary of your reports’ was used by 
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participants at any point in the study if the wished to view a list of submitted reports 
with time and date of submission by entering their PIN.  ‘Useful links’ were websites 
that the investigators knew to contain medical guidelines or library resources, and 
‘Contact the investigators’ allowed the participants to send an email enquiry directly 
to the investigating team.  Images of the home page and samples of these sections 
follow:  
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3.7.3.3 TAPS Website error reporting pages 
From the home page of the TAPS website, the participant could enter the section 
entitled “Enter a new report”.  Participants were told to choose a Personal 
Identification Number (PIN) for the duration of the study, with any combination of 
numbers or letters between 5 and 8 characters.  They were advised to choose 
something easily memorable, but not identifiable.  Investigators took no part in 
assigning the PIN, and had no knowledge of individual participant’s choices.  This 
further protected the anonymity of participant GPs, however in the event of someone 
forgetting the original PIN they had chosen, investigators were unable to assist in 
recovering the original PIN.  Participants were advised that forgetting their original 
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PIN would not prevent them from continuing in the study, but asked if this occurred, 
to please choose another and inform the investigators that they had forgotten their 
original PIN and would be continuing with a different one, to assist in interpretation 
of results.  
 
The first screen in ‘Enter a new report’ is the PIN entry page, shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the PIN entry page, the participant was led through several pages of 
reporting as per the error questionnaire, shown below in sequence: 
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Only the PIN and RRMA data entry were required fields, and participants were able 
to freely move forwards and backwards through the questionnaire if desired.  On 
hitting submit, a confirmation page appeared to advise of transmission success. 
 
3.8 The TAPS database management system 
Behind the website user interface, a specific Microsoft Access programme was 
designed by the Chief Investigator (MM) to manage the TAPS data, entitled the TAPS 
database management system.  Reports that were received by the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) were housed within this system, and transferred to the Chief 
Investigator (MM) in this format for further analysis and management each month.   
 
The database management system was built with several levels of functions, and was 
designed with capabilities to analyse the data beyond the scope of this thesis.  It is 
only available to the study researchers, not to GP participants.  The front menu had a 
series of four main sections to choose from, being:  collection of reports, summary of 
report variables, error coding reports and error classification systems, which appear in 
the following screen capture: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
100
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8.1 Collection of reports 
Within this section, the user is able to look at the contents of all reports, search 
through them and enter the coding area for each one.  There is a sub-menu with two 
further options, being ‘view reports’ and ‘search reports’.   
 
3.8.1.1 View reports 
In ‘view reports’, it is possible to look at the complete set of reports in the system, and 
in addition the database allows the user to specify a time period by month if desired.   
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The viewed report displays all of the participant entered data in a single screen, an 
example of which is shown in the following screen: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The report detail includes the date and time at which it was submitted to the database 
in addition to the answers to the TAPS questionnaire entered by the participant, and 
the group of records can be quickly navigated using the forward and back arrows on 
the bottom left of the screen.  There are also a series of short cut keys along the 
bottom of the display, including the ‘error coding’ button on the bottom left.  This 
takes the user to a page that is designed to record the classification information about 
each record, and will be described in a later section.    
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3.8.1.2 Search reports 
‘Search reports’ gives the user an option of searching for specific subsets of reports, 
whereby any of the variables that the participant GP has entered in answer to the 
closed TAPS questions may be used as search parameters.  The system allows up to 
five independent parameters to be used simultaneously.  One of the possible search 
parameters also includes the participant PIN, enabling the user to pull up a set of 
reports from an individual PIN that can be typed into the search screen.  Screen 
captures of the ‘view’ and ‘search’ functions appear below: 
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3.8.2 Summary of report variables 
This section allows the user to view the set of PINs appearing on reports, to create a 
series of two by two tables using reports variables, and to run a series of specific 
queries about reports relating to patient’s ages, harm encountered and event location.  
The sub-menu appears below showing these three main areas: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8.2.1 Summary of PINs 
Within ‘Summary of PINs’, the user can specify a time period by month or series of 
months, or look at the entire collection.  The generated report then lists all PINs 
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contained within reports for this period, and the number of times it appears.  A screen 
capture of the ‘Summary of PINs’ page appears below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8.2.2 Crosstab reports 
The second subsection within the ‘Summary of report variables menu’ is a section 
which allows the user to create bi-axial tables, using any of the TAPS questions that 
participants completed by choosing a discreet variable.  The report may be limited to 
the results of a particular RRMA grouping, or display all RRMA groups combined.  A 
time period may also be specified in months.   
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The discreet variables from the questionnaire that may be chosen as parameters on 
either axis include:  RRMA grouping (3 options), whether the error related to a patient 
(2 options), patient sex (2 options), how well do you know the patient (4 options), 
patient is from a non English speaking background (2 options), patient is of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander descent (2 options), where did the error happen 
(9 options), whether the patient was harmed (2 options), the seriousness of this harm 
(5 options), how often does this type of error occur (4 options).  Answers to questions 
involving a continuous variable such as age, or questions requiring free text 
responses, such as ‘what happened?’, are unable to be displayed in this format.   
 
In the following two screen captures for example, the requested table can display the 
numbers of all reports in the twelve month time period from the RRMA 1 subgroup, 
with the number of reports in which a patient was harmed along one axis, and the 
locations of the error events along the other:   
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3.8.2.3 Specified queries on age, harm and location 
In addition to the bi-axial tables, there were a series of specified queries designed to 
address some questions around the continuous variable of age, as well as a breakdown 
of average ratings of harm levels in different event locations, and at different ages.  
These queries could also be limited by RRMA grouping and time period in months.  
The example below queries the average age of patients appearing in reports: 
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3.8.3 Error coding reports 
The third sub-menu of the database management system is entitled ‘error coding 
reports’ and its options allow various queries to be made of the information that has 
been entered into a specific error coding page associated with each report.   
 
A major function of the TAPS database management system was to allow the 
classification of the reports using various different systems.  An error coding page 
was designed that is linked to each individual report.  From the displayed error report 
or set of reports when requested from the ‘view reports’ menu described earlier, there 
was an option of going into a specific coding page for that report, attached behind it in 
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the computer programme.  The screen capture below shows the coding page for the 
sample report which appeared previously in the description of the ‘view reports’ area: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This error coding page is comprised of information entered by the study investigator 
coding the reports.  The investigator may enter a report description summary, the 
number of error events that they have seen within the report (to account for cases 
where a series of separate error events comprise the overall error), and the 
classification of each of these events using a series of three different classification 
systems.  This thesis addresses the classification system created by using the TAPS 
reports, later described as the ‘TAPS taxonomy’, and this code was entered in the 
section on this screen entitled ‘Makeham et al’.   
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The error coding page has been designed with the potential for further classification of 
the reports by using features of the International Classification of Primary Care 
(Committee 1998) (ICPC) including ICPC-2 ‘Reason for Encounter’ codes, and a 
novel ICPC based error classification system, and this work is currently underway but 
does not form part of this thesis..   
 
There is also the potential for further classification of the reports using a coding 
system which was created from the international pilot study previously described, the 
Primary Care International Study of Medical Error (PCISME) (Makeham, Dovey et 
al. 2002).  The code that was created from PCISME has been further developed by 
researchers at the Robert Graham Center of the American Academy of Family 
Physicians using subsequently collected reports from several of the original 
participating countries as well as Germany, and has several hundred descriptors with 
up to six sub-levels of classifications.  It has not yet been published in the peer-
reviewed scientific literature, but may be viewed online at 
www.errorsinmedicine.net/taxonomy/aafp. 
 
The following screen capture shows the error coding reports sub-menu and options: 
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3.8.3.1 Summary reports 
This area has two choices within it, either allowing the user to view the completed 
report coding page as shown earlier, or to view the report description summaries.  The 
latter of these is the brief sentence or two entered by the coder to describe the contents 
of the report within the coding page.   
 
In this section, the user can specify that the results be displayed of a single report by 
entering the report number, of a range of reports by report numbers, or of specified 
time periods.  This options page and a sample of the generated query of report 
description summaries follows: 
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3.8.3.2 Number of error events per TAPS report 
An entry made by the coder on the error coding page is the number of error events 
contained within a single report, and the database user in this section can request a list 
of error report numbers based on the number of events contained within them.  This 
area also allows the user to set parameters of specific time periods in months, or view 
results of the entire collection.   
 
Within this section, the user may generate the following queries about the collection 
of report coding pages: 
• View a table showing the average number of error events per report by RRMA 
grouping and overall 
• View a table showing raw counts of the number of reports with a specific 
number of events per report, by RRMA grouping and overall 
• View a list of reports that contain a specified number of error events, and from 
this list be automatically linked to the report details for each listed result via a 
‘hot link’ key.  (Note also that from this ‘report details’ page the ‘error coding’ 
page is also immediately accessible using the ‘error coding’ button.) 
 
The following screen captures show a sample of the ‘Number of error events’ sub-
menu, with the second option above selected, requesting a table displaying raw counts 
of the number of error reports with a specific number of error events by RRMA 
grouping and overall, and the related report: 
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3.8.3.3  Questions relating to Makeham et al codes 
This sub-menu of the error coding reports menu allows the user to generate reports 
that relate to the Makeham et al code, later referred to as the TAPS taxonomy.  This 
coding method is described in detail in section 3.12, and essentially consists of a three 
level hierarchical structure, whereby reports are grouped into two main types at the 
first level.  At the second level, type 1 has five subcategories, and type 2 has two 
subcategories, termed ‘themes’.  These themes are then sub-classified again into 
varying numbers within each group, to give a third level termed ‘descriptors’, of 
which there are a total of 35 across all seven themes combined. 
 
In this sub-menu, the user has two main options.  Firstly, they can generate a list of 
reports in this section for any given time period in months by specifying a TAPS 
taxonomy code for which they are searching.  They may specify the code at any of the 
three levels to be included, so that the list could be, for example, all type 1 reports, or 
reports that are coded as type 1 and theme 2 at the second level, or only those coded 
as type 1, theme 2 and descriptor 3 at the third level.  The generated list has active 
‘hot keys’, so that the user can jump straight to the ‘report details’ page from the list, 
and again from there to the ‘error coding’ page.   
 
The second option available from this sub-menu is to generate a summary report 
showing all of the TAPS taxonomy codes that have been used in a specified time 
period, and their frequency of use.  As for the former option, the user may specify any 
combination of code from level one through to level three.   
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The following two screen captures show the first of these options, moving from the 
sub-menu through to the requested report of the hyper-linked list of reports using a 
specific code type.  Note also, the list is organised by RRMA sub grouping: 
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The next two screen captures relate to the other option within this area, being the 
request of a report within a given time period showing a list of all TAPS taxonomy 
codes used and their frequency of use: 
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3.8.3.4  Questions relating to patient characteristics within reports 
This area allows the database user to generate queries that link coded TAPS reports 
with a range of different patient characteristics as entered by the TAPS participants 
when submitting error reports.  The system is designed for three coding styles as 
previously described being the TAPS taxonomy, the Linnaeus taxonomy, and a novel 
ICPC based error taxonomy.  For the purposes of this thesis, only TAPS taxonomy 
methods and results are described. 
 
There are four main options within this section, as follows: 
• Given a specific code, generate a table showing proportions of male and 
female patients affected by RRMA group and overall 
• Given a specific code, generate a table showing the average age of patients 
affected by RRMA group and overall 
• Given a specific code, generate a table showing the distribution of the nine 
locations of the error event by RRMA group and overall 
• Given a specific code, generate a table showing the proportion of whether or 
not harm occurred and the average harm rating by RRMA group and overall 
 
An example of this is shown in the following screen captures, where reports coded as 
type 2 and theme 2 are queried for the number of patients involved where harm was 
reported to have occurred, by RRMA grouping and overall: 
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3.8.3.5 Other functions within the error coding reports menu 
Also present on the ‘error coding reports’ menu are four further sections.  They will 
not be discussed in detail as they contain a number of queries relating to work 
developing future tools which is underway and not directly relating to the TAPS 
taxonomy or the objectives of this thesis: 
• ICPC ‘Reason for encounter’ codes  
• Linnaeus taxonomy codes 
• The ICPC based error coding system under development and  
• Correlation between the three potential coding systems built into the database, 
being TAPS, Linnaeus and the ICPC based error coding system 
 
This latter section will allow, for example, a list of all the codes from the Linnaeus 
taxonomy and the ICPC based error taxonomy that have been used when a given 
TAPS taxonomy code was used at any of the first, second or third levels of the code.  
Similarly, a code from one of the other systems can be used as the base code in the 
query, and the lists of the other two code types can be displayed.  
 
3.8.4 Error classification systems 
This is the final of the four Main menu options, and is designed to allow the user to 
view the three taxonomies built into the database.  The screen capture of the sub-menu 
appears below, and the user is taken to a description of each coding system by 
selecting the appropriate taxonomy button:  
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3.9 Sampling from the population of GPs in NSW 
3.9.1 Definition of general practitioner  
For the purposes of inclusion in the random sample to be generated by the General 
Practice Branch of the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aging (DOHA), a 
general practitioner was included based on the following criteria: 
• Medical practitioner having a general practice provider number in the state of 
NSW. 
• Working a full-time load in the three months prior to the sample being drawn 
as defined by DOHA based on annual Medicare billings of greater than or 
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equal to $83,000.  This was calculated for the October to December quarter of 
2002, which directly preceded the actual sampling in February of 2003.   
• Being on the general practice vocational register for the purposes of Medicare 
claims, which requires satisfaction of continuing education requirements. 
• Not being a general practice registrar or “Other Medical Provider” as 
determined by DOHA. 
 
3.9.2 Definition of source population 
Further references in this thesis to the ‘source population’ is the group of NSW 
general practitioners meeting the definition above, based on DOHA data for the 
October to December quarter of 2002, numbering 4666 general practitioners in total. 
  
3.9.3 Sample size 
Sample size calculations were undertaken in order to estimate the incidence of 
reported error per consultation per year.  A required sample size of 80 was calculated 
from the Primary Care International Study of Medical Error (PCISME) pilot study 
results from Australian participants of 134 reports made from up to 23 GPs over four 
months (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002). Allowing one week of absence each and 
estimating an average of 132 consultations per week, being the figure estimated by a 
major DOHA publication on general practice in Australia in 2000 (General Practice 
Branch 2000), we hypothesized a reported error rate of 0.27% per consultation.  An 
estimation of this would be allowed based upon 205,465 patient encounters with a 
95% confidence interval from 0.25 to 0.29%.  We anticipated that 80 participants 
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would conduct approximately 480,000 consultations, with the excess allowing for any 
effect of clustered samples.    
 
The General Practice Branch of the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aging 
(General Practice Branch) drew a random sample of 320 names from the source 
population of vocationally registered general practitioners in NSW whose Medicare 
billings in the previous quarter indicated that they were working in a full-time 
capacity.   This figure was chosen to allow for a similar participation rate to the pilot 
study, of approximately 25% (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).   
 
It is difficult to assess whether or not a figure of 25% was a reasonable response rate 
to obtain in a study such as TAPS.   There were no other studies of this kind found in 
the literature that used a random sampling method.  Other similar error studies had 
obtained their participants essentially by volunteer (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 
1998; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).  In order to assess 
that the response rate was adequate in terms of providing a representative sample of 
GPs, the participant group was compared in terms of age, gender and Medicare billing 
characteristics to the source population, and these results are presented in section 4.3, 
showing that the sampling method and response rate were successful in these respects.  
 
3.9.3.1 Cluster effect on sample size calculations 
The cluster effect is generally found from having groups of results of varying numbers 
contributed by single participants, as we had with our 84 GPs sending various 
numbers of reports.  The result of this is largely to reduce the power of our 
calculations.  As we believed that clustering would exist using the methodology 
   
 
126
employed, we doubled our sample size, in order that we could maintain power after 
adjusting for clustering in the appropriate analyses.  Another way of explaining this is 
to say that we sampled 320 GPs in order to obtain 80 participants, which would 
provide the 480,000 consultations, although only 205,465 were required if no 
clustering was anticipated. 
 
3.9.4 Rural, Remote and Metropolitan Area (RRMA) distribution 
The sample was drawn from three Rural, Remote and Metropolitan Areas (RRMA) 
groupings of RRMA 1, RRMA 2-3, and RRMA 4-7 (Budget and Performance Branch 
2005).  The sample was comprised of 50% (160) from RRMA 1, 25% (80) from 
RRMA 2-3 and 25% (80) from RRMA 4-7 regions.  This compared to DOHA figures 
for full time GPs in NSW of 68%, 16% and 16% within these groupings in the source 
population respectively.  The smaller subgroups were over-sampled to ensure 
adequate counts of Medicare items to allow future subgroup analysis.  
 
3.9.5 Age and gender distribution 
The General Practice Branch provided a sample stratified by gender and age, 
dichotomized around 45 years, to best reflect the source population.  This 
stratification was undertaken within the three main Rural, Remote and Metropolitan 
Areas (RRMA) groupings of RRMA 1, RRMA 2 to 3 combined and RRMA 4 to 7 
combined.  Age was taken as that of the participant at the mid-point of the data 
collection period, being 31st March 2004. 
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3.10   Recruitment and consent process 
All general practitioners from the random sample were invited to participate by 
telephone call.  If interest was expressed, an information pack was sent.  These 
doctors were then contacted by follow-up telephone call.  Reasons were recorded for 
absence of a doctor from the sample, or declining to participate in the study.  All 
general practitioners who commenced the study were visited in person at their 
practices across NSW to obtain informed consent and demonstrate the electronic error 
reporting method using a laptop computer. 
 
3.10.1 General inclusion criteria for participation 
General practitioners who were contacted from the random sample were deemed 
eligible to participate in the TAPS study if they met the criteria shown below in figure 
3.2, in addition to those requirements for inclusion in the initial sample by the General 
Practice Branch: 
Figure 3.2 Eligibility criteria for participation in the TAPS study. 
1. Practicing in general practice. 
2. Usually provides direct patient care for the majority of their work time (at least 20 
hours per week). 
3. Usually will be absent from their clinical work setting for no more than six weeks 
out of the twelve months data collection period of the study. 
4. Comfortable with use of computers and have access to a personal computer (pc)  
5. Able to establish reliable internet access via an internet service provider (ISP). 
6. Willing to participate in the study. 
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3.10.2 Participant’s Medicare data collection 
Consent was also obtained for the collection of each participant’s Medicare billing 
data, for all services provided over the same 12 month duration as the reporting 
period.  Details of each practitioner’s item number counts and numbers of whole 
patients seen were calculated by the General Practice Branch, and provided quarterly.  
The calculation of the numbers of Medicare items and patients seen per GP was 
delayed for three months from the end of each quarter during the study.  This was to 
allow greater accuracy with service counts than a determination on the final day of a 
quarter would provide, at which time variable numbers of claims to Medicare may not 
yet have been lodged by patients or practices.   
 
Participants were informed that only de-identified aggregated Medicare data would be 
used for calculations in the study, pooled according to RRMA classification prior to 
analysis.  There were no records kept linking an individual GP to his or her Medicare 
data, and no analysis or publications of an individual doctor’s Medicare data set.  
Because there was no way of linking an individual participant’s Medicare data with 
their group of anonymously submitted reports, there was no possibility of determining 
an individual participant’s reported error rate or any other details of error types 
reported by an individual participant.  
 
3.10.3 Participant background information 
At the time of enrolment, the data shown in figure 3.3 below was collected from each 
participant identified by RRMA grouping to determine some basic demographic and 
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practice characteristics of the participant group.  The full text background 
questionnaire is included as Appendix 3. 
Figure 3.3 Participant demographic and practice data collected at enrolment. 
 
3.10.4 Comparison of TAPS participants to NSW general 
practitioners 
The total number of general practitioners (GPs), the proportions of male and female 
GPs, and average age of GPs at the mid-point of the study were obtained by RRMA 
groupings, for both the 84 study participants and the source population of 4666 NSW 
general practitioners from which the sample was drawn.  The General Practice Branch 
also provided the number of Medicare items billed that related to a patient encounter 
over the twelve months of the study for these two groups.  
 
This enabled a comparison of the study participants overall and by RRMA groupings 
with all NSW GPs.  The percentage of female GP participants was compared to the 
source population using Fisher’s Exact Test.  The average age and number of 
• Age in years  
• Years in practice (excluding training) 
• Gender 
• Number of half-days worked in clinical practice in a usual week 
• Number of patients seen on a usual half-day of clinical work 
• Whether medical students, residents, or registrars are taught in the practice 
• Number and full-time equivalent number of doctors practicing in the 
practice 
• Number and full-time equivalent number of other people working in the 
practice 
• Use of computers in the practice 
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Medicare items relating to patient encounters for these groups were compared using 
unpaired student t-tests.   
 
3.10.5 Participant support and feedback 
As discussed earlier, the TAPS website features enabled contact to be made in three 
main ways, being from the security page if passwords or pins were forgotten, from the 
home page in ‘contact the investigators’, or in the ‘other comments’ feed back at the 
end of a report.   
 
In addition to these features, every participant was contacted monthly by email, 
telephone call or facsimile and asked whether any other errors had been noted that 
they may have been too busy to report on-line in the previous month, or whether they 
had experienced any problems with the website.   
 
Furthermore, all participants were given TAPS packages with written information at 
their enrolment which contained the mobile phone numbers of the Chief Investigator 
(Meredith Makeham) and the Project Manager (Geraldine Card), and invited to call at 
any time immediate support was required.  The project policy was to endeavour to 
respond to any requests for support within 24 hours of contact from a participant. 
 
Another support feature of the TAPS project was that each participant was offered an 
entitlement to claim a small one off honorarium of $200, which was intended to offset 
any internet connection and phone call costs that would be incurred as part of their 
participation in the TAPS study. 
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3.11   Quantifying the number of errors reported 
3.11.1 The overall number of reported errors 
The overall number of reports submitted per participant was not possible to calculate 
directly due to the measures taken to ensure anonymity.  The best approximation that 
could be made of this was therefore the number of reports submitted per PIN, which 
was not necessarily the same as there was no way of being certain that an individual 
participant had not changed their PIN at any point over the twelve months of the 
study.  The number of errors reported per PIN, the number of PINs obtained per 
RRMA group, and the total numbers of errors from the group was obtained from the 
website data.   
 
A feedback interview at the conclusion of the study checked whether participants 
believed that they had sent any reports electronically.  The feedback interview 
provided another source of the number of participants who submitted at least one 
report during the twelve months of the study.  To protect anonymity and investigator 
blinding, we did not ask individual participants the number of reports submitted.   
 
Calculations were therefore made of both the number of reports per PIN, and the 
number of reports per participant.  These rates were able to be calculated for the 
overall group and by RRMA grouping. 
   
3.11.2 Calculating the incidence of reported error 
An incidence calculation essentially requires three elements: a numerator, in this case 
being the number of reports received from the TAPS participants; a denominator, 
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being either the number of individual patients seen by the participants, or the number 
of consultations they gave, which is considerably greater due to the fact that the same 
patient may attend a general practitioner on several occasions within a set time period 
for unrelated consultations;  and a time period, in this study being the twelve months 
for which data was collected. 
 
The numerator was calculated by simply counting the total number of reports 
submitted using the website data.  The denominator was obtained in both possible 
ways described above.  Firstly, counts of the number of Medicare items billed that 
related to a patient encounter over the twelve months of the study were used to 
calculate the incidence of anonymously reported error from NSW general 
practitioners per patient encounter Medicare item per year.  Secondly, the number of 
individual patients that were seen by the participant group over the study time frame 
was used to calculate the incidence of reported error from NSW general practitioners 
per patient seen per year.   
 
Patients who were seen on more than one occasion during the year by a single 
participant were only counted once per general practitioner.  If a patient saw more 
than one TAPS participating general practitioner during the study period, they were 
counted again in the overall figure, to best reflect an average number of individuals 
seen per year by each participating general practitioner. 
 
Our initial sample size calculations aimed to provide sufficient power to estimate 
these incidences for the population of NSW general practitioners, and this required the 
entire participant group’s data set.  A calculation of incidence within the smaller 
   
 
133
RRMA sub-groupings was therefore not made, as a greater number of participants per 
grouping would have been required, which was not practicable within the resources 
available to conduct the study.      
 
3.11.3 Data Analysis of numbers of reports per PIN and 
incidence calculations 
A non-parametric method with Fisher’s Exact Test was used to compare the median 
number of reports per PIN.   Incidence calculations included sampling weights for the 
three RRMA groupings to adjust for the relative over-sampling of RRMA 2-3 and 4-7 
GPs.  All statistics were performed using Stata 8.0 software (Stata Corporation 1984 - 
2003). 
 
3.12   Classifying the errors contained in TAPS reports 
3.12.1 Overview 
The Threats to Australian Patient Safety (TAPS) study estimated the incidence of 
general practitioner (GP) reported patient safety events in the community, using a 
method based upon a randomly selected representative sample of GPs (Makeham, 
Kidd et al. 2006).  With this collection of reports, it was therefore possible to 
postulate more accurately the proportions of reported patient safety event types 
occurring in the community.  This required the application of a classification system, 
however major limitations (mainly relating to the internal validity of existing tools) 
warranted further taxonomy development.   
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To describe the TAPS events, the aim was to develop a taxonomy that would be 
comprehensible and practical for primary care clinicians to apply themselves.  This 
section of the thesis describes the methods for that process, in addition to the methods 
to validate a primary care taxonomy in terms of its reproducibility within a group of 
general practitioners applying the tool. 
 
3.12.2 TAPS Taxonomy development methods  
3.12.2.1 PCISME pilot taxonomy 
Three GPs from the investigating team (Meredith Makeham, Simone Stromer and 
Charles Bridges-Webb) classified each report using the existing pilot study taxonomy 
from the Primary Care International Study of Medical Error (PCISME 
taxonomy)(Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002), and the results were compared to obtain a 
baseline measure of reproducibility.   
 
The basic structure of this taxonomy is a three level classification using descriptive 
terms, whereby the top level separates events into two main types, being errors related 
to the processes of delivering health care (‘process’), or errors related to a deficiency 
in the knowledge and skills of health care professionals (‘knowledge and skills’).  At 
the second level, there are six further terms describing ‘process’ errors, and three 
further terms describing ‘knowledge and skills’ errors.  These second level terms then 
have a third further level of descriptions with varying numbers of terms within each 
second level group, made up of 24 in the ‘process’ group and 11 in the ‘knowledge 
and skills’ group, totalling 35  in all at the third level.  This taxonomy was published 
in 2002, and appears as Appendix 4. 
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3.12.2.2 Team coding process 
A systematic process of reviewing disagreeing classifications was carried out, 
whereby the initial taxonomy was amended and retested using one quarter of the 
reports each time, over four face to face sessions.  A report required two out of three 
reviewers in agreement to be assigned a classification.   
 
Reports containing more than one event were given multiple classifications.  If it was 
determined that multiple events had occurred within a report, these codes were 
assigned in chronological order, as they appeared in the free text of the report.   
 
Where three different classifications had been assigned by the three reviewers, the 
report was reviewed at a face to face meeting to determine its classification.   A 
discussion then ensued within the group with each reviewer explaining their reasons 
for coding, and a resolution was reached when two of three came to an agreed 
classification or set of classifications for each discussed report. 
 
A set of guidelines to improve coder consistency when using the taxonomy was also 
developed during these meetings. 
3.12.2.3 Agreement of investigators developing the taxonomy 
Concordance amongst the coders was measured using the kappa statistic, for both the 
initial taxonomy and the final TAPS taxonomy.  To determine this statistic, the results 
of each reviewer prior to discussion as per the team coding process were used. 
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Only one classification per report was included for the kappa score calculations.  If 
reports were assigned multiple classifications by one or more coders, the first 
classification most commonly assigned was included.   
 
The kappa statistic can range from -1 (perfect disagreement) to +1 (perfect 
agreement).  A kappa score of between 0.40 and 0.75 indicates fair agreement. (Fleiss 
1981; Bolton, Mira et al. 1997) All statistical analysis was performed using Stata 8.0 
software. (Stata Corporation 1984 - 2003) 
 
3.13   The TAPS taxonomy proportions of reported error types 
The classification of the error reports using the TAPS taxonomy provided a measure 
by which the relative proportions of different reported error types could be 
determined.  These proportions are presented for all events contained within the 
reported errors. 
 
The TAPS taxonomy is presented with an analysis of its major variations from the 
pilot taxonomy, and a discussion the types of errors included within each level 2 or 
‘theme’ grouping.  Case studies of the major error types and themes are presented to 
further illustrate the TAPS taxonomy. 
   
3.14  Patient related factors in reported errors 
An analysis of the patient factors which were reported by participants in the TAPS 
questionnaire about each error was undertaken.  These include whether or not a 
patient was involved in a reported error, how well the GP participant knew the patient 
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on a 5 point rating scale, the average patient ages as well as proportions relating to 
gender, Non-English Speaking Background (NESB) and Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander (ATSI) peoples.  
 
A further analysis of these factors was undertaken, considering associations with the 
main types of errors reported, as classified using the TAPS taxonomy, to identify if 
there were any particular trends with patient factors and error event types. 
 
3.15  Event locations of reported errors 
GP participants were asked in the questionnaire to indicate where the error occurred, 
choosing from a set of nine locations.  The proportion of events occurring in each 
location was determined.  Participants were able to indicate more than one location 
associated with a report if desired, and the proportion of reports from each location 
associated with any of the other locations was also undertaken to identify any 
association trends.  In addition, location of error report by error event type as 
classified using the TAPS taxonomy was made to see if any particular trends emerged 
with types of events and their location of occurrence. 
 
3.16  TAPS reports associated with patient harm 
In addition to analysing the reported harm level associated with the commonly 
reported error types, an analysis of all reports which were associated with patient 
harm was undertaken.      
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As part of the TAPS questionnaire, participants were asked “To your knowledge, was 
any patient harmed by this error?”.  If they answered in the affirmative, they were 
then shown the question “How would you rate the seriousness of this harm?”, and 
given a 5 point Likert scale to click a number on from 1 to 5, with a label before the 
number 1 being “Not serious at all”, and after the number 5 being “Extremely 
serious”.  No clear definition of “patient harm” or the term “serious” was given within 
the questionnaire, and some differences of interpretation were likely to have occurred.   
 
An analysis of harm was then undertaken by determining the proportion of reports and 
events in which harm had been determined positive by the participants.  The 
proportion of harm positive reported errors was calculated and they were then 
analysed in terms of their error type based on TAPS taxonomy classification and their 
association with patient demographics (age, gender, ATSI and NESB).   
 
A standard chi-squared test of overall association was conducted, whereby 
frequencies of type of error and harm, and number of errors and harm were 
summarised using cross-tabulations. The associations between type of error and harm, 
and number of errors and harm were assessed using a chi-squared test. 
 
3.17  Preventability of reported errors 
Participants were asked to identify any factors that may have prevented this or any 
other similar error events, and commented on this with a free text response.  If none 
were offered, further consideration of the report by the Chief Investigator (MM) was 
undertaken with respect to preventability.  The proportion of reports in which a 
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prevention idea was offered, both by participants or the Chief Investigator, was 
measured. 
 
3.18  Reported error types considered to occur frequently in 
general practice  
The questionnaire also asked participants to indicate within four main groups how 
frequently they felt that the type of error that they had just reported occurred in their 
daily practice.  The distribution of the ‘frequency of occurrence’ score for each error 
type as classified by the TAPS taxonomy at the second taxonomic level is presented 
in a bar chart format.  
 
3.19 Participant feedback interview 
At the conclusion of the twelve month study, each participant was contacted for a 
feedback interview.  These were conducted by telephone by the TAPS Project 
Manager (Geraldine Card).  The interview covered four main areas, being 
participation habits, time requirements, error interpretation and severity of harm 
associated with given error scenarios. 
 
For the purposes of data analysis relating to the objects of this thesis, the following 
feedback questions are included in the results of this thesis, and they pertain to 
questions of the practical use aspects of a system such as TAPS.  These were the 
questions of whether the online reporting system was easy to use for GPs, how long it 
took to submit reports, and whether anonymity impacted on reporting habits. 
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The telephone script for these questions was as follows: 
1.  Did you submit any on-line reports during the study? 
2.  How would you rate the ease of use of the TAPS website from 1 to 5, where 1 is 
“easy” and 5 is “difficult” 
3.  If error reporting was not anonymous, would you be more likely or less likely to 
place a report?  
4.  About how many minutes did it take you to send an on-line error report? 
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4 Results 
4.1 Overview 
This section of the thesis describes the results obtained in the TAPS study that relate 
to the principle aims set out in section 1.3.  The results of participant sampling and 
recruitment are presented, with a comparison of the participant group to the source 
population from which they were sampled.   
 
The results relating to various aspects of quantifying TAPS error reporting are given, 
including total numbers of reports received by month, total numbers of personal 
identification numbers (PINs) used by participants, the average numbers of reports per 
PIN, and the incidence of reported error per patient seen and per Medicare item 
number claimed.  These results have all been published in the peer-reviewed scientific 
literature (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006), shown in Appendix 6.   
 
The contents of the error reports are then presented, classified using the TAPS 
taxonomy.  This taxonomy, the agreement of the coders and the proportions of error 
types in the TAPS data using this taxonomy has also been published in the peer-
reviewed scientific literature (Makeham, Stromer et al. 2007), shown in Appendix 7. 
 
Features of the group of reported errors overall are described, including patient 
demographics, event locations, associated levels of patient harm, preventability of 
reported errors and participant’s impressions of the frequency of reported error types.  
An analysis of these features is also presented as relates to the reported events as 
classified using the TAPS taxonomy to the second taxonomic level.    
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The final set of results in this section relate to the relevant sections of the feedback 
questionnaire, relating to ease of use of the TAPS website, the number of minutes to 
complete a questionnaire, and the proportion of participants who felt that anonymity 
influenced the likelihood that a report was submitted. 
 
4.2 Numbers of participants in the TAPS study 
The General Practice Branch of the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aging 
provided a random sample of 320 general practitioners (GPs), as described previously 
in section 3.9.  From the sample of 320 doctors provided by the General Practice 
Branch, we were unable to locate 52 general practitioners (16%) who had either 
moved away, retired, or were completely unknown to the practice.  Of the remaining 
268 doctors, 69 declined the first information pack, the majority stating that they were 
too busy or not interested, and 18 declining because they had no computer.  Of the 
199 GPs who received the information pack, 115 later declined after further contact, 
resulting in 84 GP participants at the commencement of the study.  Figure 4.1 presents 
a flow diagram of the original sample and resulting 84 participants.   
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Figure 4.1 Flow diagram of General Practice Branch sample and resulting study 
participants 
 
 
The 84 GP participants enrolled at the commencement of the study were comprised of 
41 RRMA 1, 22 RRMA 2-3 and 21 RRMA 4-7 GPs.  During the reporting period, one 
participant from RRMA 1 and one from RRMA 4-7 left the study.  Their results were 
included in our further calculations unless otherwise stated, as anonymous reporting 
resulted in it not being possible to ascertain if they had contributed any reports up 
until the point of leaving.  
320 GPs
280 GPs
270 GPs
268 GPs
199 GPs
84 GPs
40 GPs unknown to practice 
10 GPs no longer at practice 
2 GPs retired
69 GPs declined first info. 
•53 too busy or 
      not interested 
•38 no response  
      to calls 
•9 on leave 
•5 unexplained 
•3 retiring 
•3 confidentiality  
    concerns 
•2 no computer 
•1 no research 
•1 worried about  
    publicity 
•35 too busy/no interest 
•18 no computer 
•7 no research 
•3 just finished research 
•4 on leave 
•2 retiring 
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4.3 Comparison of the TAPS participants to the source 
population 
The total number of GPs, their sex and average age were obtained from the General 
Practice Branch by RRMA groupings at the time the random sample was generated, 
enabling comparison of the study participants to the source population of the 4666 
NSW GPs from which the sample was drawn.  The number of Medicare items billed 
that related to a patient encounter over the twelve months of the study for these two 
groups was also provided by the General Practice Branch for comparison.  There was 
no significant difference between the participants and source population, within each 
RRMA sub-grouping or for all combined, using any of these measures. 
 
4.3.1 TAPS participant gender distribution compared to NSW GPs 
Table 4.1 shows the percentage of female general practitioners in the TAPS 
participant group compared to the underlying percentages in the source population 
from which the sample was drawn, using figures provided by the General Practice 
Branch of the Department of Health and Aging at the time that the random sample 
was generated.  Using Fisher’s exact test, for all RRMA groupings combined and 
within each RRMA sub-grouping, there was no significant difference found. 
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Table 4.1 The percentage of female general practitioners in the participant group 
compared to the source population. 
 RRMA 1 
% female 
RRMA 2-3 
% female 
RRMA 4-7 
% female 
All doctors 
combined 
% female 
TAPS 
participants 
( n = 84) 
22.0% 9.5% 22.7% 19.0% 
Source  
population 
( n = 4666) 
29.8% 24.2% 17.9% 27.0% 
Fisher’s exact 
p  value 
0.3065 0.1278 0.5721 0.1071 
 
4.3.2 TAPS participant average age compared to NSW GPs 
The average age of GP participants in comparison to the source population of 4666 
NSW GPs using the Student’s t-test is shown in table 4.2, showing no significant 
difference between TAPS participants and the source population at the 5% 
significance level. 
 
Table 4.2 The average age of TAPS participants in comparison to NSW GPs. 
 
 
 
RRMA 1 
Average age 
(SD) 
RRMA 2-3 
Average age 
(SD) 
RRMA 4-7 
Average age 
(SD) 
All combined 
Average Age 
(SD) 
TAPS 
participants 
( n = 84) 
51.7 (8.70) 50.8 (8.48) 49.5 (9.10) 50.9 (8.69) 
Source 
population 
( n = 4666) 
52.4 (10.56) 52.2 (10.11) 51.2 (10.11) 52.2 (10.43) 
Two-tailed  
P  value 
0.6740 0.5267 0.4281 0.2680 
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4.3.3 The number of Medicare Items billed by TAPS participants 
compared to NSW GPs 
Over the twelve months of the study, the General Practice Branch counted the number 
of Medicare Item numbers claimed by each GP participant that could have related to a 
patient encounter.  This was the closest approximation that could be made to a unique 
patient consultation using Medicare data.  The same figures were also calculated by 
the General Practice Branch for the source population of 4666 GPs from which the 
sample was drawn.  The average number of patient encounter Medicare Items and 
their standard deviations for participants and the source population are compared 
using the Student’s t-test in table 4.3, showing no significant difference. 
 
Table 4.3 The average number of patient encounter Medicare Items per general 
practitioner over the study period in the participant group compared to the 
source population of 4666 NSW general practitioners. 
 
 Average Number of patient encounter Medicare Items (SD) 
 RRMA 1 RRMA 2-3 RRMA 4-7 All combined 
TAPS 
participants 
5782.79 
(3839.17) 
5247.86 
(2880.68) 
4808.81 
(1565.59) 
5389.84 
(3136.67) 
     
Source 
population 
5917.12 
(3517.51)  
5667.03 
(3264.16) 
4605.93 
(2503.22) 
5671.58 
(3370.13) 
     
P value 0.8129 0.5521 0.7122 0.4527 
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4.4 The number of TAPS reports submitted 
During the 12 months of the study, 433 report forms were sent using the TAPS 
website, 15 of which contained no information or a test message.  The 418 remaining 
TAPS reports described an error, identified only by the participant’s self-chosen 
personal identification number (PIN) and RRMA grouping.   
 
Initial analyses were done with and without adjustment for clustering in the sample, 
but it was found that the design effect was very close to one, and therefore analyses 
were conducted without adjustment for clustering for the sake of simplicity in the 
thesis. 
 
4.4.1 Personal identification numbers submitted during the study 
period 
For the purposes of further calculations, a PIN was combined with another on twelve 
occasions where they differed only by capitalization, or appeared highly similar with a 
difference in either one or two of the eight possible characters. (For example 
“271260” was combined with “27121960”).  This resulted in 90 unique PINs.  Five of 
these PINs were associated with a test report having been sent, but no further 
completed TAPS reports.  Therefore the 418 TAPS reports originated from 85 unique 
PINs.  At 12 month feedback interview with the 82 participants who completed the 
study, 79 fed back that they had submitted a report.   
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4.4.2 TAPS reports submitted per month during the study period 
Figure 4.2 shows the number of reports received per month, which varied from 15 to 
60.  The overall appearance of this chart indicates that there was no general decline in 
reporting as the twelve month study period progressed. 
     
Figure 4.2 The number of TAPS reports received by month over the duration of 
the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.3 TAPS reports submitted per PIN and per GP participant 
There was no way of equating PINs with individual participants, and so the twelve 
month feedback interview was used to assess how often more than one PIN may have 
been used by participants.  Table 4.4 shows RRMA grouping comparisons of the 
number of TAPS reports submitted, PINs submitted, GPs who fed back that a report 
was sent during the study, average number of reports per GP based on feedback, and 
the median number of reports per PIN over the duration of the study.   
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Table 4.4 Summary statistics describing TAPS reports submitted by RRMA 
group over the study period. 
RRMA  
Group 
Number of 
participants 
TAPS 
Reports 
received 
Unique 
PINs 
submitted 
GP sent 
a report 
Average 
reports 
per GP  
Median number 
of  reports per 
unique PIN  
1 41 199 46 38 5.2 3 
2-3 22 121 18 21 5.8 6 
4-7 21 98 21 20 4.9 4 
Total 84 418 85 79 5.3 3 
 
4.5 Frequency of error reporting amongst RRMA groupings 
The distribution of reporting frequencies amongst RRMA groupings was assessed by 
looking at the number of reports per PIN.  This varied from 1 to 25, with a median of 
3 reports per unique PIN for all participants combined.  Figure 4.3 shows the 
frequency of reports submitted per PIN, separated into RRMA groupings.  There was 
no significant difference amongst RRMA groupings in the median number of reports 
submitted per PIN, splitting values equivalent to the median equally between the 
above and below group (p = 0.40).  
 
Figure 4.3 Frequency of reporting per unique PIN by RRMA grouping over 12 
months. 
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4.6 Incidence of reported error 
The total numbers of Medicare items relating to a patient encounter and total numbers 
of individual patients seen by RRMA grouping are shown in table 4.5.  Each report 
within a RRMA grouping was matched with the group’s average number of Medicare 
items and average number of patients seen, and assigned a sampling weight to adjust 
for the larger representation of RRMA 2-3 and 4-7 GPs in the sample design.  
 
The resulting calculations gave an incidence of anonymously reported error per 
Medicare patient encounter item per year of 0.078% (95% CI 0.076% to 0.080%), and 
an incidence of reported error per patient seen per year of 0.240% (95% CI 0.235% to 
0.245%).   
Table 4.5  The number of Medicare items relating to a patient encounter and 
individual patients seen by TAPS participants during the study. 
 RRMA 1 RRMA 2-3 RRMA 4-7 All RRMA 
Medicare Items 260150 127610 103104 490864 
Patients seen 89042 45176 32351 166569 
 
4.7 TAPS Report description summaries 
The TAPS database management system allowed the investigators to view a 
completed report and enter a brief summary of its contents into its coding area, as 
described previously in section 3.8.3.  These ‘description summaries’ provide a 
general overview of the contents of each of the submitted TAPS reports during the 
study period, and are included in this thesis as Appendix 5. 
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4.8 Number of error events per TAPS report 
As detailed in the methods section 3.12 of this thesis, the collection of TAPS reports 
was analysed by three general practitioners on the study team (Dr Meredith Makeham, 
Dr Simone Stromer and Prof Charles Bridges-Webb AO).  As the first step in the 
process of classifying a report, it was necessary to determine if in fact it contained an 
error as per the definition described to study participants. 
   
It was also possible for a TAPS report to contain more than one patient safety event 
within the report, and when two or more investigators agreed that a separate event had 
occurred and assigned it a classification, it was counted within the report’s ‘number of 
error events’. 
 
Altogether 433 website submissions were received, with 415 containing true reports 
after discounting tests and reports with missing data (15), and reports that 
investigators deemed to have no patient safety event described within them (3).  Of 
the remaining 415 reports, 320 contained one event, 82 contained two events, 11 
contained three events, and 2 contained 4 events.    
 
An example of a complex TAPS report containing multiple patient safety events is 
given below in figure 4.4, and the full text is presented as appears in the original 
report.  The report was from a RRMA 2-3 participant.  After error classification using 
the TAPS taxonomy (shown in section 4.9), the investigators assigned four 
classifications to this report.   The TAPS classifications given were 2.1.4 (Diagnostic 
error), 2.2.1 (Medication management error), 1.3.3 (Medication dispensing error) and 
1.5.2 (Communication error relating to hospital discharge summary). 
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Figure 4.4 TAPS report containing multiple error events including 2.1.4 
(Diagnostic error), 2.2.1 (Medication management error), 1.3.3 (Medication 
dispensing error) and 1.5.2 (Communication error relating to hospital discharge 
summary). 
b)  Related to a 
specific patient? 
YES 
c)  How well do you 
know the patient?  
5 – Very well 
d)  What is the 
patient’s age? 
79 
e)  What is the 
patient’s sex? 
MALE 
f)  Is the patient from a 
non-English speaking 
background? 
NO 
g)  Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander 
descent?  
NO 
h)  What happened?  
Please consider what, 
where and who was 
involved. 
I saw the patient following discharge from hospital following 
an admission with pneumonia. It was on a weekend with 
pathology and radiology services not available to me. The 
patient had just completed the short course of oral antibiotics 
prescribed on discharge. He reported a painful ankle which had 
been present for a week (it had been present, but not dealt with, 
during his admission). He had no past history of gout or other 
arthritis. 
On examination he had an acute mono-arthritis of his ankle. 
This needed immediate investigation (I considered partially-
treated septic arthritis to be one of the differential diagnoses). 
He was sent back to the teaching hospital from which he had 
been discharged. 
I saw him again one and a half weeks later. His discharge 
summary recorded his diagnosis as "cellulitis". This was not 
consistent with the clinical picture on presentation or at this 
time (he still had pain and an effusion of his ankle clinically). 
His discharge summary recorded him as being on dicloxacillin. 
The patient wasn't on any antibiotics. He had a script for 
Keflex for the hospital pharmacy but had been told by the 
nurse discharging him (on a weekend, no doctor saw him prior 
to discharge) that there wasn't time to get this filled as his bed 
was needed urgently. 
I rang the hospital to try and sort out what was going on. The 
switch told me there was no way they could ascertain who the 
responsible resident or registrar (of the consultant under my 
patient was admitted) was. They could, however, refer me to 
the orthopaedic registrar on call.   
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The registrar told me that he wasn't involved in my patient's 
care, but was aware of this as an interesting case that had been 
discussed in clinical meetings. The patient had not been 
diagnosed as having cellulitis - the diagnosis was of a 
Charcot’s joint. He didn't need to be on antibiotics. 
 
i)  What was the 
result?  Please think 
about actual and 
potential 
consequences. 
Apart from the distress of not knowing what was going on and 
his dissatisfaction re the discharge process, my patient suffered 
no ill-effects. But the appalling lack of communication (and 
disinformation) and difficulty accessing clinical information 
from the hospital put my patient a risk of adverse outcomes. 
The attitude of not filling scripts because of logistic difficulties 
not related to the patient's own care, in fact, benefited my 
patient as the treatment was inappropriate (a result of egregious 
lack of attention by the resident involved), but obviously has 
the potential to produce adverse outcomes. 
 
j)  What may have 
contributed to this 
error? Please consider 
any special 
circumstances. 
I can only speculate as to how a resident could have got the 
diagnosis entirely wrong on a discharge summary when those 
not involved in the patient's clinical care were aware of the 
diagnosis and the clinical scenario was at odds with the 
diagnosis. Given previous similar experiences, I suspect 
understaffing, the trend to shift-work like rosters (i.e. 
diminished clinical responsibility for individual patients) and 
the imperative to throw sick patients out of beds on weekends 
may be factors. 
 
k)  Where did the error 
happen?   
Hospital 
l)  Was any patient 
harmed by this error? 
NO 
n)  How often does this 
error occur in your 
practice?  
Sometimes (3–11 per year) 
o)  What could have 
prevented this error?  
Please consider what 
could be done to 
prevent similar 
episodes in the future. 
A total overhaul of the organisation, staffing, funding and 
integration of the health-care system. 
 
p) Other comments? It is easy to apportion blame to individuals in this scenario. I 
am not privy to exactly how this error came about, but I 
suspect system rather than individual errors are of primary 
importance. 
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4.9 The TAPS Taxonomy  
The TAPS taxonomy is a descriptive domain specific taxonomy.  It has been recently 
published along with the results relating to the reviewer agreement and proportions of 
event types in the international journal Quality and Safety in Health Care (Makeham, 
Stromer et al. 2007).  The full paper appears as Appendix 7 of this thesis, and the 
published taxonomy also appears in this thesis as Appendix 10.   
 
The taxonomy has 3 levels of classification.  The first level (‘event type’) relates to 
the underlying cause of the event, being either due to deficiencies in the process of 
delivering health care (type 1), or the knowledge and skills of health professionals 
(type 2).  The second level has five groupings (‘themes’) within type 1 errors, and two 
groupings within type 2 errors.  The five themes within type 1 are practice and health 
care systems, investigations, medications, non-medication treatments and 
communication. The type 2 themes are diagnosis and managing patient care.  At the 
third level there are from 3 to 9 ‘descriptors’ for each theme.  .   
 
4.9.1 Proportions of error events classified using the TAPS 
taxonomy 
The TAPS taxonomy and the proportions of the 525 reported events that were 
classified from the study data using the TAPS taxonomy are shown on the following 
page in table 4.6, showing that 69.5% of events were process related (type 1), and 
30.5% related to the knowledge and skills of health professionals (type 2):
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Table 4.6 TAPS taxonomy with results of 525 patient safety events within 415 
reports. 
N % of total  
365 69.5 1. Errors related to the Processes of Health Care 
112 21.3  1.1. Errors in practice and health care systems 
12 2.3   1.1.1    Errors relating to incorrect patient identification  
15 2.9   1.1.2    Appointments and message handling errors   
28 5.3   1.1.3    Patient record and filing system errors  
25 4.8   1.1.4    Recall event and recall systems errors 
6 1.1   1.1.5    Computer systems errors  
6 1.1   1.1.6    Errors in the maintenance of a safe physical environment  
7 1.3   1.1.7 Errors in provision of care after hours or inadequate staff coverage 
1.1.8 Errors relating to patient confidentiality issues 4 0.8 
9 1.7   1.1.9    Practice and health care systems errors not otherwise specified 
65 12.4  1.2.  Investigation errors 
7 1.3   1.2.1    Errors relating to incorrect patient identification 
12 2.3   1.2.2 Errors in the process of requesting investigations 
1.2.3 Errors in the process of undertaking investigations  
1.2.4 Errors in reporting processes or managing investigation reports 
1.2.5 Investigation errors not otherwise specified 
9 1.7 
35 6.7 
2 0.4 
107 20.4  1.3.  Medication errors 
31 5.9   1.3.1.  Electronic prescription writing or medication charting errors 
16 3.1   1.3.2   Other prescription or medication charting errors 
38 7.2   1.3.3   Medication dispensing and delivery errors 
11 2.1   1.3.4   Patient self-administration of medication errors 
11 2.1   1.3.5   Medication errors not otherwise specified 
13 2.5  1.4.  Treatment errors (non-medication) 
11 2.1   1.4.1   Errors in the process of providing Immunisations 
1 0.2   1.4.2.  Errors in the process of undertaking procedures  
1 0.2   1.4.3.  Non-medication treatment errors not otherwise specified 
68 12.9  1.5.  Communication errors and process errors not otherwise specified 
17 3.2   1.5.1.  Errors in general communication with patients 
31 5.9   1.5.2   Hospital discharge and other hospital based communication errors  
9 1.7   1.5.3.  Errors in referral to other health care providers 
8 1.5   1.5.4   Errors in general communication with other health care providers  
3 0.6   1.5.5.  Communication and process errors not otherwise specified 
160 30.5 2.  Errors related to the Knowledge and Skills of Health Professionals 
62 11.8  2.1.  Errors in diagnosis  
2 0.4   2.1.1.  Errors in patient history taking 
11 2.1   2.1.2.  Errors in patient physical examination 
27 5.1   2.1.3.  Errors in investigations requested or their interpretation 
22 4.2   2.1.4.  Diagnosis related errors not otherwise specified 
98 18.7  2.2.  Errors in managing patient care 
57 10.9   2.2.1 Medication management errors 
2.2.2 Knowledge or skills errors in undertaking immunisations  
2.2.3 Knowledge or skills errors in undertaking procedures  
9 1.7 
13 2.5 
19 3.6   2.2.4    Errors managing care not otherwise specified 
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4.9.2  TAPS taxonomy coding guidelines 
The guidelines for using the TAPS taxonomy were devised by the three coding 
investigators as the classification developed, and are presented below in table 4.7:  
  
Table 4.7 TAPS taxonomy guidelines for coding patient safety events. 
TAPS taxonomy guidelines for use 
1. Consider the number of ‘patient safety events’ or separate elements that 
have contributed to a report describing a threat to patient safety, and classify 
each distinct patient safety event separately if there are more than one. 
2. Consider the underlying cause to first code the event ‘type’.  Consider 
whether it should be considered as resulting from a breakdown in the 
‘processes’ around patient care (type 1), or in the knowledge or skills base 
required for any person involved in the delivery of  patient care (type 2). 
3. Next assign the second level ‘theme’ of the patient safety event, choosing the 
most specific option from those listed within the assigned event type. (that is, 
from 1.1 to 1.5 for ‘type 1’ events, or 2.1 to 2.2 for ‘type 2’ events).   
     *For type 1 events, use theme 1.5 ‘Communication errors and process errors 
       not otherwise specified’ when a more specific theme is not suitable. 
4. To complete, assign the most specific level 3 ‘descriptor’ available from 
within the second level theme chosen.  In general, these descriptors are listed 
from more specific to less specific when moving down the list.   
 
4.9.3 TAPS event types – ‘process’ versus ‘knowledge and skills’ 
When classifying an error event using the TAPS taxonomy, the fundamental decision 
to be made was the distinction between a type 1 or ‘Process’ type of event, versus a 
type 2 or ‘Knowledge and Skills’ related event.  Essentially any event that was 
contributed to by a deficiency in the knowledge and skills of a person providing 
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clinical care to a patient involved in the incident was classified as a type 2 event, and 
all others fell into the type 1 category.  The exception to this was a report in which 
there did not appear to be any error noted which were classified as ‘not an error’ in the 
brief description summaries.   
 
The following two case studies are presented to demonstrate the different nature of a 
process event (type 1) to a knowledge and skills event (type 2).  A synopsis of the 
salient features is given for each. 
 
Figure 4.5 TAPS case study of a report containing a patient safety event relating 
to the processes of health care. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A patient with a background of developmental delay, epilepsy and 
schizophrenia attended a general practice regularly, but used two different 
surnames on different occasions, being the names of each of his divorced 
parents.  The practice mistakenly held two different electronic records for 
him under these two names, which contained different medication lists.  He 
was prescribed a new medication which resulted in him becoming over-
sedated, lethargic and depressed as a result of an interaction with a 
medication listed in the other chart, before the mistake was discovered.   
 
TAPS Code 1.1.3 
Type   Processes of health care  
Theme Errors in practice and health care systems  
Descriptor Patient record and filing system errors  
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Figure 4.6 TAPS case study of a report containing patient safety events relating 
to the knowledge and skills of health professionals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
4.9.4 TAPS event themes and descriptors 
After categorising an event as either a type 1 or type 2 error, the next step was to 
decide on the ‘theme’ of the event, which was one of five descriptive categories 
within type 1, or two descriptive categories within type 2.  Then within these themes 
were a varying number of sublevels of description, called ‘descriptors’ with 35 end-
descriptors in all (see Appendix 10).   
 
The pilot taxonomy is shown in Appendix 4 (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002a).  The 
main differences between the pilot and TAPS taxonomies at the second or ‘theme’ 
level of the type 1 process errors were the merging of payment errors and errors in 
healthcare workforce management into third level descriptors under the theme of 
‘errors in practice and health care systems’, and the expansion of the treatment error 
A patient with severe depression was scheduled by their general 
practitioner (GP) to the regional psychiatric hospital. A week later the 
patient returned to the GP for follow-up after discharge.  The patient 
reported to the GP that he had complained of increasing pain in the chest 
after admission to the psychiatric unit, and after some delay he was sent 
into the local base hospital by the psychiatric unit for a chest Xray without 
actually being physically examined. The chest Xray was normal, and after 
a further 3 days he was examined by a medical officer in the psychiatric 
unit and found to have a florid shingles rash.  He was eventually sent home 
on analgesia, but antiviral management had not been appropriately 
instituted. 
 
TAPS Code 2.1.2, 2.2.1 (2 events identified) 
Type    Knowledge and skills of health professionals (both events) 
Theme Errors in diagnosis (event 1)  
Errors in managing patient care (event 2) 
Descriptor Errors in patient physical examination (event 1) 
Medication management errors (event 2) 
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category into medication and non-medication treatment errors.  The themes of the 
type 2 errors were greatly changed and simplified from the pilot to the TAPS 
taxonomy, with three categories under ‘knowledge and skills’ in the pilot becoming 
just two themes in the TAPS taxonomy.  This was based on the logic that errors in 
knowledge and skills essentially related to either diagnostic or management issues, 
and the earlier categories of ‘execution of a clinical task’ and ‘wrong treatment 
decision with right diagnosis’ were very problematic for coding agreement.  Finally, 
an addition into every theme was the end-descriptor category of ‘not otherwise 
specified’, which essentially allowed for the categorisation of all the reported events. 
 
4.9.4.1   Type 1.1 - Errors in practice and health care systems 
The theme of ‘Errors in practice and health care systems’ accounted for the largest 
proportion of reported error events when compared to the second level of TAPS 
taxonomy classifications.  It was largely comprised of administrative process errors in 
general practice, but occasionally also arose from systems failures in the residential 
care and hospital setting affecting patients visiting GP participants in the study.   
 
It ranged from problems with the front desk contact with the patient, through to 
bookings, filing records, arranging recalls for patients requiring follow-up of specific 
conditions, computer system breakdowns in practices, physical problems with practice 
buildings or fittings, confidentiality problems such as personal information being 
inadvertently faxed to a third unrelated party, inadequate staff coverage in practices, 
residential care or hospital settings, and physical problems with the practice 
environment such as broken steps or examination couches.   
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The reports that fell into the ‘not otherwise specified’ category had a mixture of health 
systems errors, such as payment problems at reception, incorrect billing procedures, 
incorrect certificates being issued, poor staff management processes, the absence of 
required equipment in the practice, incorrect level of placement of a patient into a 
residential aged care facility influenced by family financial constraints, budgetary 
constraints at local hospitals causing bed closures, and unacceptable waiting times for 
coronary angiograms for public hospital patients.   
 
The major variations in this theme from the pilot taxonomy were firstly its expansion 
in name and nature, from ‘office administration’ to a wider range of errors in practice 
and other health care systems.  Secondly, a series of changes were made at the third or 
‘descriptor’ level.  Additions included errors relating to patient identification, recall 
systems, computer systems, after hours care and inadequate staffing, patient 
confidentiality issues, and the not otherwise specified group.  The pilot taxonomy 
categories of chart completeness and patient flow through the healthcare system were 
deleted as they proved to be quite confusing.  Message handling and appointments 
were condensed into one group.  A case study of this theme is presented below in 
figure 4.7.  It demonstrates an example of a recall system error in the practice. 
Figure 4.7 Case study of an error in practice and health care systems - recall 
error. 
A patient presents with a breast lump which the GP thinks is non-malignant.  The 
doctor asks her to come back in 6 to 8 weeks, but both patient and GP forget and 
she is not seen for another 4 months.  When she returns to the GP at a later time, 
her lump is diagnosed as breast cancer for which she requires mastectomy and 
chemotherapy.  The reporting GP states that their recall systems were inadequate. 
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4.9.4.2  Type 1.2 - Investigation errors 
The third level descriptors of the ‘Investigation error’ theme in the TAPS taxonomy 
were substantially changed from the pilot study taxonomy, where essentially they had 
been comprised of  two groups being ‘laboratory’ or ‘diagnostic imaging’.  Instead of 
these, the concept of the process by which any type of investigation is managed was 
adopted as the basis of the third level descriptors.  Five new descriptors resulted in the 
TAPS taxonomy, being issues relating to patient identification, the requesting process, 
the process of undertaking the investigation, reporting processes or managing 
investigation reports, (such as a failure in the dictation or transcription of an 
investigation report, as opposed to the report being incorrect due to a problem with the 
knowledge required to correctly report an investigation), and finally the ‘not 
otherwise specified’ group.  Errors in reporting processes or managing investigation 
reports (1.2.4 of the TAPS taxonomy, see table 4.6) comprised the major portion of 
the events occurring in the investigation error theme. 
 
A case study of the investigation error theme is presented below in figure 4.8, 
demonstrating an error in the reporting process of an investigation. 
 
Figure 4.8 Case study of an investigation process error - reporting processes. 
Serial beta-HCGs are taken due to concerns that a patient does not have an ongoing 
pregnancy. Results obtained by phone from the lab on day 3 find the level has 
dropped.  The patient is distressed and the GP refers her for further management of 
a potential miscarriage.  When the hard copy result arrives later, it shows a rise in 
levels, to the patient’s relief.  The reporting GP determined that the technician had 
read out the wrong group of numbers on the pathology report. 
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4.9.4.3   Type 1.3 - Medication errors 
The theme of medication errors was created in the TAPS taxonomy and given a group 
of five descriptors, in comparison to the pilot taxonomy where it existed as a single 
third level descriptor under ‘treatment errors’.  It comprised the second largest group 
of process errors, and its descriptors ranged from prescription writing or medication 
charting (with and without a computer), dispensing and delivery errors, and patient 
self-administration of medication errors.   
 
The largest group of descriptors were the dispensing and delivery errors, which 
included pharmacists accidentally mislabelling or handing out a different medication 
to that prescribed, and nursing staff mainly in residential aged care facilities 
accidentally administering different medication to that which had been charted for the 
patient.  This was closely followed by a large group of errors relating to incorrectly 
printing information on computer generated prescriptions, often as a result of 
accidentally clicking the wrong drug strength on a drop-down menu of medications on 
the GP’s prescribing software, or as a result of having the incorrect patient file open 
whilst consulting, if the GP forgot to close off the file of the patient from the previous 
visit in their room.  A case study of a medication process error is presented on the 
following page in figure 4.9, which demonstrates an accidental dispensing error in 
pharmacy. 
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Figure 4.9 Case study of a medication process error - dispensing error 
 
 
4.9.4.4   Type 1.4 - Treatment errors (non-medication) 
The fourth theme of type 1 error events in the TAPS taxonomy related to non-
medication treatment errors, and applied to reported problems concerning some aspect 
of the process of providing a non-medication treatment to a patient, as opposed to type 
2 treatment errors which involved some sort of clinical lack of knowledge or skill in 
performing a procedure or providing a non-medication treatment.  It was largely 
comprised of systems failures around the delivery of immunisations, and also 
included a case of accidentally using unsterilised equipment in a procedure, and a case 
of failing to provide palliative care treatment in a timely manner due to time 
management problems in the practice. 
 
A case study of an immunisation process error is presented below in figure 4.10, 
demonstrating problems with documentation processes leading to a treatment error. 
 
Figure 4.10 Case study of a non-medication treatment process error – 
immunisation 
 
A patient who had been taking Prothiaden 25mg, 2 nocte, was dispensed 75mg 
tablets in error at the pharmacy.  She became unsteady on her feet and started 
getting sleepy before the error was picked up when she questioned the pharmacist. 
A four year old child presented for routine immunisations, which were given 
correctly as per the standard schedule.  At the consultation, the child’s ‘blue book’ 
(immunisation record) was not present.  When the ‘blue book’ was later found, it 
showed that these immunisations had been given on a previous occasion. 
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4.9.4.5  Type 1.5 - Communication errors and process errors not 
otherwise specified 
The TAPS taxonomy theme of communication errors and process errors not otherwise 
specified was similar to the pilot taxonomy’s communication errors section (see 
Appendix 4).  There was some refinement of the descriptors, new additions of specific 
problems with hospital discharge and other hospital communication errors, and of 
specific problems with referrals to other providers.  It was also broader than the pilot 
taxonomy’s communication section in that it captured all ‘not otherwise specified’ 
process type errors.   
 
The concept of ‘communication failure’ is very broad, and it could be argues that 
most reported errors actually contain some aspect of a breakdown in communication.  
Therefore it was intended that this general theme be used when the error was some 
type of process problem, but one of the earlier four more specific themes listed did not 
suit the situation.  This rule is detailed in the taxonomy guidelines for use, described 
previously in section 4.9.2.  
 
The largest proportion of this theme, and equal second as the largest group of reported 
errors at the third level, was due to hospital discharge and other hospital based 
communication errors.  Many of these were concerning the interface between the 
emergency department and the GP, as well as poor discharge communications as 
patients left the hospital sector and returned to the community. 
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A case study of a communication process error is shown below in figure 4.11, giving 
a common example of hospital discharge communication problems with a patient, as 
well as a patient self-administration of medication process error.   
 
Figure 4.11 Case study of a communication process error - hospital based 
 
 
 
4.9.4.6 Type 2.1 - Errors in diagnosis 
Errors in diagnostic knowledge and skills of health professionals comprised around 
12% of total reported events, and the main difference in this part of the TAPS 
taxonomy from the pilot taxonomy was that a need to assign blame to a particular 
health profession was removed for this section of the classification.  The main 
justification for this was that in the original study design there was no perceived 
benefit in assigning blame to an individual clinician for a reported error, and so there 
was no question relating to this in the reporting process.  As for all events, but most 
relevant for the type 2 errors, a reported error by definition was not necessarily the 
result of the reporter’s actions.  This meant that very often the information relating to 
fault was unavailable from the report, making the pilot taxonomy very difficult to 
apply.  The TAPS taxonomy descriptors for this section were instead divided into the 
different elements of the diagnostic process, being history, physical examination and 
investigations.   
A patient is discharged from hospital with a 5 day supply of their medications.  
On review with their GP some days later it was realised that they had been taking 
both their original medicines in addition to the hospital supplied medications each 
day, resulting in double dosing.   
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In some instances, a type 2 diagnostic error was clearly being reported by the 
participant, but it was not always possible to determine from the written report where 
in the diagnostic process an error had occurred, and so the category of ‘diagnosis 
related errors not otherwise specified’ was able to capture these events. 
 
As shown in the TAPS taxonomy proportions of error events in section 4.9.1 (see 
table 4.6), the majority of this group of events related to knowledge and skills 
deficiencies in the request or interpretation of investigations, and an example is given 
in the following case study shown in figure 4.12 demonstrating diagnostic problems 
with physical examination and a delay in requesting an investigation of a skin biopsy. 
 
Figure 4.12 Case study of a knowledge and skills error in diagnosis 
  
4.9.4.7   Type 2.2 - Errors in managing patient care 
As a theme group, type 2 errors concerning the management of patient care was 
almost twice as common as diagnostic errors.  The theme appears in the TAPS 
taxonomy as a replacement of the pilot taxonomy sections 2.1 ‘errors in the execution 
of a clinical task’ and 2.3 ‘wrong treatment decision with right diagnosis’ (see 
Appendix 4), however it does not have any of the same descriptors as these sections, 
both of which were found to be very confusing and poorly described in the pilot 
taxonomy.  Instead the management of patient care is broken down into the 
A non-healing ulcer on a man’s thumb is treated with dressings for a year initially 
on the advice of a surgeon, and when he sees the treating GP’s colleague, a biopsy 
is taken which shows a squamous cell carcinoma.  He requires amputation of the 
thumb and develops a chest infection and acute heart failure post-operatively. 
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management of medication, the undertaking of immunisations, the undertaking of 
other procedures such as minor operations, and other patient care management errors.   
 
An earlier version of the TAPS taxonomy also had a descriptor for errors in the 
provision of preventative care, however it was found that no reports were made 
relating to this subject, and so it was dropped from the final taxonomy. 
 
Although knowledge and skills errors overall only accounted for about 30% of events, 
the most common group of reported error events at the third level of the taxonomy 
was medication management errors.  A case study example of one of these is 
presented below in figure 4.13. 
 
Figure 4.13 Case study of a knowledge and skills error in managing patient care 
- medication management 
 
4.10   Coder agreement from pilot to TAPS taxonomy 
Three GPs from the investigating team (Meredith Makeham, Simone Stromer and 
Charles Bridges-Webb) initially coded the set of 433 reports using the pilot taxonomy 
shown in Appendix 4 (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).  After discussion, an initial draft 
of the TAPS taxonomy was created for testing, and as described in the methods, the 
A GP prescribes tramadol for a patient on an SSRI, ignoring the computer 
prescribing software’s warning about interactions.  The patient develops symptoms 
of serotonergic syndrome and the medication is stopped after 2 days. 
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coders started the classification process again using approximately a quarter of the 
reports at a time.   
 
The coders came together after each quarter of report coding to discuss coding issues 
and make adjustments to the working draft of the TAPS taxonomy, and specifically 
review cases in which there was a complete disagreement of classifications used by 
the three coders to reach a consensus on which classification should be applied (a 
minimum of two out of three coders in agreement).  This process resulted in the 
production of the TAPS taxonomy (shown in Appendix 10) and its guidelines for use. 
 
Using the final TAPS taxonomy, the last 132 reports in the dataset (approximately one 
quarter) were classified by the three coders, and the results presented below represent 
the classifications made prior to discussion of reports in which there was a complete 
disagreement (that is, cases where all three coders applied a different taxonomic 
classification to the report).      
 
Using the kappa statistic, the percentage agreement of the three coders was compared 
from the initial level of agreement using the pilot taxonomy with the full set of 433 
reports, to this final set of 132 reports using the TAPS taxonomy.  The agreement 
amongst the three coders at each level of both the pilot and TAPS taxonomies, with 
corresponding kappa scores, are shown in table 4.8 on the following page:   
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Table 4.8 The proportion of agreement amongst the three coders and kappa 
score at each level of the taxonomies, comparing the pilot to the TAPS taxonomy. 
Coding level Taxonomy Complete 
disagreement % 
Two of three 
coders agree % 
Compete 
agreement % 
Kappa 
score 
Level 1 
(Type) 
Pilot 2 28 70 0.59 
TAPS 0 10 90 0.82 
Level 2  
(Theme) 
Pilot 14 45 41 0.48 
TAPS 1 34 65 0.72 
Level 3 
(Descriptor) 
Pilot 26 49 25 0.37 
TAPS 8 34 58 0.66 
 
 
A kappa score of between 0.40 and 0.75 indicates fair agreement. (Fleiss 1981; 
Bolton, Mira et al. 1997)  The results show that this was not able to be achieved in the 
pilot taxonomy’s third level of classification which had a kappa score of 0.37.  Even 
in the second level of classification, the pilot taxonomy’s kappa score is in the lower 
end of the range of fair agreement, at 0.48.   
 
The TAPS taxonomy showed a marked improvement in coder agreement at all levels 
from the pilot taxonomy.  At the first level, kappa agreement was highest at 0.82.  The 
kappa score for the TAPS taxonomy was lower at levels 2 and 3, although remaining 
in the upper range of fair agreement.  This decrease in coder agreement from level 1 
to level 3 was as expected, because the number of choices for coding increased at 
each level, moving from two at the first level, to seven at the second level, and to 
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thirty five unique classifications at the third level.  With this increasing number of 
choices, there was a far greater likelihood that coders would choose different options 
from chance alone, which in turn would lower the kappa statistic.   
 
At the third level of the code from the pilot to the TAPS taxonomy, the proportion of 
reports in which at least two of three coders agreed rose from 74% to 92%, and the 
kappa score moved from 0.37 to 0.66, and as such the TAPS taxonomy falls within  
the fair agreement range based on the kappa statistic (Makeham, Stromer et al. 2007). 
 
4.11   Patient related factors in reported errors 
During the reporting process, a number of patient demographic details and other 
factors were recorded by the participants, results of which are presented in more detail 
in this section.  These include whether or not a patient was involved in a report, how 
well the GP participant knew the patient on a 5 point rating scale, the average age of 
the patient as well as proportions relating to gender, Non-English Speaking 
Background (NESB) and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
 
4.11.1 Patient involvement in reported errors 
In answer to the question of whether or not the error being reported was related to a 
patient, participants answered ‘Yes’ in the majority of cases, being 385 of 433 reports 
(89%).  Considering only those reports that contained at least one error event (415), a 
patient was involved in the error that was being reported 93% of the time. 
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In examining the 48 reports that were not associated with patient involvement and 
their types of events (as classified using the TAPS taxonomy), approximately one 
quarter were tests that had come in from participants after the official start of 
reporting had commenced, and the rest were type 1 events.  (This is as would be 
expected from the nature of the taxonomy and the relationship of type 2 events to 
diagnosis of patients and patient care management issues, making it unlikely for a 
type 2 event to be reported that was unrelated to a patient.)   
 
In terms of the type 1 themes, all five of the level 2 groups of the TAPS taxonomy 
were represented, but the majority of these non-patient reports were concerning the 
first theme of errors noted with practice and health care systems (16), such as 
computer system failures, followed by medication process errors (10). 
 
4.11.2 How well the patient was known 
Participants were asked to rate how well the patient was known on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 was labelled “I have never seen this patient before and am not familiar with 
his/her health problems” and 5 was labelled “I am very familiar with this patient and 
his/her health problems”. 
 
For all reports in which it was indicated that a patient was involved, the participants 
more commonly indicated that they were very familiar with the patient than that they 
had never seen them before.  In one case, the question was left unanswered.  Figure 
4.14 on the following page shows the distribution demonstrating the trend of patient 
familiarity across the board. 
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Figure 4.14 The number of responses per each of five familiarity categories, 
rating how well the patient involved in an error was known to participants.   
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A further analysis of the responses given to this question was undertaken, in relation 
to the error types as classified by the TAPS taxonomy.  There appeared to be a 
possible trend in the data, with reports in which the patient was said to have been well 
known being more commonly associated with the events being classified as type 2, 
knowledge and skills related.  When the response was “5” (very familiar), 37% of 
events had been classified as type 2 as opposed to 26% when the response to the 
question was “1” (never seen before). 
 
The data was firstly examined for an association between having never seen the 
patient before (“1”) versus any category of having seen the patient (>1), and the error 
type being process (type 1) versus knowledge and skills (type 2).  Using Fischer’s 
exact test, there was no significant association between these outcomes at the 5% 
level (p = 0.35).   
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Next the results were examined for an association between having never seen the 
patient before (“1”) versus the category of knowing the patient very well (“5”), and 
the error type being process (type 1) versus knowledge and skills (type 2).  Using 
Fischer’s exact test, again there was no significant association between these 
outcomes at the 5% level (p = 0.25).   
 
4.11.3 Age of patients involved in reported errors 
If an error was reported as relating to a specific patient, participants were asked to 
state the age of the patient in whole numbers.  Descriptive statistics of the reported 
age of patients is presented below in table 4.9 for the 383 reports in which this figure 
was completed: 
Table 4.9  Descriptive statistics relating to the age of patients in error reports. 
Parameter  Value 
Mean  51.9 
Standard deviation (SD)  26.7 
Standard error of the mean (SEM)  1.36 
 Number (N)  383      
95% Confidence Interval 49.2 to 54.6
Minimum  0 
Median  56 
Maximum  104 
 
The average age of patients involved in type 1 (process) events was 52.4 years (with a 
standard error of the mean (SEM) of 1.45), as compared to type 2 events in which the 
average age was 55.0 years, with a SEM of 2.26.  There was no significant difference 
in these averages using the unpaired Student’s t-test at the 5% significance level (p = 
0.33). 
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4.11.4 Gender of patients involved in reported errors 
If an error was reported as relating to a specific patient, participants were asked to 
state the gender of the patient by clicking next to male or female on the web 
questionnaire.  This was answered in 382 cases, with 169 responses of male (44%) 
and 213 responses of female (56%). 
 
There appeared to be a possible higher proportion of male patients involved in type 2 
(knowledge and skills) error events, with 49% of type 2 events involving male 
patients, versus 42% of type 1 events. A statistical analysis of the association between 
gender and type 1 (process) versus type 2 (knowledge and skills) was undertaken.  
Using Fisher’s exact test, there was no significant association between gender and 
event type at the 5% significance level (p = 0.22).  
 
4.11.5 Ethnicity of patients involved in reported errors 
If an error was reported as relating to a specific patient, participants were asked to 
indicate if the patient was either from a non-English speaking background (NESB), 
and whether or not the patient was an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) 
person.  In 385 reports in which a patient was said to have been involved, the 
participant identified the patient as NESB in 60 reports (16%), and ATSI in 6 (2%).    
 
The proportions of type 1 and 2 events when comparing the NESB reports to non-
NESB reports were almost identical, and no statistically significant association 
between event type and whether or not a patient was NESB was found at the 5% 
significance level using Fishers exact test (p = 1.0).  However on considering the issue 
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of whether a patient was ATSI, of the 6 cases, there were twice as many type 2 events 
as type 1 events.  This association was not quite statistically significant at the 5% 
level using Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.096). 
 
4.12  Event locations of reported errors 
In answer to the question of where a reported error had occurred, there were ten 
options for the event location (office or surgery, nursing home, hospital, patient’s 
home, telephone, emergency room, laboratory, pharmacy, radiology, and  ‘other’).  
Participants were able to answer with as many choices as they felt applicable.   
 
First considering each error report as a single case, regardless of the number of events 
contained within it, there were 477 location selections made by participants in 433 
TAPS reports.  This included 16 reports where no location was selected (tests), 370 
reports with 1 location, 37 reports with two locations, 7 reports with three locations, 
and 3 reports with four locations.  The majority of the reports with two or more 
locations included office and one other, and of the ten reports with 3 or 4 locations, 
combinations of the office or surgery, patient’s home, hospital and telephone were 
commonly involved. 
 
In considering the association between event types and locations, it should be recalled 
that each report could contain one or more events, and so each event within a report 
was tagged with the location or locations that the participant had selected for this 
analysis.  This resulted in the 525 error events being associated with 610 location 
counts, as again multiple locations could be associated with a single event.  The 
overall proportion of type 1 to type 2 events within this group was 70% to 30%. 
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Table 4.10 on the following page shows the total number of reports with a particular 
location selected, the number of reports within this that had a second, third or fourth 
additional location selected (multiple locations), the number of type 1, type 2 and the 
total number of events associated with the location, and the proportion of type 1 to 
type 2 events associated with a given location. 
 
The proportion of type 1 to type 2 events within each location was compared to the 
proportions of type 1 to type 2 events for all other locations combined, using Fisher’s 
exact test.  The probability that a given location’s proportion of type 1 to type 2 events 
was significantly different from the remainder of the reports at the 5% significance 
level is presented as the ‘p value’ in the final column of table 4.10.  This shows that    
there were significantly more type 2 events reported that were located in nursing 
homes than other locations, at 45% (p = 0.05), and significantly less type 2 events 
reported from pharmacies than other locations, at 7% (p = 0.003). 
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Table 4.10 The total number of locations chosen by participants within 433 
TAPS reports; the number of counts of a given location within reports that were 
associated with a second, third or fourth location; location counts associated with 
type 1 and 2 events; the proportion of type 1 to type 2 events for each location; 
and the p-value of the proportion of type 1 to type 2 events for a given location 
compared to all others combined. 
Location Total 
Number 
location 
counts  
associated 
with 
reports 
(N= 477) 
Number 
of 
location 
counts 
associated 
with 
other  
locations 
(N= 107)
Location 
counts 
associated 
with Type 
1 events 
(N= 427) 
Location 
counts 
associated 
with Type 
2 events 
(N= 183) 
Proportion 
of type 1 
to type 2 
events in a 
given 
location 
Proportion 
of type 1 
to type 2 
events for 
all other 
locations 
combined 
P-
value  
Office 271 35 233  93 0.71 0.68 0.43 
Nursing 
Home 
29 9 25  17 0.55 0.71 0.05 
Hospital 66 17 61  36 0.64 0.71 0.19 
Patient’s 
Home 
11 10 13 2 0.87 0.70 0.25 
Phone  37 15 30 21 0.59 0.71 0.08 
Emergency 5 3 6 3 0.82 0.70 1.00 
Laboratory 14 8 14 3 0.82 0.70 0.42 
Pharmacy 27 3 28 2 0.93 0.69 0.003
Radiology 11 5 10 5 0.67 0.70 0.78 
Other 6 2 7 1 0.88 0.70 0.45 
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4.13   TAPS reports associated with patient harm 
4.13.1 Patient harm ratings by participants in TAPS reports 
When completing reports, TAPS study participants were asked the question “To your 
knowledge, was any patient harmed by this error?”.  If they answered in the 
affirmative, they were then shown the question “How would you rate the seriousness 
of this harm?”, and given a 5 point Likert scale to click a number on from 1 to 5, with 
a label before the number 1 being “Not serious at all”, and after the number 5 being 
“Extremely serious”.   
 
Within the group of the 415 error reports which contained at least one event, there 
were 100 reports (24%) in which the participant had given a positive response to the 
question of patient harm (harm positive).  Within this, the frequencies of ratings given 
from 1 to 5 are shown below in figure 4.15. 
 
 
Figure 4.15 The distribution of harm ratings (from 1 to 5) within the 100 reports 
containing at least one error event, in which patient harm was stated to be 
positive by the participant. 
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4.13.2 Reported patient harm in relation to TAPS event 
classification 
The association between harm positive reports and their TAPS taxonomy 
classifications were considered in a number of ways.  Firstly, to evaluate the first level 
event type 1 or 2 and its association with harm, each of the 415 reports was grouped 
into either a type 1 category, a type 2 category, or a ‘mixed’ category if both type 1 
and 2 events were present within the same report.  This resulted in a frequency of 
event types as shown below in table 4.11. 
Table 4.11 The frequency of type 1, type 2 and mixed event types in reports 
Event type Frequency 
1 275 (66%) 
2 109 (27%) 
Mixed 31 (7%) 
Total 415 (100%) 
 
The association between these categories of event types and patient harm being 
reported as positive is shown below in table 4.12. 
Table 4.12 The frequency of harm positive reports within TAPS taxonomy event 
types 1, 2 and mixed. 
Event type Frequency of harm 
1  Errors related to the processes of health care 41/275 (15%) 
2  Errors related to the knowledge and skills of health professionals 42/109 (39%) 
Mixed event types 1 and 2 17/31 (55%) 
Total 100/415 (24%) 
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Event type 1 had the lowest rate of harm (15%), with mixed events resulting in the 
greatest rate of harm (55%). There was very strong evidence of a difference in rates of 
reported harm between the types of event (χ22=41.13, P<0.0001). 
 
Next, the association between the number of events within reports and frequency of 
reports being harm positive was considered, with the results summarised in table 4.13. 
 
Table 4.13 Association between number of events and harm in the 415 TAPS 
reports. 
Number of events  Frequency of harm 
1 65/319 (20%) 
2 33/84 (39%) 
3 or 4 2/12 (17%) 
Total 100/415 (24%) 
 
There was strong evidence of a difference in rates of harm by the number of events 
(χ22=13.37, P=0.001), with reports containing two events having the highest 
association with being reported as involving patient harm. 
 
In order to examine the association between harm positive reports and their TAPS 
taxonomy classifications at the second or ‘theme’ level, each of the 525 TAPS events 
contained within the 415 TAPS reports was labelled with as ‘harm positive’ or ‘harm 
negative’, corresponding to the harm result that the overall report was given by 
participants.  This resulted in 138 counts of patient harm within the 525 separate error 
events (26%) that were contained within the 415 reports.  This then enabled an 
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evaluation of the association between harm positive reports and the second level or 
theme of events, of which there are seven main groupings (five under type 1 and two 
under type 2).  The frequency of harm positive reports within each of the second level 
themes is presented below in table 4.14: 
 
Table 4.14 The frequency of harm positive events per TAPS theme for the 525 
error events within 415 reports, the frequency of harm positive events for all 
other themes combined, and the p-value of the frequency of harm positive events 
for a given theme compared to all other themes combined. 
 
Event theme Frequency of 
harm positive 
events within  
each theme 
Frequency of harm 
positive events for 
all other themes 
combined 
P value 
1.1 Errors in practice and 
health care systems 
 20/112 (18%) 118/413 (29%) 
 
0.022 
1.2 Investigation errors  11/65 (17%) 127/460 (28%) 
 
0.072 
1.3 Medication errors 11/107 (10%) 127/418 (30%) 
 
<0.0001 
1.4 Treatment errors (non-
medication) 
3/13 (23%) 135/512 (26%) 
 
1.00 
1.5 Communication and 
process errors NOS 
25/68 (37%) 113/457 (25%) 
 
0.039 
2.1 Errors in diagnosis 28/62 (45%) 110/463 (24%) 
 
0.0006 
2.2 Errors in managing patient 
care 
40/98 (41%) 98/427 (23%) 
 
0.0005 
Total 138/525 (26%)   
 
The proportion of harm positive to harm negative events within each theme was 
compared to the proportions of harm positive to harm negative events for all other 
themes combined, using Fisher’s exact test.  The probability that a given theme’s 
proportion of harm positive to harm negative events was significantly different from 
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the remainder of the themes at the 5% significance level is presented as the ‘p value’ 
in the final column of table 4.14.   
 
This shows that for themes 11 (Errors in practice and health care systems) and 13 
(Medication process errors), there was a lower proportion of harm positive events, and 
for themes 15 (Communication errors and process errors not otherwise specified), 21 
(Errors in diagnosis) and 22 (Errors in managing patient care) a higher proportion of 
harm positive events, than in all other themes combined at the 5% significance level.   
 
4.13.3 Reported patient harm in relation to patient age 
The average age of patients involved in reports that were harm positive was compared 
to reports in which participants reported that there was no patient harm.  There were 
284 reports in which an age was provided, and patient harm was stated to be negative 
and 96 reports in which an age was provided, and patient harm was positive.  In four 
reports, there was positive patient harm but no patient age provided.  The descriptive 
statistics for the average age of patients in the 380 reports in which age was provided, 
and harm was noted as positive or negative, are presented below in table 4.15, 
showing an average age of 49.8 versus 58.2 in harm negative versus harm positive 
reports. 
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Table 4.15 Descriptive statistics for the average age of patients in harm negative 
versus harm positive reports. 
Parameter  Harm negative  Harm positive 
Mean  49.9  58.2 
Standard deviation (SD)  25.9  27.6 
Standard error of the mean 
(SEM)  1.54  2.82 
 Number (N)  284       96     
95% Confidence Interval 46.8 to 52.9 52.6 to 63.8 
Minimum  0.4  0 
Median  53  66 
Maximum  100  104 
 
These averages were then compared using the Student’s t-test, which showed that the 
difference in mean age of patients involved in harm positive to harm negative reports 
was highly statistically significant (t = 2.68, DF = 278, p = 0.0076), with older 
patients more commonly being involved in harm positive reports. 
 
4.13.4 Reported patient harm in relation to patient gender 
There were 380 of 415 reports in which a patient gender was selected, and harm was 
reported as positive or negative, and 4 reports in which harm was indicated as 
positive, but no gender selected.  The proportions of male and female patients 
involved in reports that were harm positive and negative are presented below in table 
4.16. 
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Table 4.16 The proportions of female to male patients in harm positive and harm 
negative TAPS reports. 
Patient harm reported Female patients Male patients 
YES (%) 51 (53%) 45 (47%) 
NO (%) 162 (57%) 122 (43%) 
 
These proportions were then compared using Fisher’s exact test, which showed that 
the association between gender and harm was not statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level (p = 0.55). 
   
4.13.5 Reported patient harm in relation to ethnicity (NESB) 
There were a total of 60 reports in which one or more error events occurred and 
participants indicated that a patient of non-English speaking background (NESB) was 
involved.  The number and percentages of NESB to non-NESB patients involved in 
reports in which harm was deemed positive or negative by participants is shown 
below in table 4.17. 
 
Table 4.17 The proportions of non-English speaking background (NESB) to non-
NESB patients in harm positive and harm negative TAPS reports. 
Patient harm reported NESB patients Non-NESB patients 
YES (%) 13 (13%) 87 (87%) 
NO (%) 47 (15%) 268 (85%) 
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These proportions were compared using Fisher’s exact test, showing that there was no 
significant association between patient harm and patient’s being NESB at the 5% 
significance level (p = 0.7448). 
 
4.13.6 Reported patient harm in relation to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) peoples 
There were a total of 6 reports in which one or more error events occurred and 
participants indicated that they identified the patient as Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander (ATSI).  The number and percentages of ATSI to non-ATSI patients involved 
in reports in which harm was deemed positive or negative by participants is shown 
below in table 4.18. 
 
Table 4.18 The proportions of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) 
patients to non-ATSI patients in harm positive and harm negative TAPS reports. 
Patient harm reported ATSI patients Non-ATSI patients 
YES (%) 3 (3%)  97 (97%) 
NO (%) 3 (1%)  312 (99%) 
 
These proportions were compared using Fisher’s exact test, showing that there was no 
significant association between patient harm and patient’s being ATSI at the 5% 
significance level (p = 0.154).  This is based on a very small number of cases 
however, and so the trend shown in table 4.18 above towards a higher proportion of 
harm reported in association with ATSI patients may become significant with a larger 
number of reports.   
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4.14   Preventability of reported errors 
In almost all TAPS reports, preventive strategies were offered by participants in the 
free text response to the question of whether there were any factors that may have 
prevented this or any other similar error events.  There were 9 of 415 TAPS reports 
(2.2%) containing 10 of 525 error events (1.9%) in which participants had either no 
response or a negative response in their answers to this question. 
 
On review of each report by the Chief Investigator (Meredith Makeham) regarding the 
question of preventability, preventive strategies were considered possible in 4 of the 
reports in which participants had not suggested anything, reducing the number of 
reports in which no preventive strategies could be suggested by either participants or 
the Chief Investigator to 5 of 415, or 1.2%.   
 
The types of preventive suggestions provided by participants in the most part related 
to the specific detail of the error that was raised in the report.  There were three main 
types of preventive suggestions raised, and these were irrespective of whether the 
report was a result of the participant’s own actions or those of other parties.   
 
The first were suggestions related to personal practices, or personal learning goals.  
For example, a failure to use the computer file of the patient in the consulting room 
because the previous patient file was still open would have a comment such as “Be 
more vigilant in changing from previous patient’s file to file of patient now in 
consulting room”, or a case of supra-patellar bursitis due to poor injection technique 
had a comment of “improve my injection technique”.   
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The second related the systems in place at the location where an error occurred, such 
as the general practice or communications from the local hospital.  For example, a 
failure to recall a patient for review of a serious medical condition would have the 
suggestion “Need to improve our practice recall system”, or a failure to provide 
adequate follow-up treatment due to poor communication from the hospital resident 
such as after the initiation of warfarin had the suggestion “Hospitals need to use a 
separate sheet for charting warfarin. That sheet should include the hospital protocol 
for initiating warfarin, INR results and daily warfarin dose. That sheet should be 
attached to the discharge summary.” 
 
The third type of suggestions related to the wider health system, such as a case of a 
mental health patient having inadequate assessment and treatment having the 
comment “Proper assessment at hospital.  More bed space and more staff for mental 
health area.”  Another example was a case of an elderly lady being discharged from 
the local hospital Emergency Department when the GP sent her in after a fall due to 
her being at high risk of further injury and requiring assessment and rehabilitation.  
Within hours of being sent home she had a further fall and hip fracture, requiring 
operation and months of further treatment and care.  The GP commented that this 
could possibly have been prevented if “GP referrals to admitting officer of public 
hospital (got) a higher priority than they does.  Public hospital 'closed bed' policy 
(should) be reviewed - a budget constraint.  Bed block in the Emergency Department 
secondary to closed bed policy.”  A similar type of report had the comment “Sending 
home elderly unstable patients after hours is risky as support services can't be put in 
place after hours, consider keeping them til (sic) morning.” 
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4.15   Reported error types considered to occur frequently in 
general practice  
Participants were asked to indicate within four main groups how frequently they felt 
that the type of error that they had just reported occurred in their daily practice.  The 
groups were labelled on the questionnaire as “1 = first time”, “2 = seldom, 1-2 times 
per year”, “3 = sometimes, 3-11 times per year”, and “4 = frequently, >1 per month”.   
The distribution of reported frequencies of error types within the 415 reports which 
contained at least one error event are presented on the following page in figure 4.16. 
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Figure 4.16 The distribution of reported frequency of error type occurring (with 
1 = first time, 2 = seldom, 1-2 times per year, 3 = sometimes, 3-11 times per year, 
4 = frequently, >1 per month) within the 415 reports containing at least one error 
event. 
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In order to consider the association between the second level of error classification (or 
‘theme’ of the event) and the reported frequency of error type occurring, each of the 
525 identified error events were tagged with the frequency of occurrence score from 1 
to 4 (detailed in section 3.18) that was associated with the report in which the event 
occurred.  The resulting proportions of frequency of occurrence scores within each 
theme are presented visually on the following page in figure 4.17, showing that type 2 
events were felt by participants to be occurring for the first time more often than type 
1, with no counts of the ‘frequent’ category being selected for either diagnostic or 
patient management errors related to the knowledge and skills of health professionals.  
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Figure 4.17 The proportion of events per frequency of error occurrence category, 
with four categories ranging from 1 = first time to 4 = frequently, >1 per month. 
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4.16   Participant feedback interview 
After the completion of the TAPS study 12 month data collection period, 82 of the 
original 84 participants completed a 12 month feedback interview conducted by 
phone.  The two participants who were not able to be followed up had left the study, 
one due to personal reasons and one moving interstate during the study period. 
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In addition to the earlier analysis of the 12 month feedback questionnaire regarding 
whether or not participants had submitted a report included in the quantitative analysis 
in section 4.4, other responses analysed were questions relating to the ease of use of 
the TAPS website ranked from 1 to 5, how many minutes it took to submit an online 
report, and the proportion of participants who said they would be more or less likely 
to report errors if the process had not been anonymous.   
 
The participants were asked if they had sent any reports (to which 79 had reported 
YES), how had they found the website in terms of its ease of use, and asked to rank 
from 1 to 5, where 1 was easy and 5 was difficult.  The results of this question are 
presented below in figure 4.18, showing that the majority of users felt that the site was 
easy to use. 
 
Figure 4.18  Participant rating of the ease of use of the TAPS website from 1 (= 
easy) to 5 (= difficult). 
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The participants were also asked if they felt that they would have been more likely or 
less likely to have sent a report if the system had not been anonymous, and overall the 
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feeling was that anonymity supported error reporting.  52 answered that they would be 
“less likely” to report if not anonymous (66% of those who sent reports), 23 
participants answered “no difference” (29%), no participants answered “more likely” 
and 4 participants (5%) said it would depend on the purpose of the system, such as if 
it were only for research. 
  
The question “About how many minutes did it take you to send an on-line error 
report?” was answered by 76 of the 79 participants who sent reports.  Three 
participants who had said they had sent reports were not able to estimate the time 
taken for submission.  The results relating to the 76 responses are presented below in 
table 4.19, with an estimated average of 6.2 minutes for each report. 
 
Table 4.19  Descriptive statistics relating to the time in minutes taken to submit 
an error report. 
Parameter  Value 
Mean  6.20 
Standard deviation (SD)  3.99 
Standard error of the mean (SEM)  0.46 
 Number (N)  76     
95% Confidence Interval 5.29 to 7.11
Minimum  1 
Median  5 
Maximum  15 
  
 
 
 
   
 
193
4.17   Reports involving patient deaths 
The eight reports in the TAPS study which involved a patient death are discussed in 
more detail in this section of the thesis, in terms of the types of errors that were 
involved and the prevention messages that emerge.  They represent an extreme level 
of patient harm arising in a health care setting.  All of these eight reports had a 
positive response from participants to the question of whether harm had occurred, and 
all but two were rated at 5 out of 5 for severity of harm, with one rated 3 and another 
4, explained in the reports as due to balancing other factors such as quality of life 
issues.  These aspects will be discussed in more detail in section 4.17.2.   
 
4.17.1 Types of reports as classified by the TAPS taxonomy 
The proportion of reports involving a patient death contained more coded error events 
on average than the rest of the TAPS reports, with 50% having more than one event 
classification assigned.  Four of the reports had one event, two had two events, and 
two had three events.  This is an extremely small sample, and so further statistical 
analysis of this probable trend was not undertaken, however it would appear that these 
reports may be more complex generally than others in the data set. 
 
All of the reports involving a patient death contained at least one type 2 (relating to 
the knowledge and skills of health professionals involved in patient care) TAPS 
taxonomy classification, and of the 15 error events contained within these reports, 11 
were of type 2 (73%) in comparison to the 30% of all events in the data being type 2. 
At the theme level, the type 2 errors were fairly evenly spread between diagnostic 
(2.1) and patient management (2.2) errors, with six and five events respectively. 
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Three of the four events in this group which were type 1 (relating to the processes of 
providing patient care) were theme 5 (communication errors), two being 1.5.1 
(failures related to patient communication) and one being 1.5.2 (hospital 
communication).  The other was relating to the process of managing investigation 
results (1.2.4), in the case of responding to a high INR reading in a warfarinised 
patient. 
 
4.17.2 Brief descriptions of TAPS reports involving a patient 
death 
A brief description of the eight reports is provided on the following page in table 4.20.  
This shows that five of the reports in some way involved medication error, two of 
these cases being Warfarin related.  The harm levels given by the reporting GP are 
also presented.   
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Table 4.20 TAPS report descriptions of cases involving a patient death, 
presented with the level of patient harm assigned by participants. 
Report 
Number   
Harm 
level 
Description  
100 5 Clindamycin caused renal problems in hospital.  This was not communicated 
to the reporting GP upon discharge and the outcome was eventually that the 
patient had a premature death from renal failure. 
112 3 A misdiagnosis of bacterial pneumonia in a nursing home patient, reporting 
GP felt patient was under investigated and treated, but balanced this decision 
and the outcome against probable increased patient suffering if they had been 
sent to hospital for further investigation and treatment.  
153 4 Premature death from congestive cardiac failure/cardiomyopathy, with the 
severity of disease being underestimated.  The reporting GP felt that the 
patient was inadequately investigated and managed. 
222 5 A failure to diagnose a sub-arachnoid haemorrhage in a patient with 
persistent headache resulted in their death. 
344 5 Patient death was from a haemorrhage due to a high INR, resulting from a 
drug interaction.  No advice was given to the patient to have early an early 
INR check, and then a further mistake occurred in responding to a high INR 
reading. 
360 5 Patient death was probably due to a high INR in patient who refused to 
follow the GP advice given on a home visit and go to hospital for further 
management. 
402 5 Patient death was from congestive cardiac failure and renal failure due to the 
use of a Cox2 Inhibitor.  The reporting GP felt that the patient may not have 
been aware of the potential risks of the medication and in hindsight they 
could have tried other analgesics. 
442 5 Patient death was from multiorgan failure after the delayed diagnosis of  
pancreatitis as a side effect of an antibiotic (Klacid) in a patient who was also 
immune compromised. 
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4.17.3 TAPS case study involving imminent patient death 
One other TAPS report deserves mention with respect to patient death, as it was 
assumed by the reporting GP that death was imminent although the outcome was 
unknown when the report was made.  It is a particularly Australian example of 
community error, as it illustrates a case of communication failure and a health system 
that failed a patient identified as an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person.  The 
reporting GP wrote the majority of the story in the “what happened” text box, and 
further commented that better education and use of an aboriginal health worker in the 
original referral might have prevented the outcome described.  The story is presented 
below in figure 4.19 in the words of the reporting GP, located in a RRMA 4-7 setting. 
Figure 4.19 Case study of a TAPS report involving imminent patient death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What happened? 
“A poorly educated 38 year old aboriginal woman was admitted to our local 
hospital.  She had hypercalcaemia, grossly raised tumour markers and metastatic 
deposits throughout her skeletal survey.  Three years previously she had been 
referred to a specialist after discovery of a mass and abnormal radiology.  She had 
defaulted from this appointment.  Why, I have been unable to determine.  
 
On discussion with her on her admission (she was informed) that she was seriously 
unwell and would require further investigations and scans to determine why she 
was so unwell.  She objected to any more investigations and requested to be 
discharged.  Apparently her family were away.  Even explaining that she may well 
have cancer and would become increasingly unwell after discharge, she left and 
has declined further contact with medical services.  
  
There are many problems here...relating to Aboriginal health beliefs about cancer, 
being dealt with by white medical services and the cultural backdrop to 
sophisticated high tech medicine.  If she had been persuaded to accept help 
originally, she might have a normal life expectancy.  If she accepted help now, she 
might live another 6 months to 2 years with chemotherapy. Currently she will die 
within days or weeks.” 
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4.18  Summary of results in relation to aims of the TAPS study 
The four major aims of the TAPS study were presented earlier in this thesis in section 
1.3.  The results presented have addressed these aims in a number of ways, as follows:   
 
1. The design of a web-based, secure and anonymous error reporting system was 
completed.  As presented in results of the participant feedback interview in section 
4.16, the resulting system was found to be suitable in terms of access (79 of 82 
participants submitted an online report) and ease of use (67 of 82 reported 
category 1 or 2 on a five point Likert scale measuring ease of use, with 1 being 
‘easy’ and 5 being ‘difficult).  The participant group were shown to be 
representative of  NSW GPs (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).   
2. The incidence of reported error was determined, as presented in section 4.6, and 
these results were the first (and only to date) published in the world scientific peer 
reviewed literature on the incidence of reported error in a representative sample of 
GPs given a secure and anonymous electronic error reporting system (Makeham, 
Kidd et al. 2006). 
3. The TAPS taxonomy was used to quantify the proportions of error types reported 
by GPs, presented in section 4.9, and these proportions were the first published in 
the scientific literature based on a representative sample of GPs (Makeham, 
Stromer et al. 2007).   
4. A taxonomy was created to describe reported error in general practice, presented 
in section 4.9 and Appendix 10.  It was found to have a good level of inter-coder 
agreement as presented in section 4.10.  It has been suggested in the scientific 
literature that it would be possible to adapt the TAPS taxonomy as a tool for GPs 
to self-code error (Makeham, Stromer et al. 2007). 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Overview 
In this section of the thesis, a discussion of the results of the TAPS study and their 
interpretation is presented.  The key findings of the study are presented in section 5.2.  
Further discussion relating to the quantification of error reporting is presented in 
section 5.3.  The creation of the TAPS taxonomy and features of error types contained 
within it are discussed in section 5.4.  The measurement of patient harm in reported 
errors is discussed in section 5.5.  Preventability of error is discussed in section 5.6, 
and other features of reported errors that were measured including patient related 
factors such as demographics are discussed in section 5.7.  Future directions in the use 
of error reporting as feedback and learning tools for GPs are discussed in section 5.8.  
The strengths and weaknesses of the study methodology are discussed, with particular 
reference to existing literature addressing the reporting threats to patient safety in 
community settings. 
   
5.2 Major outcomes and key findings of the TAPS study  
The major outcomes and key findings of TAPS study are as follows: 
 
• The TAPS study presented the first calculations known worldwide of the 
incidence of reported error in a general practice setting using a representative 
random sample of general practitioners.  It was found that if an anonymous, 
secure, web-based reporting system was provided, the incidence of reported 
error per Medicare patient encounter item was 0.078% (95% CI 0.076% to 
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0.080%), and the incidence of reported error per patient seen per year was 
0.240% (95% CI 0.235% to 0.245%) (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).   
 
• The TAPS study created a simple descriptive general practice based error 
taxonomy, and is the first and only study to date to test the reproducibility of 
the application of such a tool using a group of general practitioners.  The 
TAPS taxonomy was has a good level of inter-coder agreement (Makeham, 
Stromer et al. 2007). 
 
• The TAPS study found that the majority of reported patient safety events were 
errors related to the processes of health care (type 1), rather than errors related 
to the knowledge and skills of health professionals (type 2), at 69% and 31% 
respectively at the first level of the TAPS taxonomy (Makeham, Stromer et al. 
2007). 
 
• At the second level of the TAPS taxonomy, five type 1 themes were identified:  
health care systems (21%); investigations (12%); medications (20%); other 
treatments (3%); and communication (13%).  Two type 2 themes were 
identified: diagnosis (12%) and management (19%).  Level three comprised 35 
descriptors of the themes (Makeham, Stromer et al. 2007).   
 
• The TAPS study created a secure anonymous web-based error reporting 
system suited to the Australian general practice setting (Makeham, Kidd et al. 
2006).  The majority of participants found the process easy to undertake, and 
took approximately 6 minutes to send a report. 
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• The TAPS database management system created an electronic method for 
managing and analysing a wide variety of features related to large numbers of 
anonymously reported errors from the Australian general practice setting. 
 
• The majority of errors reported in the TAPS study had the direct involvement 
of a patient (93% of error reports).  Overall the reporting general practitioners 
were very familiar with these patients, who were on average 52 years old, and 
more often female (56%).  
 
• Approximately one quarter of the errors reported in the TAPS study was 
associated with patients being harmed.  Reports containing events related to 
processes of health care were associated less frequently with harm than those 
containing events related to the knowledge and skills of health professionals.   
 
• In reported errors associated with patient harm, the patients were on average 
older than patients in reports where no harm was known to have occurred (58 
years versus 50 years respectively, p = 0.0076).  There was no statistically 
significant difference found between these groups with respect to gender or 
ethnicity, including people from Non-English speaking backgrounds or 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
 
• Patient death was reported in 8 of 415 errors reported in the TAPS study (2%).  
In contrast to reports not involving patient death, these reports more often 
involved events relating to the knowledge and skills of health professionals 
(type 2) than events relating to the processes of health care (type 1).  
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• Anonymity is an important factor in medical error reporting systems.  Two 
thirds of participants agreed that anonymity made them more likely to 
participate in reporting. 
 
• The TAPS study provided a self directed learning educational activity for 
Australian general practitioners that was approved for 30 group 1 Quality 
Assurance and Continuing Education points by the Royal Australian College 
of General Practitioners (RACGP). 
 
• The TAPS study highlighted a systematic error relating to immunisation 
failures with meningococcal vaccines which was reported to relevant 
organisations including NSW Health, the RACGP and the manufacturer 
involved, which was addressed with educational materials for GPs being 
distributed and communications in Australian Family Physician (Makeham, 
Kidd et al. 2004). 
 
5.3 The quantification of error reported by general 
practitioners  
Original research on errors in the primary care setting consists of a relatively limited 
number of studies, which have focused on qualitative descriptions of errors (Elder and 
Dovey 2002).  The TAPS study provides the first calculated incidence of reported 
error from a random representative sample of GPs.  Despite the small sample size, 
these findings can be generalised to NSW GPs, as there were no statistically 
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significant differences between the age, sex, and Medicare billings of TAPS 
participants and the source population from which they were sampled.    
 
It may be concluded from the incidence findings that approximately one error was 
reported for every 1000 patient encounter related Medicare items billed per year, and 
approximately 2 errors were reported for every 1000 individual patients seen by a GP 
per year (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).   
 
The results also indicate that using a secure encrypted website with an anonymous 
reporting method is a practical way of collecting error information from general 
practitioners, as at least 94% of doctors who enrolled in the study reported sending at 
least one report.  This method may be a way forward in developing suggestions in the 
literature that an error database in general practice should be established (Sheikh and 
Hurwitz 2000; Sheikh and Hurwitz 2001; Runciman 2002). 
 
The TAPS study provides an estimation of the incidence of reported errors in the 
general practice setting, but this should not be interpreted as the actual number of 
threats to patient safety that occur in the community.  It is very difficult to assess the 
proportion of errors that go unreported, especially with an anonymous reporting 
system.  Apart from deliberate under-reporting of errors that may arise through fear of 
litigation or lack of time to submit reports, a GP may not be aware that an error has 
even occurred.  GPs have been found to have under-reported adverse drug events 
(Moride, Haramburu et al. 1997), suggesting other patient safety threats may also be 
under-reported. 
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The incidence of adverse events found in hospital settings has been reported to be  
orders of magnitude greater than the incidence of reported error found in the general 
practice setting of the TAPS study (Brennan, Leape et al. 1991), (Wilson, Runciman 
et al. 1995).  Direct comparison is difficult to make, however this difference could be 
explained by considering the different methodologies used, and further consideration 
of their differences in findings relating to patient harm are considered later in section 
5.5.  These studies counted adverse events per hospital admission, rather than per 
single patient encounter with a doctor, as our Medicare item count approximated.  A 
single admission may involve encounters with staff in a hospital many numbers of 
times, and so the potential for a single error to occur could be many times greater.  In 
addition, these studies used a different definition of ‘error’, and a different method of 
counting error, by retrospective record review.  This could impact upon the rates at 
which errors are noted in comparison to prospective self-reporting. 
   
Anonymity was of major importance in our methodological design, to encourage 
reporting.  In the past there has been a reluctance of health professionals to address 
the problem of errors due to feelings of guilt and a desire to avoid disapproval from 
colleagues (Kidd and Veale 1998).  However, the use of a self-chosen PIN which was 
unknown to investigators led to some difficulties in interpreting the number of reports 
per GP, as the researchers were unable to assist if a PIN was forgotten.  In addition, 
there was no way of knowing absolutely how many GPs submitted a report or 
changed their PIN during the study.  This is likely to have lead to an underestimate of 
the numbers of reports per participant, as a result of decreased average number of 
reports per unique PIN. 
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The number of individual Medicare items billed relating to a patient encounter are the 
best approximation that could be made of separate patient encounters, but should not 
be interpreted directly as such.  These counts do not always represent separate 
consultations, as the doctor may claim more than one item within a single visit.  It is 
not possible to estimate how often this may have occurred from our data.  
Consultations may also have occurred which were not billed, charged to the patient 
privately, or charged to the Department of Veterans Affairs, which keeps its data 
separately from the General Practice Branch of the Australian Government 
Department of Health and Aging.   
 
There are no published studies on the incidence of reported error that are directly 
comparable to that found in the TAPS study, which was lower than hypothesised.  In 
comparison to the Australian pilot study, the higher incidence of reported error may 
be due to volunteer bias and the non-representative nature of the participants 
(Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).  The authors of  a US study showing an error rate 
close to 25% stated that their results were not generalisable due to limitations of the 
study (Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 2004).  In this study, only a small group of 15 
doctors in 7 practices made reports, completing a review form after every consultation 
during three half day sessions.  A UK study reporting an error rate of 7.6% was based 
on a two week collection of errors from ten practices in a single city (Rubin, George 
et al. 2003).  However, a major difference is that this result was based upon a 
collection of reports from a large cross-section of staff working in general practice, 
with 163 people able to submit reports, and a higher proportion of participants with 
administrative rather than clinical roles. 
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The TAPS study method of prospective self-reporting returned a higher rate of error 
detection than a US study using retrospective record review in eight primary health 
care clinics (Fischer, Fetters et al. 1997).   Once again direct comparison is difficult, 
as only medical adverse events were counted in this work, rather than errors using the 
broader definition of the TAPS study.   
 
If a practical method of error reporting in primary care is to be instituted, retrospective 
record review would not offer the potential for use as an active learning tool.  A 
prospective electronic reporting tool could be enhanced with the addition of feedback 
to the user and links to educational activities, plus have the scope to allow many other 
stakeholders in primary care settings to contribute error information. 
 
5.4 A descriptive classification for safety events in general 
practice - The TAPS taxonomy 
There is little information available on the proportion of types of patient safety events 
that are reported in general practice settings, and no taxonomy that is widely used by 
general practitioners (GPs) to describe these events.   
 
Previous studies in primary care have described the relative proportions of different 
types of patient safety events that have been reported by their participants (Ely, 
Levinson et al. 1995; Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Fischer, Fetters et al. 1997; Bhasale, 
Miller et al. 1998; Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003c; Rubin, George et al. 2003; Wilf-
Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 2003; Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 2004; Phillips, 
Bartholomew et al. 2004; Rosser, Dovey et al. 2005), however none have been based 
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upon a representative sample of primary care clinicians contributing data.  This makes 
generalisation of their results to the wider clinical setting difficult in comparison to 
the TAPS study, which is the first to include a representative sample of reporting GPs.   
In addition, the method of error classification varies markedly between these studies, 
further hampering direct comparison.     
 
In recent years, a small number of taxonomies of patient safety events related to a 
general practice setting have been proposed (Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; Elder and 
Dovey 2002; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Rubin, George et al. 2003), all based upon 
patient safety event reports collected from small non-random samples of participants.  
They use both causative and descriptive elements of like themes to group events, 
sometimes referred to as ‘domain specific’ taxonomies (Kostopoulou 2006).   
 
‘Multiaxial taxonomies’ capture additional elements of an event, such as harm levels, 
location, participants or preventability.  One study has developed such a tool in a 
primary care setting in North America (Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et 
al. 2004), although its full details have not been published in the scientific literature.  
A further multiaxial taxonomy has been suggested as one that could allow comparison 
of safety events across disciplines, although no trial in a primary care setting has been 
described (Chang, Schyve et al. 2005).   
 
There have also been some recent calls for classifications that address cognitive 
psychological processes (Zhang, Patel et al. 2004), with one developed for general 
practice (Kostopoulou 2006), which is yet to be tested.  Finally, one taxonomy has 
been described that is based upon patients’ perceptions of harm in primary care, 
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although it has a limited application in terms of categorizing causes of events (Kuzel, 
Woolf et al. 2004). 
 
The TAPS study estimated the incidence of general practitioner reported patient safety 
events in the community, using a method based upon a randomly selected 
representative sample of GPs (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).  Major limitations mainly 
relating to the internal validity and practicality of existing tools warranted extensive 
taxonomy development.  A major aim of the TAPS study was to develop a taxonomy 
that would be easily understood and practical for primary care clinicians to apply 
themselves.  Further, we describe the first attempts to validate a taxonomy in terms of 
its inter-observer reproducibility with GPs (Makeham, Stromer et al. 2007). 
 
The proposed TAPS taxonomy builds upon pilot work which has at its primary level a 
causative classification (Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002), 
adding sub-categories to this by grouping like themes, and then adding detail with 
descriptive categories in the style of a domain specific taxonomy.  Application of the 
taxonomy to the TAPS data shows that the majority of reports contained a single 
patient safety event, and the majority of events reported by GPs related to the 
processes of providing health care rather than deficiencies in knowledge and skills of 
health professionals, as suggested in previous work with non-representative samples 
(Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Rubin, George et al. 2003; 
Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 2004). 
 
The reporting GPs demonstrated a clear understanding of the definition of error used  
(Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006), with less than 1% of reports being found by the group 
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of investigators to contain no safety event.  In contrast to previous similar taxonomies 
(Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; Elder and Dovey 2002; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002), 
every second level theme contained a third level descriptor of ‘not otherwise 
specified’.  This added descriptor allowed the proposed seven themes to adequately 
describe all reported safety events in the TAPS data, with no reports unable to be 
classified. 
   
The largest proportion of events were classified as relating to ‘practice and health care 
systems’ at the theme level (21%, see section 4.9.4.1), consistent with American and 
UK studies (Dovey, Meyers et al. 2002; Rubin, George et al. 2003).  Our category 1.1 
is different from any used in previously described taxonomies as it contains elements 
of the larger health care system rather than just ‘administrative’ events.  The 2002 
pilot study found a similar proportion of ‘office administration’ events (20%) 
(Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002).   
 
If both process and knowledge and skills event types are combined, the ‘medication’ 
groups represent the largest proportion at the theme level (31%, see sections 4.9.4.3 
and 4.9.4.7), and this is similar to findings in earlier Australian studies (Britt, Miller et 
al. 1997; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998).  The separation of this group of events into the 
suggested types and descriptors provides a useful way to plan future preventive 
strategies such as targeted education for clinicians on specific medication groups 
versus systems changes that would reduce electronic prescription errors or dispensing 
mistakes. 
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A purpose of the study was to develop a tool that would be easily understood by 
primary care clinicians reporting safety events.  The use of investigators with a 
clinical background in general practice was important to produce language that would 
be acceptable for self-coding.  One other study has asked the reporting clinicians to 
code the events using a simple descriptive taxonomy (Rubin, George et al. 2003).  
However, as the study period was brief and the majority of reporters were reception 
staff, the authors noted that some event types may not have been captured.   
 
There are no published studies with which a comparison of the results on 
reproducibility of the taxonomy can be made.  The kappa statistic and proportions 
relating to inter-coder agreement showed a marked improvement in agreement from 
the pilot to the TAPS taxonomy at all levels of the code (see section 4.10).  Some 
caution should be exercised in the interpretation of these results, as it is possible that 
some of this improvement (even though the GPs were independently coding), could 
have occurred through an unconscious learning of each others’ styles at the taxonomy 
development meetings. 
 
At the most detailed third level of the taxonomies, complete disagreement amongst 
the coders fell from over a quarter to less than ten per cent of cases (see sectio 4.10).  
In the cases where complete agreement was not reached, there was often difficulty in 
interpreting the reporting language used, or brevity of description provided in the 
report, requiring a degree of personal interpretation or assumption from the coding 
GPs.  While further refinement of the taxonomy might lessen possible ambiguity, it is 
probable that a system where the reporting clinician actually codes the event would 
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reduce this type of error by eliminating a loss of detail in the process of describing the 
event and its cause to another clinician or analyst conducting the coding.   
 
The taxonomy developed by the Applied Strategies for Improving Patient Safety 
(ASIPS) collaborative (Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et al. 2004) is a 
multiaxial model developed in a primary care setting, using trained analysts to classify 
reported events.  It has not been published in the peer-reviewed literature in full, 
however it is able to be viewed online at www.cudfm.org/carenet/asips/taxonomy 
(accessed 27th July 2007).  The TAPS electronic reporting system collects data of a 
similar nature to the additional axes and domains of ASIPS, including a harm scale, 
location check-box, event frequency scale, and details of patients such as age, gender 
and ethnicity (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).  These elements are closed questions 
completed electronically by the reporter.  They could be combined with reporters self-
coding an event with the TAPS taxonomy to effectively produce a self-reported 
multiaxial taxonomy describing safety events.  
 
An important limitation of the taxonomy event proportions is that they do not 
represent the underlying proportions of error types in the community, although the 
reporters were a representative sample.  The study has not measured which event 
types may have been under-reported in comparison to others, and the incidence of 
reported error is likely to be an under-representation of the true incidence of error in a 
community setting despite efforts to encourage reporting (Makeham, Kidd et al. 
2006).   
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The TAPS reports are a reflection of the experiences of GPs, and the taxonomy was 
created by GPs.  As such, it may be limited in its application to other primary care 
groups.  In other studies, a variety of clinicians or administrative staff have been 
involved in reporting events (Pace, Staton et al. 2003; Rubin, George et al. 2003; 
Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 2003; Fernald, Pace et al. 2004; Westfall, Fernald et al. 
2004; Shaw, Drever et al. 2005; Kostopoulou 2006; Williams and Osborn 2006).  It 
may be important to explore language differences that may exist.   
 
The TAPS reports and taxonomy may not have captured all error types that could be 
reported by a more diverse group.  One other general practice taxonomy has recently 
been shown to be acceptable to opticians reporting safety events (Steele, Rubin et al. 
2006).  The TAPS taxonomy may similarly have potential uses to other disciplines in 
a community setting.  
 
5.5 The measurement of patient harm in reported errors 
Around one quarter of the errors reported in the TAPS study were associated with 
patients being harmed, as described in section 4.13.  An analysis of the event types in 
harm positive reports found that reports containing events related to processes of 
health care were associated less with harm than those containing events related to the 
knowledge and skills of health professionals.   
 
The patient related factors that were analysed found that in errors associated with 
patient harm, the patients were on average older than patients in reports where no 
harm was known to have occurred (58 years versus 50 years respectively, p = 0.0076).  
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There was no statistically significant difference found between these groups with 
respect to gender or ethnicity, including people from Non-English speaking 
backgrounds or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) people, although harm in 
association with errors involving the ATSI group was approaching statistical 
significance, and a larger number of results may in fact have found that this was a 
significant factor (see section 4.13.6). 
 
Also related to harm, patient death was reported in 8 of 415 errors reported in the 
TAPS study (2%), and more often involved events relating to the knowledge and 
skills of health professionals (type 2) than events relating to the processes of health 
care (type 1) in comparison to reports not involving a known patient death. 
 
There is very little research in the general practice or community setting that has been 
published in relation to the measurement of patient harm in association with reported 
errors.  The critical incident study in Australia undertaken between October 1993 and 
June 1995 (see section 2.8.2) collected incidents of potential or actual harm reported 
by a non random sample of general practitioners (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998).  The 
questionnaire asked for structured responses to questions related to the potential for 
harm, immediate consequences and predicted long-term outcomes.  The study found 
that 27% of reported incidents had the potential for severe harm, although no long 
term harm was predicted for 66% of incidents (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998). In 
publications relating to this study (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 1998; Bhasale, 
Miller et al. 1998), the figure for the reports where actual harm occurred versus did 
not occur is not presented.  Harm was not defined, although the 1 to 5 scale on the 
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form had 1 marked as ‘mild’ and 5 marked as ‘severe’ (Bhasale 1998), similar to that 
used in the TAPS study.  
 
The TAPS study results are not easily comparable to the critical incident study (Britt, 
Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 1998; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998), as the harm question 
was framed quite differently.  In the TAPS study, the one quarter of errors reported as 
harm positive was indicative of actual harm rather than potential harm.  All reports 
were intended to have had the potential for harm based on the definition of error 
chosen, although this was not tested specifically with a closed question.  
 
A similar harm result (22% of reports involved patient harm) was found in a study 
based in an academic medical centre in New York City in 2004 (Tuttle, Holloway et 
al. 2004).  The setting and participants were quite different from TAPS, however, as 
the role of the physicians differed somewhat from those of the Australian GPs in 
TAPS, and reports were made by a variety of staff at the centre.  Most of the reports 
were made by nursing staff (73%) rather than the physicians (2%) (Tuttle, Holloway 
et al. 2004).  The study was conducted using a voluntary internal confidential 
electronic reporting system rather than an anonymous system.  
 
Looking at the proportion of reports where death had occurred, the critical incident 
study (Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 1998; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998) found that 
38 deaths were reported amongst 805 incidents over roughly a 2 year period, which 
gives a higher proportion to that found in TAPS.  However, this was not a collection 
of reports from a single group of participants for the entire study duration – it was a 
non random volunteer group of 324 GPs who entered and left the study over some 
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point during the reporting period between October 1993 and June 1995.  A valid 
comparison to the proportion of deaths reported in the TAPS study is not possible.   
 
Some research has been published looking at cases of deaths in community settings 
and the association with errors as a cause (Berlin, Spencer et al. 1992; Holden, 
O'Donnell et al. 1998; Kristoffersen 2000).  The studies that audited death found a 
range in the proportion that contained critical incidents, with a 1992 British study of 8 
cases finding critical incidents in all (Berlin, Spencer et al. 1992).  A Norwegian study 
published in 1998 followed a defined population and the deaths arising over a twelve 
month period, and looked at cases that had had a visit with an after-hours primary care 
physician in the preceding four weeks.  It was found that the physicians may have 
misinterpreted events in 5% of cases (Kristoffersen 2000).  It is not possible to draw 
any comparisons with these types of results as the overall number of deaths that may 
have occurred amongst patients of TAPS participants during the study period is not 
readily determined.   
 
Beyond the community setting, studies relating to harm and death as a result of error 
may be found in the hospital setting.  The Quality in Australian Healthcare study 
(QAHCS) reviewed over 14,000 admissions to 28 hospitals in NSW and South 
Australia in 1992 (Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995).  It was based on the methods used 
in the landmark Harvard Medical Practice study (HMPS) conducted in the mid 1980s 
(Brennan, Leape et al. 1991; Leape, Brennan et al. 1991).  The HMPS found that 
adverse events occurred in 3.7% of hospitalisations, and of these, 27.6% were due to 
negligence.  The QAHCS found a much higher rate of adverse events, at 16.6% 
(Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995).  Of these adverse events, 13.7% caused some form of 
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permanent disability and 4.9% resulted in death.  The authors determined that 51% of 
the adverse events detected were preventable. 
 
The hospital studies described above (QAHCS, HMPS) had very different definitions 
and methods to TAPS, as they looked at adverse events that harmed patients detected 
from medical record review, rather than examining cases of error with the potential 
for harm, regardless of actual outcome.  They detected many cases of poor outcome 
for patients unrelated to systems or human failures and were essentially 
unpreventable, such as adverse drug reactions, which on the whole were not reported 
by TAPS participants, who tended to only report issues which they saw as 
preventable. 
   
There are some major limitations to be considered when interpreting the harm 
findings presented in this thesis, and the methodology in future work should be 
adjusted in consideration of these points.  No clear definition of “patient harm” or the 
term “serious” was given within the questionnaire, and some differences of 
interpretation by reporting GPs were likely to have occurred.  Secondly, the harm 
rating scale had no indication of the meaning of the various points 1 to 5 that were 
intended to indicate severity of harm.  The results of this question would be more 
consistent if a guide had been provided to assist participants in this respect.  Thirdly, 
participants at the time of making reports may not always have been aware that a 
patient harm had resulted. Finally, it is possible that the participants, often reporting 
about errors that they had felt to be of their own doing, were reluctant to suggest that 
they had been responsible for causing harm to their patients, leading to an overall 
   
 
216
under-reporting of the harm positive errors, and an underestimation of the severity of 
harm ratings.  
 
Future research methods attempting to address this question may benefit from the use 
of a standard definition, such as that which now appears on the website of the 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare at 
www.safetyandquality.org/internet/safety/publishing.nsf/Content/former-pubs-
archive-definitions#e (accessed 27th July 2007).  This defines harm as “Death, disease, 
injury, suffering, and/or disability experienced by a person”.   
 
A suggestion for an improved rating scale of severity to accompany this which would 
be useful to improve the consistency of severity scoring could be as follows, and an 
example of each category could be provided to illustrate these levels further along 
with a definition of ‘seriousness’. 
1 = Minor seriousness, reversible 
2 = Moderate seriousness, reversible 
3 = Extreme seriousness, reversible 
4 = Irreversible harm 
5 = Death or imminent death 
 
5.6 Comments related to the preventability of reported errors 
Interestingly in the TAPS study data, almost all cases reported had some aspect of 
preventability which was discussed by the participant (98%).  This was an interesting 
result as the definition of error used did not specifically exclude errors where 
prevention would be difficult such as cases of adverse drug reactions or other errors 
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complying with the TAPS study definition: ‘That was a threat to patient well-being 
and should not happen.  I don’t want it to happen again’. 
   
The three main types of error prevention reported by participants related to human 
factors of improving knowledge and skills, to changes in local systems factors around 
the event such as practice guidelines, and changes to the wider health care system. 
 
The Australian general practice incident monitoring study conducted in the mid 1990s 
published ‘preventability’ at a much lower proportion of errors than this at 76% 
(Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998), and it is likely that the reasons for this difference lie in 
the definition used.  This study had a different definition for error of ‘An unintended 
event, no matter how seemingly trivial or commonplace, that could have harmed or 
did harm a patient’.  The addition of the phrase ‘I don’t want it to happen again’ in 
the TAPS study definition may have introduced some sort of implication that the 
TAPS study was looking for issues that had some aspect of preventability about them, 
either due to the system or human elements involved in the cases.   
 
An adverse drug reaction may represent an ‘unpreventable’ error, if due to the 
individual patient’s physiology rather than an interaction.  This reaction would be 
likely to happen again to the same patient with the same drug regardless of the actions 
of health care professionals or their systems of providing care, irrespective of the fact 
that the reporting physician wouldn’t have wanted it to happen.  It is possible that this 
changed the context somewhat of error reporting for the TAPS participants in 
comparison to the earlier Australian critical incident study. 
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Similarly, hospital studies examining ‘adverse events’ using medical record review 
such as the Quality in Australian Health Care study (QAHCS) have much lower 
proportions of cases that would be considered ‘preventable’, at only approximately 
50% (Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995).  The definition used for an index case was very 
different and included events such as adverse drug reactions.  It should also be noted 
that the QAHCS had a 6 level gradation of preventability, and the figure of 50% 
relates to ‘high preventability’ cases, which included levels 4 (more likely preventable 
than not), 5 (strong evidence for preventability) and 6 (virtually certain evidence for 
preventability), and excluded levels 3 (preventability not likely, less than 50-50 but 
close call), 2 (slight to modest evidence for preventability) and 1 (virtually no 
evidence for preventability) (Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995).    
 
To provide further insight into prevention methods relating to various event types in 
the community setting, future studies could have more rigorous data collection on the 
issue of preventability incorporated into the study design, allowing for more in depth 
post-hoc analysis.   
 
5.7 The features of patients involved in reported errors 
The finding of the TAPS study related to patient factors conclude that most reported 
errors involved patients (92%), that these patients were usually well know to the GPs 
reporting the errors, that they were on average 52 years old, slightly more often 
female (56%), of a non-English speaking background 16% of the time and an 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person 2% of the time (see section 4.11).  Of 
these measures, patient age was the only factor found to have an association with 
harm as an outcome, with patients involved in reported errors associated with harm 
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being on average 8 years older than patients involved in reported errors that were not 
associated with harm (58 years versus 50 years respectively, p = 0.0076). 
 
The number of individual patients seen by participants in the TAPS study was 
collected in order to address the question of the incidence of reported error per patient 
seen per year.  Consent and a legal instrument for further details relating to the age, 
gender, and ethnicity for the specific group of patients seen by TAPS participants 
during the study period was not obtained.  Although it was possible to conclude that 
participating GPs were a representative sample based on their age, gender and 
Medicare billings, the same comparisons cannot be made of the patient groups who 
attended the general practices of the TAPS participants.  This means that although a 
comparison can be made to general Australian or NSW data on the average age and 
gender of patients or the average number of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
people attending GPs, it can’t necessarily be assumed that the TAPS GPs overall saw 
a representative patient sample during the study period.   
 
Attempting to compare patient factors such as the proportion of female patients or the 
average age of patients involved in errors to the background rates of these figures for 
patients visiting GPs in NSW is difficult.  For example, although the average age of 
the patients in TAPS error reports is known, the study did not determine the average 
age of the other patients that participants saw during the study period, or the average 
age of patients seen by the source population of NSW GPs.  It should be noted given 
the broad representation of GPs in the TAPS study, including major metropolitan as 
well as rural areas, that the patient populations are likely to be similar.  
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Looking at other studies of errors reported in community settings, Bhasale described 
some patient characteristics of those involved in the critical incident study in 
Australian general practice undertaken in the mid 1990s (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998).  
In agreement with the TAPS study data, this study demonstrated a similar proportion 
of female patients (58% versus TAPS 56%, see section 4.11.4).  The average ages and 
distributions were not published in the critical incident study, however the median age 
of patients was 50 years (range 0 – 98) compared with the TAPS median of 56 (range 
0 – 104).  Younger patients were less likely to be involved in incidents (Bhasale, 
Miller et al. 1998).  Considering the different definition used in the Bhasale study 
(focusing on harm), this result may be similar to the TAPS finding that on average 
older patients were more often involved in harm positive events (see section 4.13.3). 
 
Some detail of patient age and gender has been described in the literature in relation to 
reports of adverse drug reactions in general practice settings. An English study 
combining 48 national cohort studies of newly marketed drugs found that in general 
practice in England, suspected adverse drug reactions to newly marketed drugs are 
recorded more often in adults aged between 30 and 59 years of age, with females 
more commonly affected (56% female vs. 44% male) (Martin, Biswas et al. 1998).  
However, as previously discussed, these types of studies have a limited value in terms 
of comparison to the TAPS study data.  Different definitions used in the TAPS study 
was likely to have resulted in an absence of reports relating to adverse drug events 
perceived as non-preventable (see section 5.6).  
 
In future data collections using the TAPS methodology, a significant improvement in 
the ability to generalise findings could be obtained by collection of demographic and 
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patient factor data from the total cohort of patients seen by study participants.  This 
would lead to more accurate comparisons between those patients involved in reported 
errors and the source population of patients from which they have come.  This would 
require the consent of the participants and a further legal instrument from DOHA. 
 
5.8 Future directions – error analysis and feedback as 
learning tools for GPs and the primary care sector 
It has been suggested in recent years by the lead author of the landmark Quality in 
Australian Healthcare study (Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995) that despite an effort to 
improve the way patient safety issues are measured and analysed in Australia, there 
has really been very little progress made over the past decade (Wilson and Van Der 
Weyden 2005).  A system which “captures the imagination of politicians, 
professionals and the public” was called for in 2005.       
 
To date, only the National Patient Safety Agency of the National Health Service in the 
United Kingdom has an anonymous electronic error reporting system which is 
universally accessible to health care providers in both community and hospital 
settings, although almost no information on its use and acceptability to general 
practitioners is yet available (Shaw, Drever et al. 2005; Williams and Osborn 2006).  
Such a system however could be a way forward to improving our ability to use data 
on error in healthcare settings to learn from patient safety threats and improve 
Australian health systems in the community setting.   
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A broadly accepted and readily accessible error reporting system is more likely to 
diagnose and offer solutions to problems in healthcare than learning tools which are 
targeted at the level of the individual clinician and their learning needs.  However, it 
should be noted that the TAPS study found that it was probably these types of 
mistakes (type 2 knowledge and skills errors), although less common, that were more 
often associated with patient harm (see section 4.13.2).   
 
It has been proposed that the improvement of the safety culture or the acquirement of 
an improved degree of ‘error wisdom’ by some of those on the frontline could thwart 
some organisational accident sequences at the last minute (Reason 2004), and that 
vulnerable systems are more liable to adverse events (Reason, Carthey et al. 2001).  
Psychological factors such as inattention, distraction and forgetfulness are the last and 
often the least manageable aspects of the accident sequence (Reason 1995). Whereas 
individual unsafe acts are hard to predict and control, the organisational and 
contextual factors that give rise to them are present before the occurrence of an 
incident or accident. As such, they are prime candidates for treatment. Reason  
describes errors at the ‘sharp end’ as being symptomatic of both human fallibility and 
underlying organisational failings (Reason 1995). He proposes that fallibility, which 
can be moderated, but not eliminated, is here to stay, however organisational and local 
problems, in contrast, are both diagnosable and manageable.(Reason 2005)   
 
In 2002, a leading Australian patient safety researcher, Professor Bill Runciman, 
described the evolution of the concepts and processes underpinning the Australian 
Patient Safety Foundation's systems over the previous 15 years (Runciman 2002).  
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Based on this, he describes the attributes of an ideal system for national patient safety 
surveillance.  He proposes that such a system should have the following attributes:  
• an independent organisation to coordinate patient safety surveillance 
• agreed frameworks for patient safety and surveillance systems 
• common, agreed standards and terminology  
• a single, clinically useful classification for things that go wrong in health care 
• a national repository for information covering all of health care from all 
available sources 
• mechanisms for setting priorities at local, national and international levels 
• a just system which caters for the rights of patients, society, and healthcare 
practitioners and facilities 
• separate processes for accountability and "systems learnings" 
• the right to anonymity and legal privilege for reporters 
• systems for rapid feedback and evidence of action 
• mechanisms for involving and informing all stakeholders.  
 
Runciman proposes that there are powerful reasons for establishing national systems, 
for aligning terminology, tools and classification systems internationally, and for the 
rapid dissemination of successful strategies (Runciman 2002).  He has recently 
published a comprehensive set of standard definitions which could be adopted in such 
a system (Runciman 2006).   
 
Much work has been published in relation to the analysis of errors in the field of 
anaesthetics, and the Australian studies in this discipline by Runciman and others in 
the mid to late 1980s were amongst the earliest research on error in medicine around 
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the world (Runciman 1988a; Runciman 1988b; Runciman 1989).  In 1993, it was 
published that although 70-80% of problems have some component of human error, 
its overall contribution to many problems may be small, and that studies of complex 
systems have revealed that up to 85% of problems are primarily due to deficiencies in 
the lay-out and processes of the system (Runciman, Webb et al. 1993).    
 
Runciman has also highlighted that if interventions for adverse events are triggered 
only by serious outcomes, most problems would not be addressed, particularly the 
large number of ‘mundane’ problems which consume the majority of resources. He 
suggests that both serious and mundane problems should be addressed in attempts to 
improve patient safety in health care (Runciman, Edmonds et al. 2002). 
 
The TAPS methodology and taxonomy has the potential for use as part of an 
anonymous national electronic reporting system, and offers guidance to policy makers 
in directing efforts to reduce patient safety threats in general practice, particularly at a 
systems level.  Further application of the TAPS taxonomy may also aid professional 
bodies developing educational tools aimed at improving the knowledge and skills of 
providers in primary care.    
 
A system such as TAPS could address many of the needs detailed by Runciman 
(Runciman 2002), but would require a substantial amount of further development and 
testing in health care settings other than general practice before any suggestion of its 
usefulness as a health care reporting system across all settings could be made.    
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6 Clinical lessons learnt from the TAPS study 
The purpose of this section of the thesis is to broadly outline some of the major 
clinical lessons that have been learnt in the process of undertaking the TAPS study 
and analysing the error reports from GPs, and these are presented under the headings 
that relate to the level 2 themes of the TAPS taxonomy (see Appendix 10).   Sections 
6.1 to 6.5 relate to type 1 or ‘process’ errors, and sections 6.6 and 6.7 relate to type 2 
or ‘knowledge and skills’ errors.  Comparison is made to existing literature on events 
in the Australian general practice setting from the critical incident study of the mid-
1990s (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1996b; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1996a; Bhasale, Miller et al. 
1996c; Bhasale, Norton et al. 1996; Britt, Reid et al. 1996; Reid, Britt et al. 1996b; 
Reid, Britt et al. 1996a; Reid, Miller et al. 1996; Britt, Miller et al. 1997; Bhasale 
1998; Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998) (as described in section  2.8.2).   
 
6.1 Lessons from errors in practice and health care systems 
The largest proportion of problems in this theme arose in association with patient 
record and filing system errors, closely followed by recall system errors.  Some of the 
important clinical lessons relating to this theme are: 
• Clinicians should be wary of the vigilance with which patient details are 
recorded in their systems.  An absence of contact phone numbers or incorrect 
address details can lead to further problems, especially when investigation 
results requiring follow-up require the clinician to contact the patient. 
• Simple paper and computer filing system errors that result in duplicate patient 
files can lead to serious problems when medications are being prescribed and 
the opportunity to screen for drug interactions is missed. 
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• An absence of establishing consistent recall systems can lead to serious harm 
for patients when an opportunity to follow up a previously abnormal 
examination or investigation finding is missed. 
   
The critical incident study of the mid-1990s found that administrative inadequacies 
contributed to around 9% of incidents (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998).   The study 
described problems with incorrect patient record use, particularly in reference to 
errors in ordering and labelling specimens and request forms (Bhasale, Norton et al. 
1996), which are further discussed below in section 6.2.  Also described were 
problems with failing to have adequate recall systems in place.  Examples cited  
included a failure to recall patients with serious abnormalities in pathology results, 
such as PAP smears (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1996b), and a failure to recall a patient 
requiring a follow-up examination of a breast abnormality (Reid, Miller et al. 1996). 
     
6.2 Lessons relating to investigation errors 
The main clinical lesson that arose in this group was related to the management of 
investigation reports: 
• Vigilance in the practice system of checking and acting on investigation 
results is required to avoid serious harms to patients related to missing 
abnormal test results.  This occurred in association with investigation reports 
being filed before the GP had seen them, reports being seen by the GP who 
missed an abnormal result (for example on a second page of a report), and 
abnormal results being noted by the GP initially but no system for follow-up 
was instigated and so patients went untreated. 
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The critical incident study identified four stages where incidents relating to tests and 
investigations were commonly found to have occurred.  These were in arranging the 
test, in the testing process, in the communication of the results to GPs, and in the 
follow up of results with the patient (Bhasale, Norton et al. 1996).  The TAPS 
taxonomy level three descriptors within the 1.2 category of investigation process 
errors were created along similar principles to these (see section 4.9.4.2).   
 
In addition, the critical incident study highlighted two areas that required particular 
attention in relation to the management of test results, and these were very similar to 
the clinical lessons described in this theme of the TAPS study.  These areas were how 
GPs are informed of the results, and the mechanism for informing patients of their test 
results and follow-up needs (Bhasale, Norton et al. 1996).  It was found that over half 
of the incidents associated with investigations could probably have been prevented 
through more efficient systems for maintaining and passing on test results, and 
recalling patients for follow-up (Bhasale, Norton et al. 1996). 
 
6.3 Lessons relating to process medication errors 
A large number of the errors that were seen in this group related to medication 
dispensing errors, followed by electronic prescription writing errors.  The significant 
clinical lessons were: 
• Vigilance in the pharmacy in checking that the correct medication and 
strength is being dispensed to the patient is important in avoiding serious 
patient harms such as overdose. 
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• GPs using electronic script writing packages should be particularly wary of 
clicking on the wrong medication or strength of medication when choices are 
offered in ‘drop down’ menus. 
 
The critical incident study was conducted prior to the widespread use of computers for 
medication prescribing that now exists in Australia.  However it found that many 
errors, including prescription errors, were a result of ‘slips’ that related to GPs being 
tired, stressed or running late (Britt, Reid et al. 1996).  Prescription errors were often a 
result of poor legibility or similarity in the names of drugs being prescribed.  
Preventive strategies included greater vigilance in checking a written prescription, and 
suggestions to ‘adopt a computerised prescribing system which incorporates 
contraindication and interaction flags’ (Britt, Reid et al. 1996).   
 
The widespread uptake of computerised script packages over the past 10 years is 
likely to have greatly influenced the number of these types of medication process 
errors in the Australian community setting.  The TAPS study shows that systems that 
protect GPs from being ‘tired, stressed or running late’ still require attention as slips 
are still occurring in relation to prescribing process errors, despite computerisation. 
     
6.4 Lessons relating to non-medication treatment errors  
The TAPS study picked up a variety of general errors in relation to the taxonomy 
themes, however some examples of such as the one presented here were very specific.  
The main clinical lesson from this group was highlighted in a letter to the MJA in 
2004 (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2004), relating to the reconstitution of vaccines when 
active ingredient and diluent are presented in separate packaging: 
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• Health departments and drug companies should aim to present vaccines that 
require reconstitution in packaging that puts the vaccine and its diluent in the 
same box, to avoid the accidental injection of the diluent without the active 
component mixed in, as occurred with the Menjugate ten vial packs.  GPs 
should maintain vigilance regarding vaccines that require reconstitution. 
 
A report in the literature of an immunisation process error also exists from the critical 
incident study, in which a GP gave a child triple antigen instead of MMR due to a 
lack of carefully checking the label on the vaccine (Reid, Britt et al. 1996a).  The 
contributing factors identified were not specific to an immunisation error.  These 
included that the GP was ‘stressed and running late’, there was an older disruptive 
sibling present, no medication record was available, distractions and interruptions 
occurred during the consultation, and there was no protocol followed on administering 
a parenteral drug (Reid, Britt et al. 1996a). 
   
6.5  Lessons relating to communication errors  
Communication was an important aspect in many errors, and this category carried 
some important clinical lessons, particularly as the majority of problems in this theme 
occurred at the community-hospital interface. 
• Hospital emergency department medical officers and ward medical officers 
should be as clear as possible in their discharge communications with GPs, as 
an absence of information on these resulted in some serious patient harm and a 
patient death reported in the TAPS study.     
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• Patient education regarding their hospital treatments and medications is an 
area of risk and should be improved, as patients on occasion had a poor 
understanding of new medication that had been commenced, and were 
reported to have taken double doses of medications on discharge from hospital 
as they had not been educated regarding brand versus generic names of drugs. 
 
The critical incident study also highlighted communication problems between hospital 
and GP, noting that clinical information about the outcomes of hospital referrals or 
admissions, the expected role of the GP in post-discharge care, specialist’s 
recommendations for management and results of tests or investigations was often not 
communicated, or too late to be of use (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998).  Preventive 
strategies were suggested that included improving hospital-GP communication 
systems, having individual GPs meet with hospital staff and communicating their 
needs, involving the patients in the process of contacting the GP, and generally 
improving relationships with hospitals through divisions of general practice or other 
groups (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1996a). 
  
6.6 Lessons relating to errors in diagnosis 
The main clinical lesson relating to diagnostic errors that were reported in the TAPS 
study was for clinicians to be vigilant in their application of clinical skills, particularly 
in the assessment of complex patients on home visits and in nursing home settings: 
• Diagnostic error was often a result of an absence of adequately taking a history 
or examining a patient, and therefore failing to organise an appropriate 
investigation or treatment.  Particular care should be taken to avoid attempting 
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to manage complex patients with inadequate time allowed, either as ‘fit-ins’ in 
the clinic, or in a rushed home visit or nursing home visit.  
 
The critical incident study found that diagnostic incidents mainly occurred because of 
errors in judgement, particularly in the formation and evaluation of diagnostic 
hypotheses  (Bhasale 1998).  The most frequent contributing factors nominated by 
GPs in these cases related to errors in clinical judgement such as failing to recognise 
significant symptoms and signs, and poor communication.  The inappropriate 
rejection of a correct hypothesis due to insufficient or incorrect evidence is suggested 
by the author as an important type of diagnostic error (Bhasale 1998). Similarly, the 
TAPS study clinical lesson in this theme related to an absence of obtaining adequate 
clinical information. 
 
6.7 Lessons relating to errors in managing patient care  
The majority of errors that occurred in this theme were related to the management of 
medication, particularly Warfarin errors.  The important clinical lessons here are: 
• Greater care should be taken in appropriately educating patients who are 
commenced on Warfarin, who were often unaware of the vigilance required in 
monitoring their medication. 
• Clinicians should be vigilant regarding their duty of care to patients that they 
are managing on Warfarin, and institute handover and recall systems so that 
there is not a failure to check anticoagulation levels when required, 
particularly on weekends and when they are taking a leave of absence from 
their practice.  This is to avoid the situation of over-anticoagulation leading to 
a patient death, as was reported in the TAPS study. 
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Warfarin prescribing was also clearly highlighted as an important area for 
improvement by the critical incident study (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1996c).  
Contributing to the errors were consultations occurring at a time where it was difficult 
to obtain information (such as a weekend), missing information, poor communication, 
a lack of education of the patient and patient misunderstandings.  Suggested 
preventive strategies included better patient education, improved communication both 
doctor-patient and doctor-doctor, and general management systems such as patients 
carrying a card identifying the lab responsible for their INR results (Bhasale, Miller et 
al. 1996c).     
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7 Recommendations for future research 
Relatively little research into error in the community setting has occurred to date, and 
it is well recognised that much more is required to address a range of research 
questions in many different areas (Hammons, Piland et al. 2003).  The purpose of this 
section of the thesis is to outline future research strategies that could address different 
types of research questions. 
 
Four main strategies for further research, using methodologies that would be practical 
in a primary care setting, could address many of the outstanding research questions 
associated with the measurement of threats to patient safety in such settings.  The 
methods proposed vary depending on the research questions being addressed: 
 
1. Prospectively collected safety event data using simple descriptive taxonomies 
(large scale collections, national where appropriate) that clinicians, staff and 
patients could access in secure setting could appropriately address: 
• Questions relating to quantification of reported event types   
• Questions relating to primary care safety policy, observing frequencies of 
reported event types or harm levels pre and post-implementation 
• Questions relating to demographics of patients who are more vulnerable to 
certain types of reported safety events 
• Questions relating to communication problems at the community care and 
hospital interface 
• A need for the improvement of the safety culture in primary care, normalizing 
the reporting and discussion of safety events. 
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• A need for the development of self-directed educational tools relating to 
primary care safety practices, that could be linked and incorporate feedback 
from large scale safety event monitoring systems 
 
2. Methods of in-depth analysis of safety events and multi-faceted, more detailed 
taxonomies incorporating event types with cognitive theories of causation and 
harm scores (for example short-term collections with detailed analysis of reported 
events, including methods such as external reviewers analysing events, focus 
groups, and interviews with reporters) could appropriately address: 
• Questions relating to causation of patient safety events 
• Questions relating to contributing factors to safety event occurrence 
• Questions relating to preventive strategies to combat safety events 
• Questions relating to detailed reviews of specific event types (such as a study 
concentrating on factors associated with diagnostic failures or medication 
management mistakes) 
 
3. Development of sophisticated electronic web-based safety event collection 
systems could address many requirements of both large scale safety event 
collections and detailed safety event analyses.  With such a system controlled for 
example by a government or national safety organization, various studies, detailed 
analysis systems examining specific event types, feedback to clinicians, 
educational tools and a national reporting system could be housed and monitored 
simultaneously. 
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4. There is a need to develop methods that allow patients a voice in working the 
patient safety agenda in community settings. To date patients’ views have been 
heard only through small-scale qualitative studies or in the analysis of complaints 
and risk management systems. An early challenge to address is to incorporate 
patients’ perspectives on patient safety using valid methods that are devoid of the 
medico-legal threats to clinicians such as those associated with malpractice 
databases and complaints registers.  Involving patients in this type of research is 
likely to result in measures of patient safety that are different from the current 
metrics, and which are all focused on the provider perspective.    
 
It may be reasonably anticipated that factors influencing the nature of future research 
efforts will include: 
• Time and financial cost levels associated with study types, with large scale 
collections requiring national infrastructure and support from governments or 
large regulatory agencies, and detailed analyses requiring the time 
commitment of primary care professionals plus direct research costs associated 
with data analysis. 
• Access of primary health care professionals or patients to tools such as 
internet-based collection sites where security and anonymity could be 
maintained. 
• The varying levels of involvement in research of this nature in different 
primary health care communities, some having had more exposure to efforts 
designed to improve the safety culture.  These latter groups would be better 
placed to begin implementation of national collecting systems.   
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• Priorities with respect to need in primary care: safety event studies aimed at 
both detailed causation and broad event type quantification are required, and 
different areas will vary with respect to the main needs of professional groups, 
communities, regulatory organizations and governments. 
 
In order to improve our ability to measure patient safety events in community settings, 
there is a great need to address the rigour with which research is designed in order to 
be able to generalise its findings, and for researchers to consider methods that will 
improve our ability to assess the internal validity of the taxonomies or other 
measurements being proposed.  Much useful work has been done, however the study 
of safety in community settings is still in its infancy.    
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Appendix 1: Summary of relevant literature and key 
organisations 
 
This appendix lists the findings identified by the search strategy previously outlined in 
table 2.1.  These are broken down into groups relating to general safety event 
reporting, specific types of safety event reporting (such as medication events), and 
key organizations involved in safety research in community settings.  These lists of 
related papers and organisations would be of use in directing readers to the relevant 
body of literature on the various sub-categories of patient safety events that are 
provided as headings throughout this appendix. 
   
 
238
Literature on general patient safety events in community 
settings 
a) Studies reporting or measuring patient safety  
1. Patient safety events reported in general practice:  A taxonomy. (Makeham, 
Stromer et al. 2007) 
2. The Threats to Australian Patient Safety (TAPS) study: incidence of reported 
errors in general practice (Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006) 
3. The development of the National Reporting and Learning System in England 
and Wales, 2001-2005 (Williams and Osborn 2006) 
4. From cognition to the system: developing a multilevel taxonomy of patient 
safety in general practice (Kostopoulou 2006) 
5. Learning from different lenses:  Reports of medical errors in primary care by 
clinicians, staff, and patients.  A project of the American Academy of Family 
Physicians National Research Network. (Phillips, Dovey et al. 2006) 
6. Error classification in community optometric practice - a pilot project (Steele, 
Rubin et al. 2006) 
7. Adverse events and near miss reporting in the NHS (Shaw, Drever et al. 2005) 
8. Computer visualisation of patient safety in primary care: a systems approach 
adapted from management science and engineering (Singh, Singh et al. 2005) 
9. [Preliminary results of an anonymous internet-based reporting system for 
critical incidents in ambulatory primary care] (in German) (Brun 2005) 
10. Avoiding and fixing medical errors in general practice: prevention strategies 
reported in the Linnaeus Collaboration's Primary Care International Study of 
Medical Errors (Tilyard, Dovey et al. 2005) 
11. Medical errors in primary care: results of an international study of family 
practice (Rosser, Dovey et al. 2005) 
12. Event reporting to a primary care patient safety reporting system: a report 
from the ASIPS collaborative.[see comment](Fernald, Pace et al. 2004) 
13. The identification of medical errors by family physicians during outpatient 
visits (Elder, Vonder Meulen et al. 2004) 
14. Patient reports of preventable problems and harms in primary health care.[see 
comment] (Kuzel, Woolf et al. 2004) 
15. Learning from malpractice claims about negligent, adverse events in primary 
care in the United States (Phillips, Bartholomew et al. 2004) 
16. A string of mistakes: the importance of cascade analysis in describing, 
counting, and preventing medical errors.[see comment] (Woolf, Kuzel et al. 
2004) 
17. [Medical errors and iatrogenic injury--results of 173 Schlichtungsstellen 
proceedings in general practice] (Scheppokat 2004) 
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18. Errors in general practice: development of an error classification and pilot 
study of a method for detecting errors.[see comment] (Rubin, George et al. 
2003) 
19. Database design to ensure anonymous study of medical errors: a report from 
the ASIPS Collaborative (Pace, Staton et al. 2003) 
20. Family physicians' solutions to common medical errors(Dovey, Phillips et al. 
2003a) 
21. Consequences of medical errors observed by family physicians (Dovey, 
Phillips et al. 2003b) 
22. Types of medical errors commonly reported by family physicians (Dovey, 
Phillips et al. 2003c) 
23. From aviation to medicine: applying concepts of aviation safety to risk 
management in ambulatory care (Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff et al. 2003) 
24. Errors in general practice:  Results of the international PCISME-study in 
Germany (Beyer, Dovey et al. 2003) 
25. A preliminary taxonomy of medical errors in family practice (Dovey, Meyers 
et al. 2002) 
26. An international taxonomy for errors in general practice: a pilot study.[see 
comment] (Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002) 
27. Analysis of 1263 deaths in four general practices (Holden, O'Donnell et al. 
1998)  
28. The wrong diagnosis: identifying causes of potentially adverse events in 
general practice using incident monitoring (Bhasale 1998) 
29. Analysing potential harm in Australian general practice: an incident-
monitoring study.[see comment] (Bhasale, Miller et al. 1998) 
30. Collecting data on potentially harmful events: a method for monitoring 
incidents in general practice (Britt, Miller et al. 1997) 
31. Adverse events in primary care identified from a risk-management 
database.[see comment] (Fischer, Fetters et al. 1997) 
32. From novice to proficient general practitioner: a critical incident study (Sim, 
Kamien et al. 1996) 
33. Perceived causes of family physicians' errors.[see comment] (Ely, Levinson et 
al. 1995)  
34. A critical incident study of general practice trainees in their basic general 
practice term (Diamond, Kamien et al. 1995) 
b) Studies on the attitudes of health care professionals to safety 
event reporting 
1. General practitioners' attitudes toward reporting and learning from adverse 
events: results from a survey (Mikkelsen, Sokolowski et al. 2006) 
2. Effectiveness of a graduate medical education program for improving medical 
event reporting attitude and behavior (Coyle, Mercer et al. 2005) 
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3. [Possibilities for quality improvement in general practice by learning from 
adverse events] (Mikkelsen, Rubak et al. 2004)  
4. Design elements for a primary care medical error reporting system (Beasley, 
Escoto et al. 2004) 
5. The emotional impact of mistakes on family physicians.[see comment] 
(Newman 1996) 
6. Assessing the quality of data entry in a computerized medical records system 
(Dambro and Weiss 1988) 
c) Review articles and opinion pieces on patient safety events 
1. [Incident reporting on its way to general practice] (Moller 2006) 
2. Mandatory state-based error-reporting systems: current and future 
prospects.[see comment] (Wood and Nash 2005) 
3. The frequency and nature of medical error in primary care: understanding the 
diversity across studies (Sandars and Esmail 2003) 
4. Ambulatory patient safety. What we know and need to know (Hammons, 
Piland et al. 2003) 
5. Error and safety in primary care: no clear boundaries (Jacobson, Elwyn et al. 
2003) 
6. Making the case for a qualitative study of medical errors in primary care 
(Kuzel, Woolf et al. 2003) 
7. Classification of medical errors and preventable adverse events in primary 
care: a synthesis of the literature.[erratum appears in J Fam Pract. 2002 
Dec;51(12):1079.] (Elder and Dovey 2002) 
8. Promoting patient safety in primary care. Practices should set up their own 
critical incident reporting.[comment] (Ruffles 2002) 
9. Enhancing public safety in primary care (Wilson and Sheikh 2002) 
10. Promoting patient safety in primary care.[see comment] (Wilson, Pringle et al. 
2001) 
11. Setting up a database of medical error in general practice: conceptual and 
methodological considerations (Sheikh and Hurwitz 2001) 
12. Evidence on interventions to reduce medical errors: an overview and 
recommendations for future research.[see comment] (Ioannidis and Lau 2001) 
13. Patient safety: a call to action: a consensus statement from the National 
Quality Forum (Kizer 2001) 
14. Analysing potential harm in Australian general practice: an incident-
monitoring study.[comment] (Flaherty 1999) 
15. An analysis of Australian adverse drug events (Malpass, Helps et al. 1999) 
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Literature on specific types of patient safety events in 
community settings 
a) Medication related patient safety events in community settings 
i) Reporting or measuring medication events  
1. Adverse drug events in general practice patients in Australia.[see comment] 
(Miller, Britt et al. 2006) 
2. Risk of adverse drug events by patient destination after hospital discharge 
(Triller, Clause et al. 2005) 
3. Evaluation of laboratory monitoring alerts within a computerized physician 
order entry system for medication orders.[see comment] (Palen, Raebel et al. 
2006) 
4. Incidence and predictors of all and preventable adverse drug reactions in frail 
elderly persons after hospital stay (Hanlon, Pieper et al. 2006) 
5. A distance-learning program in pharmacovigilance linked to educational 
credits is associated with improved reporting of suspected adverse drug 
reactions via the UK yellow card scheme (Bracchi, Houghton et al. 2005) 
6. The potential of UK clinical databases in enhancing paediatric medication 
research (Wong and Murray 2005) 
7. Prospective study of the incidence, nature and causes of dispensing errors in 
community pharmacies (Ashcroft, Quinlan et al. 2005) 
8. Clinical relevance of automated drug alerts from the perspective of medical 
providers (Spina, Glassman et al. 2005) 
9. [Reporting the discharge medication in the discharge letter. An explorative 
survey of family doctors] (Roth-Isigkeit and Harder 2005) 
10. Patient-reported medication symptoms in primary care (Weingart, Gandhi et 
al. 2005) 
11. Neuropsychiatric reactions to drugs: an analysis of spontaneous reports from 
general practitioners in Italy (Galatti, Giustini et al. 2005) 
12. Pharmacovigilance in the 21st century: new systematic tools for an old 
problem.[comment] (Szarfman, Tonning et al. 2004) 
13. [Databases as a source for monitoring systems of drug safety (Pigeot and 
Ahrens 2004) 
14. The involvement of nurses in reporting suspected adverse drug reactions: 
experience with the meningococcal vaccination scheme (Ranganathan, 
Houghton et al. 2003) 
15. A feasibility study for recording of dispensing errors and near misses' in four 
UK primary care pharmacies (Chua, Wong et al. 2003) 
16. Investigation into the reasons for preventable drug related admissions to a 
medical admissions unit: observational study (Howard, Avery et al. 2003) 
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17. Evaluating a medical error taxonomy (relates to NCC MERP taxonomy) 
(Brixey, Johnson et al. 2002) 
18. Automated signal generation in prescription-event monitoring (Heeley, Wilton 
et al. 2002) 
19. Improving adverse-drug-reaction reporting in ambulatory care clinics at a 
Veterans Affairs hospital (Aspinall, Whittle et al. 2002) 
20. Postdischarge adverse drug reactions in primary care originating from hospital 
care in France: a nationwide prospective study (Letrilliart, Hanslik et al. 2001) 
21. Using computerized data to identify adverse drug events in outpatients 
(Honigman, Lee et al. 2001) 
22. Consultations owing to adverse drug reactions in a single practice.[see 
comment] (Millar 2001) 
23. Hospitals do not inform GPs about medication that should be monitored 
(Corry, Bonner et al. 2000) 
24. Adverse drug reactions and polypharmacy in the elderly in general practice 
(Veehof, Stewart et al. 1999) 
25. Adverse drug reaction reporting by general medical practitioners and retail 
pharmacists in Harare--a pilot study (Ball and Tisocki 1998) 
26. Under-reporting of adverse drug reactions. Estimate based on a spontaneous 
reporting scheme and a sentinel system (Alvarez-Requejo, Carvajal et al. 
1998) 
27. Under-reporting of adverse drug reactions in general practice (Moride, 
Haramburu et al. 1997) 
28. [Drug induced fatal anaphylactic shock in Denmark 1968-1990] (Lenler-
Petersen, Hansen et al. 1996) 
29. Reporting adverse drug reactions in an ambulatory care setting (Finn and 
Carlstedt 1995) 
30. Drug-related fatal anaphylactic shock in Denmark 1968-1990. A study based 
on notifications to the Committee on Adverse Drug Reactions (Lenler-
Petersen, Hansen et al. 1995) 
31. [Reporting of adverse drug reactions by primary care physicians] (Bravo 
Toledo and Campos Asensio 1995) 
32. [Approximation to the detection of drug adverse reactions among doctors at 
the primary health care level] (Valero Martin, Jimenez Luque et al. 1993) 
ii) Medication events from the perspective of patients 
1. Patient-reported medication symptoms in primary care (Weingart, Gandhi et 
al. 2005) 
2. Improving adverse-drug-reaction reporting in ambulatory care clinics at a 
Veterans Affairs hospital (Aspinall, Whittle et al. 2002) 
3. Patient reporting of potential adverse drug reactions: a methodological study 
(Jarernsiripornkul, Krska et al. 2002) 
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4. Patients' experiences of antihypertensive drugs in routine use: results of a 
Danish general practice survey (Borrild 1997) 
iii) Attitudes of primary health care professionals to medication event 
1. Physicians' decisions to override computerized drug alerts in primary care 
(Weingart, Toth et al. 2003) 
2. Attitudes to reporting adverse drug reactions in northern Sweden (Backstrom, 
Mjorndal et al. 2000) 
3. Communication regarding adverse drug reactions between secondary and 
primary care: a postal questionnaire survey of general practitioners (Green, 
Mottram et al. 1999) 
4. [Adverse drug reactions and a program of voluntary notification: an opinion 
survey of primary care physicians] (Serrano Cozar, Esteban Calvo et al. 1997) 
5. Attitudes to adverse drug reaction reporting in the Northern Region (Bateman, 
Sanders et al. 1992) 
iv) Review Articles and Opinion Pieces on medication events 
1. Off-label and unlicensed prescribing for newborns and children in different 
settings: a review of the literature and a consideration about drug safety 
(Cuzzolin, Atzei et al. 2006) 
2. Adverse drug events: counting is not enough, action is needed.[comment] 
(Roughead and Lexchin 2006)  
3. Adverse drug events: counting is not enough, action is needed.[comment] 
(Miller, Britt et al. 2006) 
4. JCAHO views medication reconciliation as adverse-event prevention  
(Thompson 1530) 
5. Strategies to reduce medication errors in ambulatory practice (Adubofour, 
Keenan et al. 2004) 
6. The general practice research database: role in pharmacovigilance (Wood and 
Martinez 2004) 
7. Medication errors in family practice, in hospitals and after discharge from the 
hospital: an ethical analysis (Clark) 
8. The perils of prescribing (Parsons 2002) 
9. Adverse drug reactions.[comment] (Anton and Cox 2001)  
10. An update of adverse drug reactions of relevance to general dental practice 
(Flint, O'Sullivan et al. 2000) 
11. Active monitoring of adverse drug reactions in children. (Menniti-Ippolito, 
Raschetti et al. 2000) 
12. [Incidence and prevalence of adverse drug reactions] (Haramburu, Pouyanne 
et al. 2000) 
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13. Age and sex distribution of suspected adverse drug reactions to newly 
marketed drugs in general practice in England: analysis of 48 cohort studies 
(Martin, Biswas et al. 1998) 
14. The UK General Practice Research Database.[see comment] (Walley and 
Mantgani 1997) 
15. A database worth saving.[comment] (Jick 1997) 
16. Drug companies should report side effects in terms of frequency.[see 
comment] (Bracchi 1996) 
17. Medication errors. Automation holds promise of prevention (Bazzoli) 
18. Post marketing surveillance versus clinical trials: which benefits the patient? 
(Lawson 1994) 
19. [Underreporting of adverse reactions to drugs: is it due to primary care or 
hospital care?].[comment] (Tejedor, Sanchez del Viso et al. 1994) 
20. [Adverse reactions to drugs reported by the primary care physicians of 
Andalusia. Analysis of underreporting].[see comment] (Torello Iserte, Castillo 
Ferrando et al. 1994)  
21. [Quality of event data in detection of unwanted drug side-effects in general 
practice of established physicians] (Schadlich 1993) 
22. Yellow card reporting (Kelleher and Carmichael 1993) 
23. Drug utilization studies and drug monitoring in The Netherlands (Haaijer-
Ruskamp and de Jong-van den Berg 1991) 
24. Post marketing surveillance of adverse drug reactions in general practice. I: 
search for new methods (Inman 1981) 
b) Radiological events 
1. Radiology by non-radiologists: is report documentation adequate? (Weiner 
2005)  
c) Vaccine events 
1. Vaccine adverse events: separating myth from reality (Kimmel 2002) 
  
Key organizations researching patient safety events in 
community settings 
a) International and national patient safety organizations and 
groups 
 
1. WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety  http://www.who.int/patientsafety/en  
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Launched in 2004, the WHO World Alliance for patient Safety stands as the 
main international advocate for patient safety research, including research in 
community settings.  
2. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, USA   
http://psnet.ahrq.gov/index.aspx  
AHRQ is the lead government agency in the USA for research on patient safety, 
health care quality, costs, and outcomes. It supports the AHRQ Patient Safety 
Network (PSNet), a national web-based resource providing access to resources 
about patient safety, including patient safety in community settings. 
3. National Patient Safety Foundation  www.npsf.org  
NPSF is a not-for-profit organization based in the USA that aims to improve 
patient safety by a number of mechanisms, including research funding. It has 
funded 26 research projects, including several with relevance to community 
settings. 
4. National Patient Safety Agency, UK www.npsa.nhs.uk  
NPSA coordinates the efforts of people involved in health care, and promotes 
learning from patient safety incidents occurring in the United Kingdom’s 
National Health System (NHS). It is involved in collecting and analysing 
information on patient safety events from local NHS organizations, staff, 
patients and carers.  
5. Australian Patient Safety Foundation http://www.apsf.net.au 
APSF is an independent not-for-profit organisation providing leadership in the 
reduction of harm to patients in all health care environments, including 
community settings. The APSF provides a software tool, the Advanced Incident 
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Management System (AIMS).  This captures safety event information from a 
variety of settings in a consistent way, to enable subsequent detailed analysis. 
6. Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
http://www.safetyandquality.org 
This government-funded Commission has developed a national strategic 
framework to promote patient safety and associated work program to guide 
efforts in improving safety and quality across the healthcare system in Australia. 
b) International and national professional and research 
organizations  
1.  American Academy of Family Physicians 
  This Family Physicians’ professional organization is the host organization for 
the National Network of Family Physicians, which have been involved in 
several primary care research studies on patient safety topics(Dovey, Meyers et 
al. 2002; Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Beyer, Dovey et al. 2003; Dovey, 
Phillips et al. 2003a; Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003b; Dovey, Phillips et al. 2003c; 
Phillips, Bartholomew et al. 2004; Woolf, Kuzel et al. 2004; Rosser, Dovey et 
al. 2005; Tilyard, Dovey et al. 2005).  Publisher of the journal American Family 
Physician, which has printed papers reviewing patient safety issues. 
2.  American Board of Family Practice 
  Family Physicians’ professional organization. Publisher of the Journal of the 
American Board of Family Medicine, which has printed papers discussing 
patient safety in the community. 
3.  College of Family Physicians of Canada  
Family Physicians’ professional organization. Publisher of the Canadian Family 
Physician, which has printed papers discussing patient safety in the community. 
4.  College of Family Physicians Singapore  
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Family Physicians’ professional organization. Has a web-searchable function 
that demonstrates that patient safety issues are addressed across a wide range of 
this College’s activities. 
5.  EQuiP (European Working Party on Quality in Family Practice) 
A European group comprising members who conduct and use research related to 
quality improvement in general practice/family medicine, including research 
related to patient safety in community settings. 
6.  International Primary Care Respiratory Group (IPCRG) 
An international umbrella organisation for national primary care respiratory 
interest groups, IPCRG aims to undertake international research in community 
settings, including research related to patient safety. 
7.  Irish College of General Practitioners 
General practitioners’ professional organization.  Confers an annual award 
sponsored by the Irish Society for Quality and Safety in Healthcare for quality 
improvements relating to improved patient safety.  
8.  North American Primary Care Research Group (NAPCRG) 
NAPCRG is a multidisciplinary organization aiming to foster primary care 
research.  Since 2001 it has had a Patient Safety Special Interest research group, 
comprising primary care researchers interested in patient safety research. 
9.  Royal Australian College of General Practitioners 
General practitioners’ professional organization. Publisher of the Australian 
Family Physician, which has printed papers discussing patient safety in the 
community.  It has developed a broad range of resources focusing on improved 
patient safety including education modules and tools providing safety checklists, 
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and has been directly involved in published research on safety events in 
community settings(Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002; Makeham, Kidd et al. 2006).  
10.  Royal College of General Practitioners 
General practitioners’ professional organization. Publisher of the British Journal 
of General Practice, which has printed papers discussing patient safety in the 
community.  The college has two research units but neither has reported 
conducting research directly related to patient safety.  
11.  Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners 
General practitioners’ professional organization. Publisher of the New Zealand 
Family Physician, which has printed papers discussing patient safety in the 
community.  
12.  Society of Teachers of Family Medicine 
Professional organization for teachers of family medicine based in USA.  
Publisher of the journal Family Medicine, which has printed papers discussing 
patient safety in the community. There are several reports and resources about 
patient safety in community settings posted on its website. 
13.  World Organization of National Colleges, Academies, and Academic 
 Associations of General Practitioners / Family Physicians (WONCA) 
WONCA is an international academic and scientific society for general 
practitioners in member countries.   The WONCA International Classification 
Committee (WICC) developed the International Classification of Primary 
Care(Lamberts, Meads et al. 1985) as a tool for describing primary care activity.  
In 2005 it considered incorporating a patient safety chapter into this tool but no 
progress has yet been made on this initiative.  
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c) University departments and professional groups that have 
conducted patient safety research in community settings identified 
in the literature 
Most published research has been produced by researchers working in academic 
departments of general practice in universities. The following academic departments, 
schools, and centres have produced patient safety research relevant to this review:  
1. Department of General Practice, University of Western Australia, Australia   
2. Department of Family Practice, University of Iowa, USA 
3. University of Rochester, NY, USA 
4. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA 
5. Department of General Practice, University of Sydney, Australia. 
6. The Robert Graham Center: Policy Studies in Family Practice/Primary Care, USA  
7. Institute for Family Medicine, Kiel University, Germany.   
8. Department of Family Medicine, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA 
9.  Department of General Practice, Dunedin School of Medicine, New Zealand 
10.  Department of Family Medicine, Queen’s University, Canada 
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Appendix 2:  Information and Consent Form for GP 
Participants 
 
 
This appendix contains the information and consent form that was provided to and 
signed by participating GPs prior to the commencement of the TAPS study data 
collection.     
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Appendix 3:  Background questionnaire for GP 
participants 
 
This appendix contains the background questionnaire that participating GPs 
completed prior to their commencement of the TAPS study.  It was provided to them 
when they were first visited by a member of the study team and given the information 
and consent form.  All participants completed and returned these details. 
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About You: 
1. What is your age?  ___  
2. What is your sex?  M   F  
3. For how many years have you worked as a GP (excluding training)? ___ 
4. In which RRMA group is your practice located? 1    2-3    4-7    
5.  What are your qualifications, including non-medical diplomas and degrees? 
     ____________________________________________________________ 
6.  Did you study for your medical degree at an Australian University?    Y   N               
7. Are you vocationally registered?  Y   N  
If yes, do you hold an FRACGP?  Y   N   
8.  How many half days per week do you usually see patients? ____ 
9.  In an average week, how many patients would you see in ½ a day of clinical work?  
 
About Your Practice: 
1.  Is your practice accredited to qualify for PIP payments? Y   N   
2.  Do you or any of the doctors in your practice teach medical students?   Y   N   
3.  Does your practice supervise GP Registrars?   Y   N   
4.  How many medical doctors see patients in your practice?   
_____         ______                           
Number           Number full time equivalent 
 
 
5.  How many other people (non-medical doctors) work in your practice? 
_____         ______                           
Number           Number full time equivalent 
6.  What are computers used for in your practice? (Choose all that apply). 
 No computer in my practice 
 accounting purposes        generating lab or investigation requests or reports 
 appointment schedules                   accessing journal articles 
 keeping patient problem lists  telemedicine consultations  
 keeping patient medication lists  electronic bulk-billing 
 keeping all patient records  e-mail 
 generating prescriptions   other (please specify)_________________ 
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Appendix 4:  Taxonomy of patient safety events from 
Primary Care International Study of Medical Error 
(Makeham, Dovey et al. 2002) 
 
This appendix contains the taxonomy of error that was published in the Medical 
Journal of Australia in 2002 resulting from the study entitled ‘The Primary Care 
International Study of Medical Error’ (PCISME).  This pilot study taxonomy was the 
starting point from which the TAPS taxonomy was further developed. 
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Taxonomy of errors reported in general practice from PCISME (Makeham, 
Dovey et al. 2002) 
 
1. Process Errors  
 1.1. Errors in Office Administration 
  1.1.1.  Filing system errors 
  1.1.2.  Chart completeness errors 
  1.1.3.  Patient flow (through the health care system) 
  1.1.4.  Message handling errors 
  1.1.5.  Appointments errors 
  1.1.6.  Errors in maintenance of a safe physical environment 
 1.2.  Investigation Errors 
  1.2.1.  Laboratory errors 
  1.2.2.  Diagnostic imaging errors 
  1.2.3.  Errors in the processes of other investigations 
 1.3.  Treatment Errors 
  1.3.1.  Medication errors 
  1.3.2.  Errors in other treatments 
 1.4.  Communication Errors 
  1.4.1.  Errors in communication with patients 
  1.4.2.  Errors in communication with other health care providers 
(non-medical) 
  1.4.3.  Errors in communication with other doctors 
  1.4.4.  Errors in communication amongst the whole health care team 
 1.5.  Payment Errors 
  1.5.1.  Errors in processing insurance claims 
  1.5.2.  Errors in electronic payments  
  1.5.3.  Wrongly charged for care not received 
 1.6.  Errors in Health Care Workforce Management 
  1.6.1.  Absent staff not covered 
  1.6.2.  Dysfunctional referral procedures  
  1.6.3.  Errors in appointing after-hours workforce 
2.  Knowledge and Skills Errors 
 2.1.  Errors in the Execution of a Clinical Task 
  2.1.1.  Non-clinical staff made the wrong clinical decision 
  2.1.2.  Failed to follow standard practice 
  2.1.3.  Lacked needed experience or expertise in a clinical task 
 2.2.  Errors in Diagnosis 
  2.2.1.  Error in diagnosis by a nurse 
  2.2.2.  Delay in diagnosis 
  2.2.3.  Wrong or delayed diagnosis attributable to misinterpretation 
of investigations 
  2.2.4.  Wrong or delayed diagnosis attributable to misinterpretation 
of examination 
  2.2.5.  Wrong diagnosis by a pharmacist 
  2.2.6.  Wrong diagnosis by a hospital-based doctor 
 2.3.  Wrong Treatment Decision with Right Diagnosis 
  2.3.1.  Wrong treatment decision, influenced by patient preferences 
  2.3.2.  Wrong treatment decision by doctor 
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 Appendix 5:  TAPS Report Description Summaries  
 
Record Number     Report Time           Description 
 75 1/10/2003 1:21:49 PM Topical steroid prescription item out of stock with pharmacy, GP not  
 made aware resulting in patient having to return for different prescription 
 76 2/10/2003 12:43:03 PM TEST REPORT - NO ERROR 
 77 3/10/2003 2:59:34 PM TEST REPORT - NOT AN ERROR 
 78 3/10/2003 3:25:13 PM Overuse of valium by reporting GP in management of status epilepticus  
 in a NH patient, resulting in patient being considered overdosed with  
 valium at a major hospital where he was referred by another doctor, and  
 reporting GP under investigation by health department over the case 
 79 6/10/2003 9:50:23 AM TEST REPORT - NO ERROR 
 80 6/10/2003 6:38:58 PM TEST REPORT - NO ERROR 
 81 6/10/2003 10:36:29 PM Delay in acting upon abnormal blood results resulting in possible delay in  
 diagnosis of bowel cancer 
 82 6/10/2003 10:43:56 PM Lipid lowering medication commenced at too high a dose and without  
 warning patient of potential side effects or arranging review, resulting in  
 patient suffering muscle aches and ceasing medication without consulting 
 83 7/10/2003 11:12:00 AM Incorrect date given for ophthalmology out patient appointment by hospital 
 84 8/10/2003 7:13:06 AM GP reports that Public Health failed to communicate an increased  
 incidence of pertussis in area, and this contributed to a delayed diagnosis 
 of pertussis in a child as GP's index of suspicion was not high for cases 
 85 8/10/2003 8:27:38 AM GP misread a release of medical records request document in chart and  
 thought patient was transferring to another GP when she was not 
 86 8/10/2003 1:56:45 PM Locum prescribed medication for a patient without seeing her, in a case  
 where her husband was seen with a likely STD, and did not want to tell  
 87 8/10/2003 3:15:37 PM TEST REPORT - NO ERROR 
 88 9/10/2003 8:31:17 AM Specialist reported result of VQ scan incorrectly, with misdiagnosis of  
 pulmonary emboli, and patient took Warfarin and suffered side effects  
 unnecessarily for 2 months 
 89 9/10/2003 4:08:01 PM Recall systems failure resulting in missed taking a FBC to assess  
 progress post treatment for Fe deficiency anaemia, and exacerbation of  
 Angina 
 90 9/10/2003 6:20:44 PM GP offended patient when advising she needed to lose weight 
 91 11/10/2003 12:18:40 PM GP was administering pethidine regularly for recurrent migraine without  
 authority for Drugs of Addiction 
 92 11/10/2003 12:27:26 PM Recall system failure for prostate check-up, resulting in delayed  
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 diagnosis of Ca prostate 
 93 12/10/2003 8:11:43 PM Patient given incorrect medication during 9 day hospital admission of  
 Provera instead of Hydrea (Rx of essential thrombocythemia), due to  
 RMO misunderstanding GP phone advice on regular medications 
 94 13/10/2003 1:53:43 PM GP incorrectly faxed confidential patient report to a wrong number,  
 resulting in loss of patient trust and custom 
 95 16/10/2003 1:46:59 PM Prescription error made using computer, forgot to state number of tablets 
  to be given and computer failed to correct 
 96 16/10/2003 4:35:25 PM Failed to secure needle to syringe which became detached during  
 vaccine administration 
 97 17/10/2003 8:54:27 AM Iatrogenic pneumothorax resulting from incorrect administration of pain  
 relieving injection for fibromyalgia 
 98 20/10/2003 1:07:20 PM TEST REPRT - NO ERROR 
 99 20/10/2003 1:45:34 PM Near miss - GP was about to use a Hyfrecator to treat a skin lesion in a  
 patient with a pacemaker 
 100 21/10/2003 1:20:00 PM Poor discharge summary information  to GP resulting in prolonged use of 
 A drug which contributed to renal failure.  Misdiagnosis of pneumonia.   
 delayed diagnosis of metastatic malignancy involving lung and spine,  
 primary unknown 
 101 22/10/2003 9:06:57 PM Prescribed antimalarials to a patient on antiepileptic medn which could  
 have resulted in serious interaction if patient had not gotten a second  
 Opinion 
 102 23/10/2003 3:19:24 PM Delay in obtaining important investigations due to lack of after-hours  
 service in area 
 103 23/10/2003 5:41:40 PM Used incorrect equipment when taking specimen for laboratory testing  
 during minor surgery, resulting in accidental destruction of specimen 
 104 23/10/2003 8:28:59 PM Mistake in noting past illness in medical records as Hep A instead of Hep 
  B due to incorrect assumptions 
 105 28/10/2003 11:39:01 AM Prescribed ear drops instead of eye drops accidentally 
 106 28/10/2003 11:44:20 AM Incorrect management/treatment plan as a result of failing to review old  
 records thoroughly during the consultation 
 107 29/10/2003 1:44:26 PM Forgot to give patient prescription as planned during consultation 
 108 29/10/2003 11:14:05 PM Failure to stabilise INR levels in warfarinised patient due to  
 communication failures with poor patient understanding and medication  
 changes by other doctors 
 109 30/10/2003 10:03:09 AM Delayed diagnosis of subdural haematoma contributed to by local  
 hospital staff resistant to investigation and treatment requests of GP  
 110 30/10/2003 10:25:59 AM Pharmacist dispensed sandomigran instead of Visken accidentally 
 111 30/10/2003 3:23:52 PM Patient referral to psychiatrist accidentally faxed to wrong number 
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 112 31/10/2003 2:00:58 PM Delayed diagnosis of severe bilateral bacterial pneumonia in NH patient,  
 resulting in patient death 
 113 31/10/2003 2:37:00 PM Omitted to follow up INR results/ failure to manage INR levels  
 appropriately by GP in newly warfarinised patient, resulting in INR of 11  
 114 31/10/2003 6:36:19 PM NOT AN ERROR - Oral contraceptive pill failure resulting in unwanted  
 Pregnancy 
 115 1/11/2003 11:25:14 AM Incorrect drug level range information given by hospital pathology  
 department to GP for serum Lamictal, resulting in mistaken dosage  
 adjustment of anti-epileptic medication 
 116 3/11/2003 2:30:47 PM Hospital emergency resident incorrectly interpreted Xray and clinical  
 signs in child with a  fractured elbow, and discharged patient  with a  
 misdiagnosis of sprain 
 117 3/11/2003 4:38:04 PM Forgot to put date on a previous entry in paper based medical records 
 118 5/11/2003 12:56:19 PM Computer script printed with incorrect patient name due to wrong file  
 being opened 
 119 5/11/2003 2:15:35 PM NO ERROR REPORT 
 120 5/11/2003 6:02:09 PM Incorrect patient details entered into computer records 
 121 6/11/2003 2:29:25 PM Delay in receiving abnormal INR results from laboratory, who faxed to  
 an unattended surgery on a Saturday afternoon 
 122 9/11/2003 4:02:13 PM Incorrect dosage of blood pressure tablets accidentally prescribed using  
 computer software 
 123 9/11/2003 5:20:27 PM NO ERROR -  TEST REPORT 
 124 10/11/2003 7:19:53 PM Accidental incorrect dosage instructions on Actonel script resulting in  
 patient taking a weekly medication daily, not corrected by computer  
 prescribing package or pharmacist 
 125 11/11/2003 11:47:39 AM Incorrect dosage information accidentally written on computer  
 126 11/11/2003 12:08:27 PM TEST REPORT - FROM TAPS TEAM 
 127 11/11/2003 8:01:03 PM TEST REPORT - not an error 
 128 13/11/2003 10:05:41 AM Attributed abnormal MSU result to wrong patient with a similar name,   
 treated wrong patient who was in a NH, plus had delay in treating original  
 patient who had the abnormal result 
 129 13/11/2003 3:42:06 PM Missed seeing a positive Chlamydia pathology result, treatment delayed 
 130 13/11/2003 6:21:40 PM Delay in patient following through with referral for specialist consultation/  
 further investigations due to transportation difficulties and lack of bulk- 
 131 14/11/2003 10:18:50 AM Hostel carer incorrectly administered medications to wrong patient 
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 132 14/11/2003 5:18:53 PM Incorrect treatment for dislocated first MTP joint, initially failed to put into  
 plaster as per standard practice, corrected next day 
 133 17/11/2003 11:35:13 AM Incorrectly spelled patient surname on PAP slide 
 134 17/11/2003 12:34:56 PM Delay in treatment of Fe deficiency anaemia possibly contributed to  
 patient having a miscarriage of pregnancy 
 135 17/11/2003 1:01:30 PM Delay in assessing, diagnosing and treating patient with severe infective  
 exacerbation of asthma due to GP time pressures resulting in poor  
 triaging of seriously ill patient 
 136 17/11/2003 5:06:07 PM Failure to ensure patient with possible pneumothorax had had an urgent  
 Xray, and then follow up urgent radiology over weekend 
 137 17/11/2003 9:02:56 PM Inadequate pain management of arterial ulcer, and failure to diagnose  
 small vessel vasculitis by previous doctor 
 138 19/11/2003 9:19:44 PM Prescription for azithromycin written in previous patient's name using  
 computer program 
 139 19/11/2003 9:31:42 PM Meningococcal C vaccine diluent given without active ingredient 
 140 19/11/2003 10:56:24 PM NO REPORT 
 141 20/11/2003 12:15:15 PM Poor technique in giving knee injection contributed to complication of  
 Bursitis 
 142 20/11/2003 6:41:02 PM Meningoccocal C vaccine diluent given without active ingredient 
 143 20/11/2003 6:55:54 PM Contraindicated medication prescribed to a patient on warfarin, causing  
 INR to rise and serious abdominal bleed requiring hospitalisation, no  
 computer warning because on home visit without access 
 144 24/11/2003 11:16:37 AM Failure to diagnose oesophageal foreign body causing chest pain, thought 
  patient had oesophagitis in rushed consultation 
 145 24/11/2003 3:06:32 PM Radiology practice sent Xray report to wrong GP 
 146 25/11/2003 11:48:55 AM Delay in receiving pelvic ultrasound results when radiology practice  
 forgot to send to requesting GP and had confusion over whether patient  
 was to collect or they were to send films to practice 
 147 25/11/2003 1:59:15 PM Prescription written in wrong name from another patient's file with same  
 surname using computer 
 148 25/11/2003 3:05:35 PM Incorrect medical management of menorrhagia 
 149 25/11/2003 3:14:10 PM Failed to recall patient with suspicious breast changes, lack of system at 
  Practice 
 150 25/11/2003 3:22:48 PM GP did not remove panadeine forte from patient's regular medication list  
 on computer when meant to cease it; GP's colleague didn't review  
 previous notes in file and provided script for a ceased medn (panadeine  
 forte) against regular doctor's orders 
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 151 26/11/2003 10:45:55 AM Wrong patient responded to call into consulting room; prescription issued  
 in incorrect name 
 152 26/11/2003 10:55:45 AM Wrong patient responded to call into consulting room; notes were entered  
 into another patient's file 
 153 26/11/2003 6:11:48 PM Delayed diagnosis of cardiomyopathy in complicated patient resulted in  
 premature death 
 154 26/11/2003 6:26:55 PM Faulty needle attachment to syringe caused failure of vaccination with  
 vaccine spilling out; lack of attention to which vaccines are in which  
 syringe with multiple immunisations, resulted in a vaccine having to be  
 administered twice in the event of one of the syringes being spilt during  
 Procedure 
 155 27/11/2003 9:49:22 AM TEST REPORT - NO ERROR 
 156 27/11/2003 3:52:35 PM TEST REPORT - NO ERROR 
 157 27/11/2003 8:55:39 PM Failure of recall system for ECG result showing AF 
 158 27/11/2003 9:04:45 PM Failed to communicate effectively to a patient that a cardiology referral  
 for a second opinion was advisable, resulting in patient not arranging to  
 See specialist despite letter being given 
 159 29/11/2003 7:12:28 PM Prescription printed with incorrect patient name using computer when  
 forgot to change file from previous consultation 
 160 30/11/2003 1:14:44 AM Dropped and lost a used open vial when attempting to take to 'sharps' bin 
  then stepped on it later 
 161 30/11/2003 1:29:35 AM Forgot to attend NH patient for 2 days when called for urgent visit 
 162 30/11/2003 1:40:57 AM Prescribed contraindicated drug against specialist advice because failed  
 to review patient's notes thoroughly when reviewing another GP's patient  
 163 30/11/2003 4:14:29 PM Prescribed a discontinued immunisation because was not informed it had  
 been ceased 
 164 1/12/2003 7:12:16 AM Needlestick injury to child during immunisation 
 165 1/12/2003 4:34:39 PM Paper notes lost from patient file 
 166 1/12/2003 5:26:48 PM Paper notes incorrectly ordered in file 
 167 3/12/2003 1:17:58 PM Prescription given for an item no longer available on PBS 
 168 3/12/2003 1:23:17 PM Inappropriate referral to a retired specialist 
 169 3/12/2003 4:38:12 PM Radiologist missed possible Ca bowel on CT, picked up by reporting GP 
 170 7/12/2003 5:29:37 PM Patient given antibiotic treatment incorrectly based on another persons  
 path results misfiled in hospital notes 
 171 7/12/2003 5:44:16 PM Prescription given for a discontinued antibiotic medication 
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 172 9/12/2003 2:37:15 PM Prolonged consultation because of incomplete records 
 173 11/12/2003 7:41:43 AM Patient consultation delayed because GP unaware they were waiting 
 174 11/12/2003 4:26:16 PM Patient records re: foot problem made in another patient's file with similar 
  name, duplication of investigations needed at subsequent visit 
 175 15/12/2003 9:06:31 AM NO ERROR - description of results processing computer vs paper 
 176 15/12/2003 9:30:24 AM Incorrect DOB on computer file 
 177 15/12/2003 9:34:08 AM Incorrect vaccination advice given 
 178 16/12/2003 11:06:05 AM GP failed to process a Work Cover case, instead claiming a Medicare  
 Consultation 
 179 16/12/2003 4:37:11 PM Delayed diagnosis cardiac arrhythmia 
 180 18/12/2003 8:45:30 AM Pathology results not matching patient name on practice computer file  
 causing delay in care process 
 181 18/12/2003 1:41:22 PM Incomplete details in patient's file meant no phone number to notify high  
 INR result 
 182 18/12/2003 1:41:34 PM Incorrect antibiotic medication dispensed by pharmacy resulted in tympanic  
 membrane rupture 
 183 18/12/2003 1:46:31 PM Contraindicated drug prescribed (allergy) in nursing home lacking  
 computer warning system 
 184 19/12/2003 12:34:09 PM Wrong DOB info in patient file transcribed to transfusion form 
 185 19/12/2003 1:56:50 PM Incorrect medication charting in Nursing Home patient 
 186 23/12/2003 1:58:56 PM Incorrect dose of warfarin prescribed 
 187 23/12/2003 7:10:52 PM Lack of appropriate follow up of new ACE and new antipsychotic  
 medications resulting in postural hypotension 
 188 23/12/2003 7:23:31 PM Failed to follow up newly commenced warfarin after dc from hospital,  
 resulted in nose bleed 
 189 23/12/2003 11:18:04 PM Failure of medical colleague to provide appropriate hospital care post  
 Trauma 
 190 23/12/2003 11:27:15 PM Failed to appropriately apply pressure post venesection resulting in minor 
  post procedure bleed for patient 
 191 24/12/2003 12:27:21 PM Delay in diagnosis of Ca Breast and incorrect interpretation of  
 Mammogram by radiologist 
 192 24/12/2003 12:47:45 PM Hip fracture hours after inappropriate discharge of elderly frail patient  
 having falls from overcrowded ED 
 193 27/12/2003 10:42:03 AM Prescription error incorrect steroid dose for asthma treatment 
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 194 29/12/2003 10:25:18 PM Wrong BP medication dosage dispensed 
 195 30/12/2003 9:35:31 AM Inadequate info on hospital discharge to provide appropriate care to post  
 partum bleed 
 196 30/12/2003 3:37:25 PM Incorrect patient info on path referral form 
 197 30/12/2003 5:26:42 PM Incorrect date on sick leave certificate 
 198 1/01/2004 11:37:11 AM Pathology lab made incorrect reading of BHCG results and nearly caused 
  a misdiagnosis of death in utero with D&C 
 199 1/01/2004 11:50:51 AM Pharmacy dispensing error of wrong dose BP medn 
 200 1/01/2004 12:11:44 PM Delay in hospital admission for serious illness of gangrene of foot due to 
  bed pressures in system and eventual ED referral 
 201 3/01/2004 3:08:32 PM Consultation carried out with incorrect patient file and name due to patient 
  responding to another's name in waiting room and during consultation;  
 scripts written with incorrect name; scripts dispensed with correct name,  
 but pharmacist failed to inform GP that written in another name 
 202 5/01/2004 5:54:02 PM INR problem due to commencement of frusemide and failure to  
 adequately monitor 
 203 6/01/2004 6:00:52 PM Hospital cancelled patient waiting for colonoscopy due to communication  
 problem when patient meant to delay procedure due to intercurrent illness 
 204 6/01/2004 6:10:43 PM Physician prescribed incorrect treatment for hypertension in pregnant  
 205 8/01/2004 8:49:00 AM GP failed to pick up high risk labour due to failing to check CTG 
 206 8/01/2004 5:27:58 PM Pharmacist failed to dispense prescribed medication for new diabetic  
 requested by patient, didn't inform GP 
 207 9/01/2004 8:25:51 AM Pharmacist illegally supplying a benzodiazepine without prescription for  
 many years, and patient suffered withdrawal when ceased using it 
 208 9/01/2004 1:06:47 PM BP medn orders from physician not followed accurately by patient 
 209 9/01/2004 2:03:40 PM Radiology failed to deliver results of abdominal US screening for Ca  
 ovary (electronically) 
 210 12/01/2004 5:15:37 PM Incorrect medication dispensed by pharmacist 
 211 13/01/2004 6:39:38 PM Pharmacist failed to dispense prescribed medication for new diabetic  
 requested by patient, and didn't inform GP 
 212 13/01/2004 10:48:14 PM Hospital nursing staff incorrectly administered antibiotic treatment order 
  for cellulitis of leg 
 213 14/01/2004 3:08:08 PM Delayed implementation of anticoagulation/INR management in post op  
 DVT; reception staff incorrect admin procedures with booking path results 
 214 14/01/2004 6:36:51 PM Pathology lab failed to carry out Rh antibody screen as ordered 
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 215 15/01/2004 11:11:45 AM (Two separate patients) failed to adequately investigate irregular pulses  
 due to time pressures resulting in 1. severe SOB and 2. CCF and  
 admission to hospital 
 216 15/01/2004 11:35:40 AM Delay in provision of PAP smear possibly due to male GP and patient  
 Discomfort 
 217 17/01/2004 5:29:38 PM Delay in specialist communicating abnormal results after endoscopy  
 caused treatment delay 
 218 20/01/2004 11:12:22 AM Wrong type of  Insulin medication prescribed at patient request, with GP  
 failing to consider the medication was inappropriate 
 219 20/01/2004 12:59:32 PM TEST REPORT – NO ERROR 
 220 20/01/2004 5:37:29 PM Delayed diagnosis of cellulitis of foot due to inadequate examination 
 221 21/01/2004 7:04:27 PM Delayed reporting of abnormal sinus CT showing possible tumour 
 222 21/01/2004 7:09:45 PM Failure to diagnose SAH resulted in death of patient 
 223 22/01/2004 11:18:09 AM Ruptured tympanic membrane as a result of ear syringing 
 224 28/01/2004 10:24:31 AM Patient left without being seen after MVA due to payment issue 
 225 28/01/2004 9:06:42 PM Incorrect patient file used for consultation requesting IVF referral 
 226 29/01/2004 8:52:47 AM Consultation notes made in another patients file with similar name; script  
 written with incorrect name 
 227 29/01/2004 11:26:11 AM Mistakenly applied fluorescein to contact lens in examination 
 228 31/01/2004 5:15:59 PM Nursing home staff failed to follow antibiotic medn order correctly 
 229 31/01/2004 5:36:30 PM Nursing home staff failed to follow Celebrex medn order correctly 
 230 31/01/2004 5:50:17 PM Prescribed antibiotic ear drops instead of eye drops 
 231 31/01/2004 6:48:06 PM Prescribed antibiotic ear drops instead of eye drops 
 232 2/02/2004 3:24:21 PM Incorrect antibiotic dose prescribed for infant with tonsillitis 
 233 3/02/2004 2:38:49 PM Patient given contraindicated antibiotic - allergic 
 234 3/02/2004 3:38:16 PM Mismanagement of Warfarin resulting in elevated INR and bruising 
 235 9/02/2004 5:12:53 PM Practice buildings disrepair caused patient accident 
 236 11/02/2004 12:18:50 PM Wrong patient details on path referral 
 237 11/02/2004 1:32:14 PM Patient presents late for contraceptive injection 
 238 11/02/2004 4:49:44 PM Recall system failure results in late treatment of significant condition 
 239 12/02/2004 8:27:27 AM Incorrect patient name details on computer records 
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 240 12/02/2004 8:29:54 AM Incorrect patient address details on computer records 
 241 12/02/2004 8:31:58 AM Incorrect patient Medicare/insurance details on computer records 
 242 14/02/2004 10:43:46 AM Abnormal pathology result not reported to patient, abnormal pathology  
 result not followed up by GP appropriately 
 243 16/02/2004 8:59:14 AM Interaction between antibiotic for cellulitis and warfarin, and failure to  
 appropriately monitor INR over weekend resulting in hospital admission 
 244 17/02/2004 8:27:35 AM Extra vaccination injection accidentally given 
 245 17/02/2004 2:22:16 PM Incorrect INR result given to patient, patient result incorrectly filed in  
 another patient's chart 
 246 18/02/2004 11:36:37 AM Incorrect medication prescribed, quinidine instead of quinine, computer  
 script writing mistake 
 247 18/02/2004 1:40:50 PM Gave a clozaril prescription without FBC results available 
 248 23/02/2004 12:11:13 PM Incorrect date on 'forms' 
 249 24/02/2004 5:57:26 PM Dizzy patient incorrectly diagnosed as depression rather than arrhythmia, 
  patient incorrectly advised to cease cardiac medications causing  
 hypertension and exacerbation of arrhythmia, adverse effects of  
 antidepressant medication 
 250 25/02/2004 3:51:34 PM No records available whilst seeing patient, due to practice moving  
 locations and sharing files with an associate 
 251 26/02/2004 4:48:37 PM Patient reported abnormal pathology results ordered by another GP as  
 being normal, abnormal results could not be given to patient due to lack  
 of contact details 
 252 29/02/2004 10:50:31 PM Failed to communicate dose change of warfarin to patient 
 253 1/03/2004 10:32:10 PM Failure by hospital Dr to correctly investigate, diagnose and treat  
 referred gastroenteritis case from GP 
 254 1/03/2004 10:43:42 PM Respiratory arrest and ongoing PTSD due to morphine overdose on  
 malfunctioning PCA machine 
 255 2/03/2004 10:39:00 PM Misdiagnosis of SCC on thumb 
 256 4/03/2004 8:53:56 AM Pathology results misfiled in computer system, patient didn't receive them 
 257 4/03/2004 12:21:20 PM NO ERROR - STORY ABOUT VACCINES 
 258 4/03/2004 12:26:16 PM Warfarin mismanagement resulted in haemoptysis 
 259 4/03/2004 12:58:47 PM Warfarin mismanagement resulting in low INR 
 260 6/03/2004 12:41:21 PM GP failed to give abnormal path results to patient who was told there were 
  normal, leading to delayed diagnosis and treatment of endocrine disorder 
 261 6/03/2004 5:54:24 PM Path request printed with incorrect patient details 
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 262 8/03/2004 4:24:06 PM Prescribed a medn for a patient that had been discontinued by specialist, 
  picked up by pharmacist 
 263 8/03/2004 5:57:08 PM Pharmacist failed to dispense metformin script 
 264 8/03/2004 6:13:34 PM Incorrectly charted medication in hospital 
 265 8/03/2004 6:14:57 PM NOT AN ERROR 
 266 8/03/2004 6:59:05 PM Warfarin mismanagement INR too high, then excision of skin lesion  
 without checking INR resulted in oozing and hosp admission 
 267 8/03/2004 7:09:52 PM GP posted another patients report by physician and had no info when  
 seeing his/her patient 
 268 8/03/2004 7:24:59 PM Enema given to severely neutropaenic patient, contraindicated practice 
 269 8/03/2004 7:42:09 PM Long delayed treatment of gastritis due to failure of specialist to  
 communicate gastroscopy results with GP 
 270 9/03/2004 5:18:31 PM Delayed diagnosis/treatment of skin lesion requiring excision 
 271 9/03/2004 6:46:29 PM Incorrect dose of antihypertensive medn dispensed at pharmacy 
 272 10/03/2004 9:09:23 AM Prescribed a contraindicated medn (Tramal) to patient on an SSRI  
 causing serotonergic syndrome despite MD 
 273 10/03/2004 12:08:45 PM Warfarin mismanagement; gave Daktarin oral gel to patient on warfarin,  
 on home visit without computer to missed interaction, high INR and  
 hospital admission required 
 274 10/03/2004 9:16:47 PM Misdiagnosis of atopic eczema resulting in patient experiencing adverse  
 effects of unnecessary antibiotic medn 
 275 10/03/2004 9:26:58 PM NOT AN ERROR - adverse effect of morphine appropriately prescribed 
 276 15/03/2004 6:28:15 PM Patient discharged from hospital with no follow up arrangements and  
 staples still in wound post-op 
 277 16/03/2004 10:47:47 PM Patient given 60mg of Morphine rather than 20mg by mistake intra- 
 Operatively during emergency LSCS 
 278 18/03/2004 12:22:55 PM GP missed a report of an abnormal nuchal fold result, patient didn't find  
 out until 16 weeks of any problem 
 279 19/03/2004 1:12:06 PM Computer prescription written with incorrect patient name 
 280 19/03/2004 1:19:14 PM Missed reading MSU results and UTI worsened in NH patient 
 281 25/03/2004 1:35:07 PM GP unable to admit psychiatric patient requiring admission due to lack of  
 mental health beds 
 282 26/03/2004 2:52:57 PM Warfarin mismanagement; hospital discharged patient commenced on  
 warfarin post MV replacement with no safe follow up plan in place 
 283 26/03/2004 4:21:01 PM Delayed diagnosis of glioblastoma with normal CT brain due to MRI not  
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 being performed earlier 
 284 29/03/2004 9:55:28 AM Computer technical problems resulted in loss of online Australian  
 Medicines Handbook for several months 
 285 29/03/2004 12:12:59 PM Perforated colon, peritonitis, ileostomy and protracted admission as  
 result of endoscopy 
 286 30/03/2004 12:34:24 PM Missed giving HIB vac to 4 mo old due to confusion resulting from new  
 computer template on MD software 
 287 30/03/2004 12:40:04 PM Consultation report from a/hours locum reported giving pethidine to child  
 with throat infection when child had not been given any 
 288 31/03/2004 2:29:57 PM Patient ceased progesterone HRT component and had PV bleeding due to 
  misunderstanding GP instruction 
 289 31/03/2004 2:39:20 PM Incorrect advice given to patient by GP regarding prognosis of complex  
 health problem, AS and Ca lung resulting in failure to treat Ca optimally 
 290 7/04/2004 3:48:55 PM Patient injured by surgery furniture (cut leg on exam. couch) 
 291 11/04/2004 11:48:11 AM Practice nurse overloaded with verbal instructions from GPs and nearly  
 gave incorrect injection, changed to written 
 292 11/04/2004 11:56:28 AM Warfarin management problem and INR elevated, multiple docs involved 
 contributing to problem 
 293 11/04/2004 12:03:20 PM Contraindicated medication prescribed (penicillin in allergic patient, hand  
 written notes being used 
 294 11/04/2004 12:13:43 PM Delayed treatment of child with potential testicular torsion due to  
 message handling problems 
 295 14/04/2004 4:22:15 PM Incorrect repeat prescription given, communication problem 
 296 14/04/2004 10:42:29 PM Patient given injection for muscle spasm into wrong leg 
 297 20/04/2004 1:41:34 PM Patient had inadequate discharge planning, resulting in refracture of hip  
 after THR on day 2 post d/c 
 298 20/04/2004 2:03:18 PM Patient suffered vasovagal after lignocaine injection for minor procedure 
  
 299 20/04/2004 6:12:19 PM Dementia patient from UK inappropriately placed in hostel by family due 
 to cost of nursing home, fractured hip when fell from bed due to level of 
 300 21/04/2004 4:34:09 PM Anxiety symptoms of patient worsened after switching from Cipramil to 
 Lexapro 
 301 22/04/2004 10:14:08 AM Mistaking identity of patient, GP made inappropriate comment about  
 relationship problems with husband 
 302 22/04/2004 9:48:25 PM Wrong patient given antibiotics, correct patient had delay in treatment,  
 due to misfiling of MSU report 
 303 26/04/2004 11:48:34 AM Patient prescribed out of stock item 
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 304 27/04/2004 11:47:41 AM Misdiagnosis of GORD, delayed diagnosis of cholecystitis/cholelithiasis  
 by hospital ED over 18 months 
 305 1/05/2004 9:07:22 PM Failure of follow-up high blood glucose/ pathology result, patient  
 presented to ED with hyperglycaemia 
 306 1/05/2004 9:24:20 PM Pharmacist dispensed incorrect dose Epilim 
 307 6/05/2004 7:18:07 AM Pharmacist incorrectly dispensed Mogadon instead of Maxalon, patient  
 Sedated 
 308 6/05/2004 7:41:40 AM Misdiagnosis of hypothyroidism by another GP, delayed diagnosis of  
 309 6/05/2004 7:54:09 AM Delayed diagnosis of Mycoplasma pneumonia in child 
 310 8/05/2004 2:22:43 PM Perforated tympanic membrane as a result of ear syringing 
 311 8/05/2004 2:41:28 PM General thoughts on ethics of investing in companies that return profits  
 influencing choices of patient care 
 312 11/05/2004 11:04:08 AM Pathology reports that skin ca excisions narrow or incomplete, but on re- 
 excision no residual disease found and patient therefore underwent  
 unnecessary minor surgery 
 313 11/05/2004 1:29:29 PM Incorrect dose of morphine given in nursing home 
 314 11/05/2004 1:49:48 PM Lab phoned INR to practice; message taking problem at reception  
 resulted in incorrect dose adjustment of warfarin 
 315 11/05/2004 2:59:55 PM Patient complaint "GP trawling for business" because GP sent recall letter 
  for BP check, when check was not done at visit in previous week about  
 unrelated matter.  GP felt his/her computer recall system being used  
 more effectively could have prevented. 
 316 11/05/2004 3:09:21 PM Patient inappropriately treated with antipsychotic medn when actually  
 had depression with no psychotic features 
 317 11/05/2004 4:32:27 PM Rabies vaccine recall by company and patients required to have further  
 2 injections due to live virus found in related batch 
 318 11/05/2004 6:58:25 PM Patient discharged from hospital inappropriately post-operatively,  
 possibly after a fall and CVA within 24 hrs post -op at the hospital;  
 cancellation of surgery caused extended period off aspirin possibly  
 contributing to a CVA 
 319 11/05/2004 7:02:34 PM prescription error on computer, failed to provide adequate quantity of  
 medn, lack of checking printed material 
 320 11/05/2004 11:40:02 PM Failure to appropriately examine patient with chest pain in psychiatric  
 hospital caused delay in diagnosis of shingles and inadequate treatment 
 321 11/05/2004 11:45:18 PM Pharmacist dispensed incorrect dose of Prothiaden, patient experienced  
 severe side effects of increased medn 
 322 12/05/2004 4:27:49 PM GP has inadequate follow-up systems to ensure requested investigations 
  are done and patients appropriately followed up.  GP gave example of  
 patient who had not had lipids and resting ECG ordered as screen, and  
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 then during chest pain presented for requested ECG 
 323 13/05/2004 1:19:03 PM Failed to contact patient and arrange further care following an abnormal  
 mammogram, delay of 1 month until patient contacted GP for result 
 324 14/05/2004 1:04:41 PM Incorrect Xray films given to patient and incorrect referral written based  
 on these, same surname different first names 
 325 18/05/2004 8:59:59 AM Prescription written on computer with previous patients name 
 326 18/05/2004 11:38:44 PM Local hospital nursing administration refused to accept transfer due to  
 cost of extra nursing staff to open a bed resulting in distress, cost and  
 inconvenience for family 
 327 18/05/2004 11:46:29 PM Pharmacist told patient that no medn scripts left, when authority repeats  
 had been provided by GP 
 328 18/05/2004 11:56:44 PM Patient failed to attend urologist after referred for a raised PSA, and no  
 recall in place to check that significant pathology (PSA) was followed up 
 329 19/05/2004 10:29:42 AM Delay in examination and treatment of skin cancer in nursing home  
 patient due to hospital specialist who was on leave being sent request  
 from nursing staff to see lesion rather than GP, and no communication to 
 GP from NH or hospital 
 330 19/05/2004 3:06:52 PM Poor recall system and patient education resulted in 5 year F/U post Ca  
 gall bladder CT scan not being organised, and subsequent Ca of  
 pancreas developed which may have been found at an earlier stage if  
 this scan was routinely performed. 
 331 19/05/2004 6:47:16 PM Recurrent problem of choosing wrong dosage of medication from  
 computer drop down list, usually picked up by pharmacist 
 332 20/05/2004 12:39:24 PM SAH and parietal skull fracture post trauma missed by both ED on day  
 of injury and another GP 2 days later, patient seen by reporting GP day  
 3 who investigated and diagnosed correctly 
 333 21/05/2004 1:25:53 PM Pharmacist dispensed incorrect medication - Lasix instead of Lipex 
 334 21/05/2004 1:31:53 PM Patient given incorrect medication in hostel webster pack for 2 days after 
  staff and pharmacist failed to make adjustments after GP changed  
 335 21/05/2004 5:57:38 PM Patient sent for unnecessary lumbar spine Xray one month after already  
 had this test, due to GP incorrectly completing request form when had  
 meant to request lumbar CT 
 336 21/05/2004 11:55:44 PM Young woman with severe pneumonia inappropriately managed (wrong  
 medication regime) by hospital VMO when initially referred to district  
 337 22/05/2004 10:07:11 AM Incorrect patient computer file opened and used during consultation due  
 to similar names 
 338 23/05/2004 10:13:24 PM Incorrect dose of prednisone dispensed by pharmacist resulting in 6 week  
 delay in symptom control of rheumatoid arthritis 
 339 24/05/2004 11:36:00 AM Incorrect management of Ca breast with lumpectomy initially undertaken  
 rather than mastectomy, due to incorrect interpretation of initial  
 investigations, patient requires more surgery 
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 340 24/05/2004 2:16:45 PM GP on call was not able to be contacted overnight resulting in delay for  
 patient needing medical attention, inconvenience for ambulance, hospital  
 nursing staff and second doctor 
 341 24/05/2004 6:21:05 PM Pharmacist dispensed out of date typhoid vaccines to two patients 
 342 24/05/2004 7:09:33 PM Patient had elective surgery TURP cancelled unnecessarily when hilar  
 lymphadenopathy was seen on CXR, then sent for a CT, however due to  
 lack of old written records not being readily visible on computer record  
 system in practice, it was missed that this was known about and  
 investigated nearly 10 years previously and there was no change from  
 the previous investigations 
 343 24/05/2004 7:16:34 PM Incorrect dosage of medication selected from computer drop down list in  
 prescribing software for antimalarial treatment 
 344 24/05/2004 10:09:47 PM Fatal haemorrhage in patient with terminal disease due partly to warfarin  
 mismanagement and over-anticoagulation, INR not checked when medn  
 Changed 
 345 25/05/2004 11:44:54 AM Same childhood immunisation given twice by mistake 
 346 26/05/2004 5:35:07 PM Patient sat in blood contamination on patient chair in doctor's office after  
 venipuncture of previous patient. The patient failed to hear GP say not  
 to sit down when GP noticed the blood and left the room to attend first  
 patient and get cleaning organised. 
 347 27/05/2004 1:11:25 PM GP missed reading complete pathology report with a positive syphilis  
 serology, delay of 2 weeks in informing patient 
 348 27/05/2004 3:43:32 PM Patient on warfarin requiring home collection for INR delayed for 4 days  
 and was under-anticoagulated during this wait, due to reception/pathology  
 miscommunication and a second patient of NESB (not on warfarin) being  
 visited by mistake and having INR taken 
 349 29/05/2004 11:54:36 AM Pharmacist dispensed incorrect dose medn resulting in double amount  
 prescribed being taken by patient 
 350 29/05/2004 12:11:19 PM Delayed diagnosis of urinary retention with overflow, misdiagnosed and  
 managed as recurrent UTI due to inadequate examination 
 351 30/05/2004 4:07:06 PM Difficult to get timely specialist appointments in this region for  
 neurology, ENT, paediatrics and obstetrics 
 352 30/05/2004 4:15:40 PM Delay in management of torticollis in neonate due to local hospital  
 appointment records poorly kept and patient turned away by reception 
 353 30/05/2004 4:25:07 PM Unable to obtain angiograms for high risk cardiac patients in a timely  
 manner in this region, waiting 6 weeks privately and 2 months publicly 
 354 30/05/2004 4:29:24 PM Local hospital staff refused to give information about patient's progress  
 to the patient's GP, citing "privacy act" as reason 
 355 30/05/2004 4:34:44 PM Poor follow-up arrangements for patient with Ca kidney post hospital  
 discharge after nephrectomy, with no information on histopathology being 
  sent to GP, and surgeon going on leave 
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 356 30/05/2004 6:20:31 PM Pharmacist dispensed Lanoxin 250 mcg instead of 62.5 mcg; error  
 picked up by patient's wife prior to medn being taken 
 357 31/05/2004 12:16:32 PM Problem with downloading Xray results to patient record electronically,  
 and potential for delay in appropriate management with serious  
 consequences had the patient not re-presented with hard copy 
 358 31/05/2004 12:45:55 PM Hospital resident in ED missed Colles fracture of forearm on Xray, and  
 failed to check formal report from radiologist, resulting in delay in  
 359 31/05/2004 1:21:07 PM Pharmacist incorrectly dispensed Zantac syrup to child instead of  
 Ventolin syrup.  Patient had been administered medn by mother before  
 picked up by pharmacist and rectified 
 360 31/05/2004 1:35:59 PM Sudden death of patient for unknown reason; in previous 24 hours had  
 INR reading of 6.8 and refused to attend hospital when contacted that  
 evening by reporting GP, morning of death was given a subcut Vit K  
 injection by usual LMO when continued to refuse to attend hospital.   
 Reporting GP speculates that possible self harm and missed diagnosis of 
  depression could be cause of death. 
 361 31/05/2004 1:46:50 PM Warfarin mismanaged by patient (?and another GP), resulting in INR of  
 5.8 untreated for 2 weeks.  GP comments "warfarin therapy is a  
 nightmare!” 
 362 31/05/2004 10:24:30 PM GP failed to diagnose extensive DVT for 4 days, picked up by colleague 
 363 31/05/2004 10:38:44 PM GP left a/hours message to contact him/her via local hospital; Poor  
 Communication between GP on call and hospital staff answering phone  
 after hours in ED; GP unable to be contacted because hospital staff  
 didn't know his or her whereabouts or contact details. 
 364 31/05/2004 10:52:32 PM Delayed diagnosis of lung cancer with chest wall pain mimicking  
 Radiculopathy 
 365 3/06/2004 2:19:28 PM Prescription printed with incorrect name using computer, forgot to change 
  patient file, family member with same surname being seen at same time 
 366 3/06/2004 2:25:51 PM Was using incorrect patient computer file of patient with same name for  
 some of consultation; new software doesn't display address 
 367 3/06/2004 10:25:05 PM GP forgot to do a home visit due to staff forgetting to put out patient  
 file, no standard booking system in place; visit delayed for a day 
 368 6/06/2004 3:58:01 PM Patient had prolonged period of NBM and an unnecessary cannula left in  
 wrist for 24 hours due to communication failure between radiologist and  
 nursing staff after a CT at base hospital 
 369 6/06/2004 4:17:27 PM Misdiagnosis of fractured NOF by orthopaedic surgeon based on  
 misinterpretation of CT resulted in pain for patient, incorrect  
 management, weight bearing and eventual disintegration of fracture 5  
 days later requiring more complex surgery and possibly poorer outcomes 
 370 6/06/2004 6:04:44 PM GP prescribed a medication that was out of stock at pharmacy,  
 substitution provided by pharmacist (Donnatabs instead of Donnalix), but 
  GP feels no system in place for letting them know about out of stock  
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 371 7/06/2004 11:11:31 AM Incorrect management of head injury with LOC by ED at major teaching  
 hospital; failed to do neuro obs, clean wound properly, provide antibiotic  
 cover or give instructions re what to consider post trauma or to do if  
 headaches/ symptoms persist 
 372 7/06/2004 12:19:26 PM Incorrect patient details written on file resulted in misinformation to  
 pharmacy and pathology 
 373 7/06/2004 12:37:01 PM Incorrect management of chest pain by GP on home visit; no ECG, left  
 at home in pain, no follow-up, on BG of SVT and CCF, possible further  
 AMI and cardiac deterioration 
 374 7/06/2004 3:17:47 PM Patient prescription printed with incorrect name from previous patient's  
 computer file 
 375 9/06/2004 1:34:05 PM Radiologists providing conflicting reports on CT scan findings 
 376 10/06/2004 2:58:19 PM Recall system failed in that GP called same patient back twice by  
 mistake to discuss results (CIN3 on Pap) 
 377 10/06/2004 3:03:58 PM Pathology Lab performed incorrect test on specimen sent (MCS instead  
 of drug screen on urine sample) 
 378 10/06/2004 11:39:31 PM NO ERROR - lost info, TAPS website related 
 379 11/06/2004 9:49:53 AM Reception staff incorrectly gave out confidential medical information by  
 380 11/06/2004 10:03:22 AM Patient took double doses of medication after hospital discharge due to  
 poor education from hospital staff and generic medication brands  
 supplied duplicating meds at home 
 381 11/06/2004 10:20:49 AM Incorrect pathology request form provided with PAP slide due to printing  
 request from previous patient's computer file 
 382 11/06/2004 11:24:03 AM Child fell off examination couch with GP present writing notes when  
 mother left room to attend another child; no injury 
 383 11/06/2004 5:58:07 PM Patient had serious injury to leg/ deep laceration requiring hospitalisation  
 when getting down from GP examination couch 
 384 13/06/2004 8:53:58 AM Patient prescribed a contraindicated medication; GP noted allergy but  
 forgot about it later on during consult when writing script; pharmacy  
 385 13/06/2004 7:49:44 PM GP felt he/she had placed too much pressure on practice staff to  
 complete 'tasks' (?administrative) and not seen to patient's medical  
 outcomes with delay in instituting management 
 386 13/06/2004 8:00:16 PM GP feels guidelines around abnormal PSA and LFTs are not clear enough  
 and causing management dilemmas 
 387 15/06/2004 12:36:33 PM Patient given another person's lab results and incorrect advice 
 388 15/06/2004 3:48:18 PM Hospital missed diagnosis of pneumonia in patient assessed in ED;  
 hospital failed to follow up CXR results on test they ordered; hospital  
 failed to forward test results to GP; patient's treatment of pneumonia was 
 delayed by 2 weeks 
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 389 16/06/2004 10:33:00 AM ED Dr failed to order CXR in patient with SOB and multiple probs;  
 Incorrect diagnosis of LVF made by ED Dr in  patient with small cell  
 carcinoma;  inadequate discharge communication with GP and no  
 follow up arrangements made by ED; CXR ordered by GP after  
 representation with stridor and SOB was incorrectly reported by  
 Radiologist missing mediastinal mass nodes 
 390 17/06/2004 6:58:40 PM Incorrect lab result reported on methadone urine screen 
 391 19/06/2004 8:59:44 PM Abnormal pathology result (TSH) missed by GP; practice staff told  
 patient abnormal result without GPs knowledge even though hadn't been  
 signed off by GP; delay in treatment of hypothyroidism 
 392 19/06/2004 9:06:13 PM Patient in Nursing home on two similar medications (omeprazole and  
 ranitidine) by mistake, GP didn't check medn carefully when recharting 
 393 20/06/2004 12:24:16 PM Issued prescription in incorrect patient name 
 394 20/06/2004 4:42:24 PM Lack of advice given to patient regarding managing potential side effects 
 of new antidepressant medication 
 395 22/06/2004 12:26:50 AM Patient consultation recorded in another patient's computer file with same 
 name; prescription issued for patient with wrong address details; two  
 patient's with same names issued scripts from same computer file, both  
 left scripts at same pharmacy at same time, and all medication collected 
 by the patient with correct address details (problem picked up by  
 pharmacist when second patient returned for medication that had been  
 collected by someone else) 
 396 22/06/2004 12:42:17 AM unsterilised equipment used in ear syringing resulting in patient  
 contracting otitis externa 
 397 24/06/2004 11:51:04 AM Patient details incorrectly entered into computer resulting in test results  
 not downloading correctly to patient file 
 398 24/06/2004 4:11:00 PM Problems with implementing new computer business management  
 programme, lack of support, staff and patients irate and waiting 
 399 29/06/2004 9:21:19 AM Incorrect treatment decision for cellulitis by hospital Dr; incorrect  
 investigations for cellulitis taken by hospital doctor; incorrect information  
 on hospital discharge summary 
 400 30/06/2004 11:38:47 PM GP missed reading FBC results in patient requiring transfusion, treatment 
  delayed by 3 weeks, receptionist filed result without Dr initials 
 401 5/07/2004 1:24:09 PM GP failed to check UECs after starting ACE and CRF worsened 
 402 5/07/2004 10:29:25 PM Patient died of renal failure as complication of COX2 for pain  
 management on background of complex medical problems.  GP felt may  
 be error in whether patient understood risks associated with the drug, also 
  error in not involving specialists earlier for management advice 
 403 5/07/2004 10:37:11 PM Hospital discharged patient with inadequate supply of medication;  
 hospital failed to educate patient about new medication regime, thus  
 inadequate treatment until GP attended 2 days post discharge 
 404 6/07/2004 8:46:20 PM Receptionist issued incorrect receipt and patient was unable to claim  
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 correct Medicare rebate 
 405 7/07/2004 9:48:32 AM Patient self-medicated with wife's antibiotics resulting in allergic reaction  
 itch and angioedema, cross reaction with Ceclor/penicillin 
 406 7/07/2004 3:34:55 PM GP collected blood test for PTH in wrong tube 
 407 8/07/2004 1:18:12 PM Failure to follow up abnormal MSU in pregnant patient.  Failure to treat  
 UTI in pregnant patient, resulting in pyelonephritis 
 408 8/07/2004 1:23:42 PM Incorrect management of abnormal screening GTT in pregnancy, patient  
 did not have formal follow-up investigation or diabetic education, and was  
 hyperglycaemic in late pregnancy 
 409 8/07/2004 5:20:44 PM Incorrect lab result reported leading to patient believing non-viable  
 410 11/07/2004 4:41:20 PM MSU failure to follow up abnormal result and child with abdo pain not  
 treated - sent result to wrong specialist and didn't follow up with patient 
 411 11/07/2004 4:59:14 PM Private hospital ED physician inappropriately discharged a seriously ill  
 head injured patient who presented there.  ED told GP who called to  
 complain (when family later informed him/her of situation) that it was due 
  to no beds, and patient went home bleeding and drowsy with a subdural  
 412 13/07/2004 6:10:38 PM Communication failure with NESB patient, resulted in failure to comply  
 with medn dosage instructions in cardiac failure treatment and serious  
 cardiac event 
 413 13/07/2004 6:17:51 PM Incorrect drug prescribed due to wrong choice from computer drop down  
 list; incorrect number of repeats issued due to default setting on  
 computer program 
 414 14/07/2004 2:22:44 PM Insufficient follow up procedures in place and pathology result of  
 anaemia not appropriately followed, related to poor understanding of  
 computer program 
 415 14/07/2004 2:35:26 PM Inadequate investigation, diagnosis and treatment in ED for  
 Hydronephrosis and ureteric obstruction, in presence of newly diagnosed  
 uterine cancer which was the underlying problem - GP had made diagnosis 
 but presumes hospital Dr didn't read referral letter and failed to treat  
 threatened kidney appropriately 
 416 15/07/2004 10:05:51 AM child given 4yo immunisations twice by mistake, absence of 'blue book' 
 417 16/07/2004 12:35:12 PM NO ERROR REORTED 
 418 18/07/2004 8:40:54 PM Failure of medical services to be culturally accessible or acceptable to  
 aboriginal patient - resulting in development of likely metastatic bowel  
 cancer over three years.  Original error was failure of patient to follow up  
 on abdo mass with surgical referral, then 3 years later a failure for  
 patient to accept investigation and treatment recommendations when  
 presented to hospital with likely metastatic Bowel Ca 
 419 19/07/2004 2:42:20 PM Delayed diagnosis of abdominal hernia in pregnant patient perhaps due to 
  insufficient care with examination 
 420 19/07/2004 10:48:14 PM Patient discharged from hospital with no medn and no understanding of  
 new medn regime, with some medns missed by patient until GP visit day 
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 421 19/07/2004 10:56:34 PM Inadequate information in hospital discharge summary - failed to inform  
 of a blood transfusion post-operatively 
 422 19/07/2004 11:11:47 PM Patient given a referral to specialist in mother's name, had to be rewritten 
  and faxed over 
 423 21/07/2004 2:47:23 PM NH staff gave a medication which had not been ordered 
 424 21/07/2004 2:50:27 PM Medication ceased by GP, but continued to be given by NH staff 
 425 21/07/2004 6:15:46 PM Government agency requesting confidential patient information without  
 patient's consent 
 426 23/07/2004 2:15:00 PM Consultation notes entered into another patient's file with same name, but 
  as new patient, no contact details known 
 427 28/07/2004 2:18:10 PM Pharmacy dispensed medication for a patient in her husband's name,  
 who could have inadvertently taken it with his multiple other meds 
 428 28/07/2004 7:07:40 PM Patient suffered BP medn side effect (bradycardia) from interaction  
 contributed to by GP failure to adjust other medn 
 429 28/07/2004 7:10:48 PM Patient was assessed by ED although had contacted GP office first and  
 should have been advised to come there for assessment, due to poor  
 phone triage procedures at practice 
 430 29/07/2004 4:10:10 PM NH home patient in abdominal pain left unattended by staff overnight 
 431 29/07/2004 4:20:33 PM GP had to return to NH as had charted meds incompletely 
 432 29/07/2004 9:16:57 PM prolonged wait for angiogram in uninsured patient, fault with cardiologist's  
 booking procedures with this patient group 
 433 1/08/2004 7:25:59 PM GP generated computer script with incorrect dose of antihypertensive  
 medication by pulling up an old one and changing date rather than  
 generating new one; patient noticed mistake due to weaker strength tablet 
 being different colour 
 434 1/08/2004 7:34:35 PM Lawyer requested patient MRI results but did not provide patient consent  
 for release of medical records 
 435 3/08/2004 1:58:20 PM Patient with mental illness threatened safety of GP and staff; angry as a 
  result of being refused approval to become a school bus driver 
 436 3/08/2004 9:57:38 PM Unacceptable waiting time for specialist review of patient with PV  
 bleeding; GP called specialist and sent to ED for review as per advice,  
 but communication/ procedure problems btw GP, specialist and ED and  
 patient sent home by ED due to inadequate referral letter and lack of call 
 prior from GP 
 437 8/08/2004 11:31:23 AM Difficulty using the computer record system vaccine section due to poor 
 setup/ user interface in this section when deviating from standard  
 Schedule 
 438 8/08/2004 11:41:10 AM Practice nurse stocked DTPaHepB section of fridge with fluvax  
 accidentally due to similar looking packaging 
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 439 10/08/2004 9:16:51 AM Poor incision technique whilst doing wedge resection great toenail caused  
 slip and deep cut to toe 
 440 10/08/2004 11:28:58 AM Incorrect follow-up testing of borderline GTT in pregnancy caused late  
 detection and management of gestational diabetes 
 441 11/08/2004 8:23:53 PM Miscommunication between patient and GP regarding continuation of a  
 medication when a script with repeats was issued caused patient to cease 
  rather than continue 
 442 12/08/2004 12:19:22 PM Delay in diagnosis of pancreatitis as SE of Klacid; initial misdiagnosis of  
 abdo pain as GI upset from antibiotic and treated with antiemetic; also  
 had delayed assessment in ED of patient when presented there for  
 assessment; both delays possible contributors to patient death from  
 multi-organ failure 
 443 14/08/2004 1:49:46 PM Delay in home visiting patient for 2 weeks who usually has monthly  
 home visits caused unchecked development of pulmonary oedema which 
  required hospital admission 
 444 14/08/2004 2:00:46 PM Patient delayed consulting GP with pain symptoms because felt  
 uncomfortable with Dr's interpersonal skills at previous visit - Dr had  
 been “cranky” 
 445 14/08/2004 7:42:07 PM Delay in elderly patients seeking acute hospital care due to perception  
 from TV programme that hospitals withhold treatments from elderly  
 patients and let them die - language barriers may contribute 
 446 15/08/2004 1:37:25 PM Mistakenly gave Meningococcal C vaccine to child who had been  
 vaccinated previously because failed to check vaccination record prior to 
 administering it and parent unaware that she had had it, and presented  
 requesting the vaccine 
 447 15/08/2004 4:45:14 PM Pharmacist mistakenly dispensed double strength antibiotic to child than  
 had been prescribed 
 448 16/08/2004 10:06:42 AM Pathology sent incomplete report on results 
 449 16/08/2004 10:13:35 AM Diabetic patient sent for pathology tests and GP forgot to request  
 HbA1c, resulting in patient requiring repeat testing sooner than usual 
 450 16/08/2004 10:32:23 AM Hospital and community nursing communication failure on patient with  
 DVT discharge from hospital, meant nurses did not attend to give BD  
 Clexane and patient had to present to surgery and ED over weekend for  
 Injections 
 451 16/08/2004 6:05:54 PM GP accidentally charted incorrect ACE inhibitor medication for post AMI  
 patient in hospital 
 452 17/08/2004 4:02:55 PM Prescription and referral letter generated on computer using incorrect  
 patient details 
 453 18/08/2004 3:04:37 PM Nursing staff in N/Home discontinued a medication without consulting  
 patient's GP 
 454 18/08/2004 4:45:46 PM Misdiagnosis of child sexual abuse by GPs at another practice;  
 inappropriate management of possible child sexual abuse case by GPs at 
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 another practice with failure to appropriately refer to suitable place for  
 Assessment 
 455 18/08/2004 5:14:55 PM Failure to diagnose and appropriately treat/remove a FB in child's ear by  
 GP at another practice; GP refused to listen to patient's parent who said  
 that the child had never had grommets, and insisted FB was a grommet 
 456 18/08/2004 5:25:23 PM Failure to diagnose and appropriately treat patient with acute spinal cord  
 compression by another GP 
 457 22/08/2004 2:23:39 PM Patient discharged from teaching hospital after admission for pneumonia  
 with acute monoarthritis of ankle and no apparent assessment or  
 treatment;  GP sent patient back, and after admission for a further week  
 patient was discharged abruptly due to bed pressures with incorrect  
 discharge summary diagnosis, discharge summary medications, and no  
 medication issued 
 458 23/08/2004 3:31:57 PM Patient prescribed contraindicated antibiotic and had allergic reaction  
 despite computer records 
 459 25/08/2004 11:50:53 AM Failure to follow up pathology results for 3 months delayed investigation  
 of anaemia 
 460 25/08/2004 11:58:54 AM On a home visit, lowered medication strength but failed to change on  
 computer records back at the practice, so subsequent repeat script was  
 issued with incorrect higher dose 
 461 26/08/2004 4:47:40 PM Confusion over whether 12 year old was having paediatric or adult HepB  
 Vaccination schedule, incorrectly gave paediatric dose and required  
 second needle; inadequate record keeping of vaccine types in notes 
 462 30/08/2004 10:28:22 PM Patient left phone message with reception requesting GP to call her back, 
  lost message with patient name and number 
 463 30/08/2004 10:46:38 PM Patient unable to arrange transport to surgery from hostel delayed  
 diagnosis of acute infected arthritis; Lack of triaging messages to GP by 
  practice reception delayed action on charting and returning a changed  
 medication plan for hostel patient; Hostel management failure to institute  
 medication changes over a weekend 
 464 31/08/2004 11:24:19 PM Delay in nursing staff administering charted antibiotic treatment for  
 bacterial diarrhoea in hospital for 2 days 
 465 2/09/2004 6:07:16 PM Misdiagnosis of bacterial conjunctivitis by pharmacist and delay in  
 Appropriate treatment 
 466 3/09/2004 8:20:27 PM Lack of follow up in place for abnormal PSA and glucose delayed further  
 investigation for 6 months 
 467 3/09/2004 9:25:33 PM Lack of recall in place for repeating ultrasound in patient who had had a  
 previous orchidopexy 
 468 4/09/2004 8:04:36 PM Pathology request printed with incorrect details due to generating from  
 previous patient's computer file 
 469 4/09/2004 8:28:40 PM Patient with ovarian cancer and thrombosed subclavian line commenced  
 on warfarin prior to hospital discharge , but no appropriate follow up by  
 GP or hospital specialist for 3 weeks resulted in INR 12 and readmission  
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 for IV Vit K and FFP plus multiple costly investigations 
 470 4/09/2004 8:40:34 PM Mistakenly recorded pathology results in computer records of another  
 patient of similar name and age; patient who had not had a blood test  
 given the results of another patient by mistake 
 471 4/09/2004 8:48:01 PM Accidentally wrote a script for panadeine instead of panadeine forte 
 472 6/09/2004 4:52:51 PM Nurse in NH gave incorrect antibiotic, then when realised, had a delay of  
 over 48 hours in getting and administering antibiotic treatment in patient  
 with osteomyelitis and skin infection in a nursing home contributing to  
 patient deterioration and death 
 473 6/09/2004 6:05:26 PM Misdiagnosed and treated paraseptal cellulitis as dacryocystitis 
 474 6/09/2004 6:14:37 PM Patient delayed following up abnormal pathology results with further  
 pathology tests requested by GP investigating anaemia; Patient failed to  
 correctly prepare for colonoscopy delaying investigation - possible  
 dementia contributing to communication breakdown 
 475 7/09/2004 11:08:42 AM GP was allowing patient to self-adjust warfarin doses and patient's INR  
 went to 8 resulting in hospitalisation for retroperitoneal bleed 
 476 7/09/2004 2:35:59 PM Failure of ED to correctly investigate and diagnose fracture in child with  
 wrist pain, did not Xray 
 477 8/09/2004 4:49:46 PM Missed diagnosing lower limb DVT 
 478 10/09/2004 1:28:16 PM inadequate medical record keeping by other GP at practice 
 479 14/09/2004 2:24:05 PM GP made misjudgement of patient's clinical situation and feels they  
 incorrectly issued prescription for benzodiazepine to patient who was  
 addicted and altered the dose on script 
 480 18/09/2004 9:47:26 AM Discharged from hospital with duplicate medications in generic names,  
 causing patient confusion 
 481 18/09/2004 9:51:14 AM Warfarin commenced by specialist cardiologist without appropriate  
 Explanation of drug risks and side effects or arranging and explaining  
 Appropriate monitoring of INR 
 482 18/09/2004 7:06:33 PM Delay in seeing patient requiring palliative care due to time pressures 
 483 18/09/2004 8:50:06 PM Long delay in returning call to patient who needed phone advice on  
 medication for cough - solo GP feeling pressured and unable to meet  
 484 19/09/2004 7:35:55 PM Patient prescribed and administered antibiotic to which was allergic in  
 Nursing Home 
 485 22/09/2004 10:31:55 AM GP prescribed an ear medication that had been discontinued 
 486 23/09/2004 2:11:44 PM Joint infection in hip caused by intra-articular steroid injection by  
 Radiologist 
 487 27/09/2004 5:11:31 PM GP forgot to make house call after taking message him/herself but not  
 recording details appropriately 
 488 27/09/2004 5:46:00 PM Practice equipment missing - paediatric BP cuff - impaired emergency  
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 assessment of patient 
 489 28/09/2004 5:33:22 PM Prescription written with incorrect patient name - using brother's file  
 490 29/09/2004 6:07:15 AM Misdiagnosis of cerebral haemorrhage due to misinterpretation of CT  
 results by ED doctor resulted in unnecessary cessation of warfarin  
 491 29/09/2004 6:28:12 AM Patient with poor mental functioning was using two surnames at practice  
 and so had two files both with incorrect medication summaries;  
 medication added to regime resulted in over sedation as used the chart  
 492 29/09/2004 3:01:56 PM Gave HepB vaccine 3 months early due to failure to check records prior  
 To injection 
 493 29/09/2004 3:05:35 PM Prescription generated from incorrect patient computer file, similar name 
 494 29/09/2004 3:08:20 PM Prescription generated from incorrect patient computer file, similar name 
 495 29/09/2004 10:19:14 PM Pharmacy dispensed medication with incorrect dosage instructions 
 496 30/09/2004 7:13:32 AM Pharmacy dispensed tablet form of medication instead of SR capsule as 
  Prescribed 
 497 30/09/2004 7:33:23 AM Misfiled pathology results showing UTI in NH patient resulted in week  
 long delay in instituting appropriate treatment 
 498 30/09/2004 7:44:06 AM Patients paper based file lost in practice compromising follow-up care 
 499 30/09/2004 8:00:13 AM Patient booked in for review with wrong GP by mistake, complex case,  
 caused patient distress 
 500 30/09/2004 6:47:03 PM Pneumovax given to child instead of Prevenar, other GP, unfamiliar with  
 newer childhood vaccines, child under 5 so vaccine not recommended in  
 this age group 
 501 30/09/2004 6:55:49 PM Incorrect computer record used unknowingly by another GP seeing  
 patient with same name 
 502 30/09/2004 6:59:28 PM Incorrect DOB details recorded in patient computer file by reception staff 
 503 30/09/2004 7:03:54 PM Practice nurse collected fasting bloods using incorrect collection tubes  
 and patient had to fast again and have test repeated 
 504 30/09/2004 7:13:17 PM Incorrect patient name recorded on urine specimen jar, correct name on  
 lab request form, picked up by path lab but test had to be repeated 
 505 30/09/2004 9:59:17 PM Failed to give patient results of GTT showing IGT for 2 months, lack of  
 follow-up procedures for abnormal results 
 506 30/09/2004 10:56:00 PM Accidentally gave script for Flixotide when intended Seretide due to  
 confusion over which was combo medn, patient symptoms did not  
 507 30/09/2004 11:01:27 PM Pathology courier collected incorrect blood sample from practice when  
 GP called for urgent collection 
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Appendix 6: TAPS research publication describing the 
incidence of reported errors in general practice 
 
 
This appendix contains the original research publication appearing in the Medical 
Journal of Australia in July 2006 that describes the TAPS study methodology and 
results relating to the quantification of the incidence of reported error in general 
practice.
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Appendix 7: TAPS research publication describing a 
new taxonomy for general practice patient safety 
event reporting and proportions of error types  
 
 
This appendix contains the original research publication in the journal Quality and 
Safety in Health Care of the article ‘Patient safety events reported in general practice:  
a taxonomy’, which details the development and end result of the creation of the 
TAPS taxonomy, and the proportions of errors by type that occurred in the TAPS data 
set.  
 
IN PRESS, Accepted for publication 15th June 2007 
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ABSTRACT 
Objective 
To develop a taxonomy describing patient safety events in General Practice from 
reports submitted by a random representative sample of General Practitioners (GPs), 
and to determine proportions of reported event types. 
 
Design 
433 reports received by the Threats to Australian Patient Safety (TAPS) study were 
analysed by three investigating GPs, classifying event types contained.  Agreement 
between investigators was recorded as the taxonomy developed.    
 
Setting and Participants 
84 volunteers from a random sample of 320 GPs, previously shown to be 
representative of 4666 GPs in NSW, Australia.   
 
Main Outcome Measures 
Taxonomy, agreement of investigators coding, proportions of error types.   
 
Results 
A three level taxonomy resulted.  At the first level, errors relating to the processes of 
health care (type 1) were more common than those relating to deficiencies in the 
knowledge and skills of health professionals (type 2) at 69% and 31% respectively.  
At the second level, five type 1 themes were identified:  Health care systems (21%); 
investigations (12%); medications (20%); other treatments (3%); and communication 
(13%).  Two type 2 themes were identified: Diagnosis (12%) and management (19%).  
Level three comprised 35 descriptors of the themes.  Good inter-coder agreement was 
demonstrated with an overall kappa score of 0.66.  A least two out of three 
investigators independently agreed on event classification in 92% of cases.   
 
Conclusions 
The proposed taxonomy for reported events in General Practice provides a 
comprehensible tool for clinicians describing threats to patient safety, and could be 
built into reporting systems to remove difficulties arising from coder interpretation of 
events.        Abstract word count = 250 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is little information available on the proportions of types of patient safety 
events that are reported in General Practice settings, and no taxonomy that is widely 
used by General Practitioners (GPs) to describe these events.   
 
Previous studies in primary care have provided descriptions of the relative proportions 
of different types of patient safety events that they have collected,[1-10] but none 
have been based upon a representative sample of primary care clinicians contributing 
data, and all have used different classification methods.   
 
In recent years, a small number of taxonomies of patient safety events related to a 
General Practice setting have been proposed,[7, 11-13] all based upon patient safety 
event reports collected from small non-random samples of participants.  They use 
both causative and descriptive elements of like themes to group events, sometimes 
referred to as ‘domain specific’ taxonomies.[14]   
 
‘Multiaxial taxonomies’ capture additional elements of an event, such as harm levels, 
location, participants or preventability.  One study has developed such a tool in a 
primary care setting in North America,[15, 16] although its full details have not been 
published in the scientific literature, and another has been suggested as one that could 
allow comparison of safety events across disciplines, although no trial of it in a 
primary care setting has been described.[17]   
 
There have also been some recent calls for classifications that address cognitive 
psychological processes,[18] with one developed for general practice,[14] also yet to 
be tested.  Finally, one taxonomy has been described that is based upon patients’ 
perceptions of harms in primary care, although it has a limited application in terms of 
categorizing causes of events.[19]   
 
The Threats to Australian Patient Safety (TAPS) study estimated the incidence of 
General Practitioner (GP) reported patient safety events in the community, using a 
method based upon a randomly selected representative sample of GPs.[20]  We found 
that limitations mainly relating to the internal validity of existing tools warranted 
further taxonomy development.  We aimed to develop a taxonomy that would be 
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comprehensible and practical for primary care clinicians to apply themselves, and we 
describe the first attempts to validate a taxonomy in terms of its reproducibility with 
GPs. 
 
METHODS 
The methods and definitions used in the TAPS study have been previously described, 
with 84 GPs in NSW anonymously reporting ‘errors’ (patient safety events) that they 
noted in their daily practice (including ambulatory clinics, hospital settings and 
residential aged care facilities) for a twelve month period via a secure on-line 
questionnaire.[20]  Approval for the study was obtained from the University of 
Sydney Human Research and Evaluation Ethics Committee.   
 
TAPS Taxonomy development  
Three GPs from the investigating team (MAM, SS and CBW) classified each report 
using an existing pilot taxonomy,[12] and results were compared to obtain a baseline 
measure of reproducibility.  Reports containing more than one event were given 
multiple codes in chronological order of events.  A report required two out of three 
reviewers in agreement to be assigned a classification.  Where three different codes 
had been assigned, the report was reviewed at a face to face meeting to determine its 
classification.  The initial taxonomy was amended and retested using one quarter of 
the reports each time, over four sessions, to produce the TAPS taxonomy.  A set of 
guidelines to improve coder consistency when using the taxonomy was also 
developed. 
 
Agreement of investigators developing the taxonomy 
Concordance amongst the coders was measured using the kappa statistic, for both the 
initial taxonomy and the final TAPS taxonomy.  Only one classification per report 
was included for the kappa score calculations.  If reports were assigned multiple 
classifications by one or more coders, the first classification most commonly assigned 
was included.  The kappa statistic can range from -1 (perfect disagreement) to +1 
(perfect agreement).  A kappa score of between 0.40 and 0.75 indicates fair 
agreement.[21, 22] All statistical analysis was performed using Stata 8.0 software.[23] 
 
RESULTS 
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Patient safety event numbers 
433 website submissions were received, with 415 containing true reports after 
discounting tests and reports with missing data (15), and reports that investigators 
deemed to have no patient safety event described within them (3).  Of the remaining 
415 reports, 320 contained one event, 82 contained two events, 11 contained three 
events, and 2 contained 4 events.    
 
The TAPS taxonomy 
The resulting taxonomy has 3 levels of classification.  The first level (‘event type’) 
relates to the underlying cause of the event, being either due to deficiencies in the 
process of delivering health care (type 1), or the knowledge and skills of health 
professionals (type 2).  The second level has five groupings (‘themes’) within type 1 
errors, and two groupings within type 2 errors.  The themes within type 1 are practice 
and health care systems, investigations, medications, non-medication treatments and 
communication. The type 2 themes are diagnosis and managing patient care.  At the 
third level there are from 3 to 9 ‘descriptors’ per theme.  .   
 
Table 1 shows raw counts and proportions of total events for each category of the 
taxonomy.  The guidelines for using the taxonomy is shown in table 2. Examples of 
reports describing type 1 versus type 2 events are shown in boxes 1 and 2, with the 
codes used to describe them.   
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Table 1.  TAPS taxonomy with results of 525 patient safety events within 415 reports. 
 
N % of total  
365 69.5 1. Errors related to the Processes of Health Care 
112 21.3  1.1. Errors in practice and health care systems 
12 2.3   1.1.1    Errors relating to incorrect patient identification  
15 2.9   1.1.2    Appointments and message handling errors   
28 5.3   1.1.3    Patient record and filing system errors  
25 4.8   1.1.4    Recall event and recall systems errors 
6 1.1   1.1.5    Computer systems errors  
6 1.1   1.1.6    Errors in the maintenance of a safe physical environment  
7 1.3   1.1.7    Errors in provision of care after hours or inadequate staff coverage 
1.1.8    Errors relating to patient confidentiality issues 3 0.6 
10 1.9   1.1.9    Practice and health care systems errors not otherwise specified 
65 12.4  1.2.  Investigation errors 
7 1.3   1.2.1    Errors relating to incorrect patient identification 
12 2.3   1.2.2    Errors in the process of requesting investigations 
1.2.3    Errors in the process of undertaking investigations  
1.2.4    Errors in reporting processes or managing investigation reports 
1.2.5    Investigation errors not otherwise specified 
9 1.7 
35 6.7 
2 0.4 
107 20.4  1.3.  Medication errors 
31 5.9   1.3.1.  Electronic prescription writing or medication charting errors 
16 3.1   1.3.2   Other prescription or medication charting errors 
38 7.2   1.3.3   Medication dispensing and delivery errors 
11 2.1   1.3.4   Patient self-administration of medication errors 
11 2.1   1.3.5   Medication errors not otherwise specified 
13 2.5  1.4.  Treatment errors (non-medication) 
11 2.1   1.4.1   Errors in the process of providing Immunisations 
1 0.2   1.4.2.  Errors in the process of undertaking procedures  
1 0.2   1.4.3.  Non-medication treatment errors not otherwise specified 
68 12.9  1.5.  Communication errors and process errors not otherwise specified 
17 3.2   1.5.1.  Errors in general communication with patients 
31 5.9   1.5.2   Hospital discharge and other hospital based communication errors  
9 1.7   1.5.3.  Errors in referral to other health care providers 
8 1.5   1.5.4   Errors in general communication with other health care providers  
3 0.6   1.5.5.  Communication and process errors not otherwise specified 
160 30.5 2.  Errors related to the Knowledge and Skills of Health Professionals 
62 11.8  2.1.  Errors in diagnosis  
2 0.4   2.1.1.  Errors in patient history taking 
11 2.1   2.1.2.  Errors in patient physical examination 
27 5.1   2.1.3.  Errors in investigations requested or their interpretation 
22 4.2   2.1.4.  Diagnosis related errors not otherwise specified 
98 18.7  2.2.  Errors in managing patient care 
57 10.9   2.2.1    Medication management errors 
2.2.2    Knowledge or skills errors in undertaking immunisations  
2.2.3    Knowledge or skills errors in undertaking procedures  
9 1.7 
13 2.5 
19 3.6   2.2.4    Errors managing care not otherwise specified 
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Table 2.  TAPS taxonomy guidelines for coding patient safety events. 
 
TAPS taxonomy guidelines for use 
5. Consider the number of ‘patient safety events’ or separate elements that 
have contributed to a report describing a threat to patient safety, and classify 
each distinct patient safety event separately if there are more than one. 
6. Consider the underlying cause to first code the event ‘type’.  Consider 
whether it should be considered as resulting from a breakdown in the 
‘processes’ around patient care (type 1), or in the knowledge or skills base 
required for any person involved in the delivery of  patient care (type 2). 
7. Next assign the second level ‘theme’ of the patient safety event, choosing the 
most specific option from those listed within the assigned event type. (that is, 
from 1.1 to 1.5 for ‘type 1’ events, or 2.1 to 2.2 for ‘type 2’ events).   
     *For type 1 events, use theme 1.5 ‘Communication errors and process errors 
       not otherwise specified’ when a more specific theme is not suitable. 
8. To complete, assign the most specific level 3 ‘descriptor’ available from 
within the second level theme chosen.  In general, these descriptors are listed 
from more specific to less specific when moving down the list.   
 
 
Box 1.  TAPS case study of a report containing a patient safety event relating to the 
processes of health care.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A patient of a general practice with a background of developmental delay, 
epilepsy and schizophrenia attended regularly but used two different 
surnames on different occasions, being both those of his divorced parents.  
The practice mistakenly held two different electronic records for him under 
these two names, which contained different medication lists.  He was 
prescribed a new medication which resulted in him becoming over-sedated, 
lethargic and depressed as a result of an interaction with a medication 
listed in the other chart, before the mistake was discovered.   
 
TAPS Code 113 
Type   Processes of health care  
Theme Errors in practice and health care systems  
Descriptor Patient record and filing system errors  
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Box 2.  TAPS case study of a report containing patient safety events relating to the 
knowledge and skills of health professionals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coder agreement from pilot to TAPS taxonomy 
The investigators coded the set of 433 reports using the pilot taxonomy,[12] and the 
final 132 reports (approximately one quarter) were coded using the TAPS taxonomy.  
The agreement amongst the three coders at each level of both the pilot and TAPS 
taxonomies, with corresponding kappa scores, are shown in table 3.  At the third level 
of the code from the pilot to the TAPS taxonomy, the proportion of reports in which at 
least two of three coders agreed rose from 74% to 92%, and the kappa score moved 
from 0.37 to 0.66. 
 
A patient with severe depression was scheduled by their General 
Practitioner (GP) to the regional psychiatric hospital. A week later he 
returned to the GP for follow-up after discharge.  The patient reported to 
the GP that he had complained of increasing pain in the chest after 
admission to the psychiatric unit, and after some delay he was sent into the 
base hospital by the psychiatric unit for a chest Xray without actually being 
physically examined. The chest Xray was normal, and after a further 3 
days he was examined by a medical officer in the psychiatric unit and 
found to have a florid shingles rash.  He was eventually sent home on 
analgesia, but antiviral management had not been appropriately instituted. 
 
TAPS Code 212, 221 (2 events identified) 
Type    Knowledge and skills of health professionals (both events) 
Theme Errors in diagnosis (event 1)  
Errors in managing patient care (event 2) 
Descriptor Errors in patient physical examination (event 1) 
Medication management errors (event 2) 
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Table 3.  The proportion of agreement amongst the three coders and kappa score at 
each level of the taxonomies, comparing the pilot to the TAPS taxonomy. 
 
Coding level Taxonomy Complete 
disagreement % 
Two of three 
coders agree % 
Compete 
agreement % 
Kappa 
score 
Level 1 
(Type) 
Pilot 2 28 70 0.59 
TAPS 0 10 90 0.82 
Level 2  
(Theme) 
Pilot 14 45 41 0.48 
TAPS 1 34 65 0.72 
Level 3 
(Descriptor) 
Pilot 26 49 25 0.37 
TAPS 8 34 58 0.66 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our proposed taxonomy builds upon pilot work which has at its primary level a 
causative classification,[11, 12] adding sub-categories to this by grouping like themes, 
and then adding detail with descriptive categories in the style of a domain specific 
taxonomy.  Application of the taxonomy to the TAPS data shows that the majority of 
reports contained a single patient safety event, and the majority of events related to 
the processes of providing health care rather than deficiencies in knowledge and skills 
of health professionals, as postulated in previous work with non-representative 
samples.[7, 9, 11, 12] 
 
The reporting GPs demonstrated a clear understanding of the definition of error used.  
[20]  Investigators found less than 1% of reports to contain no safety event.  The 
proposed seven themes adequately described all reported events.  The addition of “not 
otherwise specified” as a descriptor for each theme, unlike previous similar 
taxonomies, [5-7] allowed complete event coding, incorporating 13% of classified 
events.  This compares with 2.2% of reports in one single level UK taxonomy, [2] 
although it provided no other detail on the error type, and 20% of the ‘cause’ of 
anonymous reports using a multiaxial taxonomy in one study from the United States. 
[3]  
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The largest proportion of events were classified as relating to ‘practice and health care 
systems’ at the theme level (21%), consistent with American and UK studies,[7, 11]  
although our category is different from any in previously described taxonomies as it 
contains elements of the larger health care system rather than just ‘administrative’ 
events.  The 2002 pilot study had found a similar proportion of ‘office administration’ 
events (20%).[12]   
 
If both types 1 and 2 events are combined, ‘medication’ errors represent the largest 
proportion (31%), similar to findings in earlier Australian work.[3, 4]  The TAPS 
taxonomy allows the cause of medication errors to be considered, whether related to 
knowledge of their use (events 2.2.1), or to systems problems in their provision 
(events 1.3.1 to 1.3.5).  This may assist in planning prevention measures, such as 
education for clinicians or systems changes that would reduce electronic prescription 
errors or dispensing mistakes. 
 
Our purpose was to develop a tool that would be comprehensible to primary care 
clinicians reporting safety events.  The use of investigators with a clinical background 
in General Practice was important to produce language that would be acceptable for 
self-coding.  One other study has asked the reporting clinicians to code the events 
using a simple descriptive taxonomy.[7]  However, the study period was brief, and the 
majority of reporters were reception staff, so some event types may not have been 
captured.   
 
There are no studies with which we can compare our results on reproducibility of the 
taxonomy.  The kappa statistic and proportions in table 3 showed a marked 
improvement in agreement from the pilot to the TAPS taxonomy at all levels of the 
code.  It is possible that a degree of improvement could have occurred through an 
unconscious learning of each others styles at the taxonomy development meetings, in 
addition to improved clarity of the code itself. As expected, there was less agreement 
amongst coders comparing level 1 to 2, and level 2 to 3, due to more coding choices.   
 
At the most detailed third level of the taxonomies, complete disagreement amongst 
the coders fell from over a quarter to less than ten per cent of cases.  In the cases 
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where complete agreement was not reached, there was often a difficulty in 
interpreting the reporting language used, or a brevity of description provided in the 
report, requiring a degree of personal interpretation or assumption from the coding 
GPs.  While further refinement of the taxonomy might lessen possible ambiguity, we 
believe that a system where the reporting clinician actually codes the event would 
reduce this type of error by eliminating a loss of detail in the process of describing the 
event and its cause to another clinician or analyst conducting the coding.   
 
The taxonomy developed by the Applied Strategies for Improving Patient Safety 
(ASIPS) collaborative[15, 16] is a multiaxial model developed in a primary care 
setting, using trained analysts to classify reported events.  It has not been published in 
the peer-reviewed literature in full, however it is able to be viewed online.[24]  The 
TAPS electronic reporting system collects data of a similar nature to the additional 
axes and domains of ASIPS, including a harm scale, location check-box, event 
frequency scale, and details of patients such as age, gender and ethnicity.[20]  These 
elements are closed questions completed electronically by the reporter.  They could be 
combined with reporters self-coding an event with the TAPS taxonomy to effectively 
produce a self-reported multiaxial taxonomy describing safety events.  
 
An important limitation of our results is that they do not represent the underlying 
proportions of error types in the community, although the reporters were a 
representative sample.  Some event types may have been under-reported in 
comparison to others, despite efforts to encourage reporting.  Participants may have 
been unaware of deficits in their own knowledge or skills.  
 
The TAPS reports are a reflection of GP’s experiences, and the taxonomy was created 
by GPs.  As such, it may be limited in its application to other primary care groups.  In 
other studies, a variety of clinicians or administrative staff have been required to 
report events,[6, 7, 14-16, 25-27] and it would be important to explore language 
differences that may exist.   
 
The TAPS reports and taxonomy may not have captured all error types that could be 
reported by a more diverse group.  One other General Practice taxonomy has recently 
been shown to be acceptable to opticians reporting safety events [33].  The TAPS 
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taxonomy may similarly have potential uses to other disciplines in a community 
setting.  
 
Our purpose in this paper did not include an appraisal of error types in relation to 
harm, preventability and demographics of patients affected by threats to safety, 
however this analysis is underway.   
 
We believe that the TAPS taxonomy has the potential for use as part of an anonymous 
national electronic reporting system, and offers guidance to policy makers in directing 
efforts to reduce patient safety threats in the community, particularly at a systems 
level.  Further application of the TAPS taxonomy may also aid professional bodies 
developing educational tools aimed at improving the knowledge and skills of 
providers in primary care.    
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Appendix 8: Literature review invited by 
saferhealthcare.org.uk , website of the BMJ/National 
Patient Safety Agency, UK.  
 
This appendix shows the commissioned article for the BMJ/National Patient Safety 
Agency website www.saferhealthcare.org.uk. 
 
This article is in the style of a ‘What we know’ article, which is a peer reviewed, 2000 
word piece, entitled ‘Monitoring threats to patient safety in community settings:  a 
review of the literature.’ 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study of patient safety in community settings is recognized as a relatively under-
researched area.  A stronger emphasis on community based patient safety research is 
important because the overwhelming majority of healthcare is delivered outside 
hospitals, in community settings [1]. 
 
The types of threats to patient safety in community settings are often distinctly 
different from hospital settings due to factors such as the nature of clinical 
presentations, and the health care delivery environment.  Community care is often 
more logistically complex than hospital-based care. More than one site (not 
necessarily designed for providing healthcare) is often involved in an episode of care 
and this has implications for failures in communication, patient and information 
transfer.   
 
Promoting the ‘safety culture’ has been recognized as a key factor in enhancing 
patient safety in primary care.  Patient safety may be improved through the cultural 
change associated with an increased sensitivity to safety issues when sentinel event 
monitoring systems are established [2] [3].   
 
This review examines the peer reviewed scientific literature about patient safety event 
reporting and the measurement of threats to patient safety in community settings, 
including the methods that have been applied to collect information relating to safety 
events, the measurement and classification methods that have been used to describe 
these events, and design features of patient safety event reporting systems in the 
community. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW METHODS 
A comprehensive review of the published scientific literature was undertaken using 
OVID Medline 1966 – present.  A variety of Medical Subject Headings (MeSH terms) 
relating to patient safety, primary care and incident reporting were used, and 
additional searches of the Web of Science (general and related references) and 
Excerpta Medica (EMBASE) were undertaken.  The reference lists of selected articles 
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were scanned for any additional publications.  Literature limited to specific types of 
event reporting such as systems for adverse drug reactions was not included.  
KEY MESSAGES 
The key messages from this review are shown in box 1.  
Box 1:  Key messages in this literature review. 
 
 
MONITORING SAFETY IN THE COMMUNITY:  METHODS  
Definitions 
There is no single definition that conveys the accepted meaning of what should define 
a patient safety event in a community setting.  The literature on patient safety in 
community settings has used a range of definitions of error, around the notion of 
whether or not the reporter of an event should base their inclusion of the incident on 
whether or not a patient may have been harmed, or potentially harmed.  Various 
• Incident reporting systems are reported as the method most often applied to 
safety event data collection in community settings 
• Incident reporting systems have been trialled and are acceptable to primary 
care providers, however the National Reporting and Learning System 
established by the National Patient Safety Agency in the UK is the only 
national safety event reporting system reported in the literature as being an 
anonymous secure system accessible to health care workers in community 
settings 
• There is a large variation in definitions of ‘error’ and other related terms in 
patient safety research, and national or preferably international uniformity 
should be established to improve shared understanding of the subject 
• Taxonomies of patient safety events in community settings are of two main 
types:  ‘domain specific’ and ‘multiaxial’, and the appropriate classification 
will depend on the aims of the research, nature of the reporters and 
resources available to analyse data 
• Despite a recognized poor ‘safety culture’ in primary health care, clinician 
attitudes to safety event reporting are positive provided the reporting 
systems are non-punitive, educational, and support clinical care 
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researchers and organizations in the field have produced documents suggesting 
preferred definitions [4, 5], and shared concepts and standard definitions are a 
necessary concept for the field of patient safety to progress [6].    
 
Research Questions 
The specific type of research question being considered in a study is the most 
important factor in determining an appropriate methodology.  In the literature 
studying patient safety in community settings, the research questions fell into the 
groups shown in box 2:  
Box 2.  Research questions posed in patient safety literature in community settings.  
 
Data collection methods 
Methods used in studies in community settings that monitor patient safety events have  
predominantly used prospective event reporting, with survey designs (‘incident 
reporting systems’) [7-19].  A small number of studies have used other methods 
including interviews with health care providers [20, 21], reviews of incident reports or 
malpractice claims data [22, 23], and interviewing primary care patients [24].  Unlike 
hospital based studies, no studies in community settings using direct observation of 
incidents, review of medical records, or autopsy reports were found in the literature.  
 
MONITORING SAFETY IN THE COMMUNITY:  MEASURES 
Only seven groups of studies that propose a measure (or taxonomy) for describing 
safety events in the primary care setting were identified in the literature[11, 12, 15-17, 
24, 25].  These classifications fell into two main categories: (1) ‘multiaxial’ 
taxonomies and (2) ‘domain specific’ or more simple classifications describing a 
single element of the safety event [25].  The former incorporate a number of different 
aspects about a safety event into its coding, such as the nature of the event, associated 
• What are the types of patient safety events occurring? 
• What is the prevalence of patient safety event types occurring? 
• What are the design features of a community based patient safety event 
reporting system? 
• What are the attitudes to reporting community based patient safety events?  
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harm, patient and reporter factors, or cognitive factors in its causation.  The identified 
domain specific taxonomies focus mainly on the nature of the event in categories with 
a mixture of clinical and administrative titles. 
  
Box 3.  Features of patient safety events described by taxonomies developed in 
community settings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multi-axial taxonomies  
The taxonomy used by the Applied Strategies for Improving Patient Safety (ASIPS) 
collaborative in the United States (USA), is an example of this category of measures 
[15].  These are appropriate tools if the research question requires a detailed measure 
of a safety event at multiple levels, as when the research attempts to address the 
complexity of the underlying causation and associated features of specific event types.  
This process is carried out by specifically trained coders and analysts, following 
notification of a patient safety event by a healthcare provider or patient.  Other multi-
axial taxonomies may also be appropriate for community based settings but have not 
yet been field tested.  An example is the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) Patient Safety Event Taxonomy [26]. 
 
Domain specific taxonomies 
These most commonly describe ‘event type’ without necessarily incorporating a 
measurement of other aspects of the event such as location, provider, and associated 
harm.  Due to their simplicity, they may be more practicable for broad application in 
community settings.  They could appropriately address questions about the types of 
patient safety risks occurring in community based settings, and their quantification.  A 
less complex taxonomy, such as described in the literature relating to the Preliminary 
• Nature or descriptive type of event 
• Location of event 
• Mitigating factors associated with events 
• Outcomes of event, including patient harm 
• Patient factors, such as age, gender and ethnicity 
• Reporter factors, such as profession  
• Preventative factors relating to events 
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Taxonomy of Medical Errors in Primary Care [11], the simplified three level 
taxonomy from the International Study of Medical Errors [12], or the taxonomy 
developed in a United Kingdom (UK) general practice study [17], could be tools that 
providers of community based care access to code event types themselves.  An 
electronic event reporting system may also capture patient safety domains other than 
the causal and descriptive factors (such as a severity score, location, patient 
demographic factors, or reporter factors), which could be combined with a descriptive 
taxonomy to answer other questions about factors associated with specific event 
types. 
 
Limitations of taxonomies described 
Not all of the taxonomies in the literature proposed for community settings have been 
tested, and in those that have, there are major limitations to consider with respect to 
their validity and comprehensibility.  None of the studies attempted to test the 
reproducibility of their proposed taxonomies across different analysts or primary care 
clinicians. Of all the studies identified discussing safety events in community settings, 
only one used a representative sample [19].  Although a taxonomy developed to cross 
disciplines has been proposed [26], it also remains untested in primary care.   
 
MONITORING SAFETY IN THE COMMUNITY:  CURRENT FINDINGS 
Types of patient safety events 
Incident reporting systems are most commonly used to answer questions relating to 
types of safety events.  There were variations in the style by which reports were 
collected, including completing a paper based proforma or questionnaire[7, 10, 16, 
17], telephone reporting[18], electronic transmission of reports[12], secure web-based 
reports[8, 9, 19], or a combination of these[11, 13-15].  Reporter protections varied, 
with clinicians being anonymous[12, 19], reporting confidentially[7, 10, 25], being 
identified[16, 17], or a combination or option of these[13-15].  Some settings had 
varying legal protections in place to prevent litigation[7, 10, 18].  The profession of 
reporters also varied, so that some collections of data were by general practitioners or 
family physicians only[7, 10-12, 16, 19], while other studies used a variety of other 
community based medical, allied health, nursing, administrative and reception staff 
[13-15, 17, 18].  In addition to varying types of participants in these studies and their 
reporting options and protections, a variety of both definitions of reportable events 
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and classification systems used to describe events make the results of these studies 
difficult to combine or compare. 
 
Prevalence of safety events 
The results of studies asking questions about the prevalence of safety events using 
incident reporting were limited by the fact that reporters may not recognize safety 
events, or choose to report for a variety of reasons.  One Australian study used a 
representative random sample of General Practitioners and counted their consultations 
with patients over a twelve month period.  It was found that if an anonymous, secure, 
web-based reporting system was provided, approximately 2 errors were reported per 
1000 patients seen per year [19].  A review of a large US malpractice database over a 
five year period found that problems with high severity outcomes and death more 
often involved claims with communication between providers and early hospital 
discharge as contributing factors [23], however malpractice data represent a limited 
view of patient safety events, missing many episodes that have no association with 
insurance companies. 
 
Design features of safety event reporting systems 
Evidence of the design success of a system should be considered in terms of its ability 
to answer the research questions that it set out to address, or provide the service or 
education to clinicians for whom it was established.  To date there is little critical 
appraisal of existing reporting systems along these lines, and further evidence is 
needed before one particular style of reporting model should clearly be supported over 
another. 
 
A non-punitive approach to safety event reporting has been supported in the literature 
[27, 28].  A Danish survey of 1200 General Practitioners showed that they had a 
positive attitude towards reporting adverse events to a database if the system granted 
legal and administrative immunity to reporters [27].   
 
There is some debate over the benefit of a legally protected  and confidential method 
versus an anonymous approach to reporting, with some advocating confidential 
reporting provides more detailed data and opportunities to further explore safety 
events [14].  However the anonymous approach has been used in several studies and 
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is more likely to prevent unwanted discovery of reporter details. To date, no reports of 
a legal challenge associated with a patient safety event reporting system in primary 
care have been found, so confidential systems are untested with respect to protecting 
reporters from legal action. 
 
MONITORING SAFETY IN THE COMMUNITY:  FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Patient safety event reporting in community settings is a relatively new activity, and 
much more research is required to refine and test the reliability and validity of the 
methods and measures described in this review.  We recommend this as a priority for 
patient safety advancement.  Recent discussion in the scientific literature has 
postulated that the gap in knowledge around the rarely researched subject of patient 
error may be an important source of threat to patient safety [29].  Uniformity in 
definitions, a clear sense of the research questions being posed and other aims of a 
safety event reporting system (such as educational goals) should be clearly identified 
by researchers, and the use of guides such as those created by the WHO World 
Alliance for Patient Safety is recommended. 
 
SUMMARY 
National patient safety event reporting systems have been established in mainly 
hospital settings in several countries, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Slovenia, and Sweden [30].  Only the National Reporting and 
Learning System of England and Wales is reported in the scientific literature as 
readily accessible to all clinicians in the community setting via an anonymous secure 
website.  Overviews of its results have been published, however there have been no 
specifics of its findings in the community setting published so far [8, 9].   
 
Incident reporting systems are reported as the method most often applied to safety 
event data collection in the community setting, but large variation in definitions of 
‘error’ and other related terms in patient safety research limit attempts to combine the 
findings of these studies.  Taxonomies of patient safety events in community settings 
are mainly in developmental stages, and much further testing is required in the field.  
Community based clinician attitudes to safety event reporting are generally positive, 
provided the systems in place are non-punitive and educational, and their institution 
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on large scales would likely provide a mechanism to assist in improving the safety 
culture in community settings. 
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Appendix 9: Letter to Australian Family Physician 
arising from TAPS immunisation error 
 
This appendix is the text of a letter to the editor that was published in Australian 
Family Physician in September 2004.  It highlights the recurring error that was noted 
in relation to reconstituting the Meningococcal Group C vaccine, Menjugate, in the 
form that had been previously distributed by the state health department of NSW to 
many practices, presented in ten vial packs. 
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To the Editor: 
 
The Threats to Australian Patient Safety (TAPS) Project is an NHMRC funded study, 
in which General Practitioners make anonymous reports using a highly secure website 
concerning error events that they note in their daily practice.   
 
Data collection commenced in October 2003 with 84 participants spread across 
metropolitan, regional and rural NSW.  The methodology is based upon a pilot study 
involving six countries (1).  
 
A repeated error posing a significant potential safety threat was found to have 
occurred in the first quarter of data collection related to the administration of a type of 
Meningococcal Group C vaccine, Menjugate ten (10) vial packs.  The package 
contains five vials of powder and separate five vials of solvent.  Reports have been 
received of practice staff opening these packs, selecting the solvent vial and injecting 
it, only later to discover that there are one or more unused vials of vaccine powder left 
in the box.  We are unaware of any case reports of vaccine failure due to this problem. 
 
As a result of the TAPS reports, CSL Pharmaceutical Group was notified about this 
potential problem via the Quality Care National Standing Committee of the RACGP, 
and responded by indicating that they would distribute an information leaflet outlining 
the optimum method of preparing the vaccine. 
 
The packaging in question was discontinued in June 2003, and Menjugate has since 
been supplied in Australia as a unit dose presentation with the solvent and vaccine 
paired.  However, the existing stocks of the Menjugate ten vial pack may take some 
time to be used and replaced in the community, posing a significant public health 
issue as the implication of inadequate coverage for patients is life threatening.  In 
addition, practitioners may wish to review the records of those patients who have 
received this vaccination and ensure that it was given correctly if the serial number 
noted is only that of the solvent. 
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It is important for people administering any vaccination which uses a process of 
reconstituting a lyophilized vaccine with a separate solvent that they are aware of the 
risk of accidentally omitting to follow this procedure when the vaccine and solvent are 
supplied in bulk rather than pre-packaged in pairs. 
 
We would urge vaccine manufacturers and purchasers to consider that the financial 
savings gained from the bulk packaging of vaccines and solvents could be at the 
expense of immunization failures resulting in potentially life threatening cases of 
preventable diseases. 
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Appendix 10:  The TAPS taxonomy of error reported in 
general practice 
 
This appendix contains the TAPS taxonomy, which is the result of the work described 
in this thesis and appears in the paper entitled ‘Patient safety events reported in 
general practice:  a taxonomy’ (Appendix 7) which is in press and was accepted for 
publication on June 15th 2007 in the journal Quality and Safety in Health Care. 
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The TAPS taxonomy of error reported in general practice (Makeham, Stromer 
et al. 2007) 
1. Errors related to the Processes of Health Care 
1.1. Errors in practice and health care systems 
 1.1.1    Errors relating to incorrect patient identification  
 1.1.2    Appointments and message handling errors   
 1.1.3    Patient record and filing system errors  
 1.1.4    Recall event and recall systems errors 
 1.1.5    Computer systems errors  
 1.1.6    Errors in the maintenance of a safe physical environment  
 1.1.7    Errors in provision of care after hours or inadequate staff coverage  
1.1.8    Errors relating to patient confidentiality issues 
 1.1.9    Practice and health care systems errors not otherwise specified 
1.2.  Investigation errors 
 1.2.1    Errors relating to incorrect patient identification 
 1.2.2    Errors in the process of requesting investigations 
1.2.3    Errors in the process of undertaking investigations  
1.2.4    Errors in reporting processes or managing investigation reports 
1.2.5    Investigation errors not otherwise specified 
1.3.  Medication errors 
 1.3.1.  Electronic prescription writing or medication charting errors 
 1.3.2   Other prescription or medication charting errors 
 1.3.3   Medication dispensing and delivery errors 
 1.3.4   Patient self-administration of medication errors 
 1.3.5   Medication errors not otherwise specified 
1.4.  Treatment errors (non-medication) 
 1.4.1   Errors in the process of providing Immunisations 
 1.4.2.  Errors in the process of undertaking procedures  
 1.4.3.  Non-medication treatment errors not otherwise specified 
1.5.  Communication errors and process errors not otherwise specified 
 1.5.1.  Errors in general communication with patients 
 1.5.2   Hospital discharge and other hospital based communication errors  
 1.5.3.  Errors in referral to other health care providers 
 1.5.4   Errors in general communication with other health care providers  
 1.5.5.  Communication and process errors not otherwise specified 
2.  Errors related to the Knowledge and Skills of Health Professionals 
2.1.  Errors in diagnosis  
 2.1.1.  Errors in patient history taking 
2.1.2.  Errors in patient physical examination 
2.1.3.  Errors in investigations requested or their interpretation 
2.1.4.  Diagnosis related errors not otherwise specified 
2.2.  Errors in managing patient care 
 2.2.1   Medication management errors 
2.2.2   Knowledge or skills errors in undertaking immunisations  
2.2.3   Knowledge or skills errors in undertaking procedures  
2.2.4   Errors managing care not otherwise specified 
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